State v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 23 July 1918
• Citation: 93 Conn. 3,104 A. 653
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CAMPBELL.

104 A. 653

93 Conn. 3

STATE v. CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 23, 1918

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Donald T. Warner Judge.

Thomas J. Campbell was convicted of perjury, and appeals. Affirmed.

The case, upon the trial of which the defendant is charged with having given perjured testimony, is State v. Triplett reported in 92 Conn. 47, 101 A. 486. In that case Triplett was informed against in three counts, to wit: (1) A conspiracy to commit an assault upon the person of Dorothy A Triplett; (2) a conspiracy to commit rape upon her; and (3) an assault upon her with intent to commit rape. The circumstances attending that case and its trial are quite fully detailed in the report of it. The present defendant's testimony given upon that trial was confined to incidents connected with the scene in the bedroom in the Garde Hotel where it was claimed by the state that the conspiracies charged culminated, and the assault charged was committed by one known in that case by the name of Wilson. The particular portion of Campbell's testimony which the state in the present information charges was willfully false was that in which he testified, in substance that upon the occasion, and in the room referred to, he saw Dorothy A. Triplett undressed and in bed with a man who was then and there undressed and in bed with her.

Among the witnesses produced by the accused was one Donahue. Upon the former trial he had testified in confirmation of the evidence of Triplett and Campbell that he accompanied them in their visit to the bedroom, and that he there saw Mrs. Triplett undressed and in bed with a man who was likewise undressed and in bed with her. This evidence he had substantially repeated on his direct examination in the present case. Upon cross-examination the following ensued:

" Q. Mr. Donahue, you testified here on the last trial, did you not? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall upon that occasion when you were testifying that Mrs. Triplett was present in court? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall that the counsel for Mrs. Triplett requested Mrs. Triplett to step to the front of the witness box while you were testifying so you could identify her? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then she denounced your statement that she had been, that you were in that bedroom, did she not? Mr. Goodhart: That's objected to as improper; grossly improper. The Court: Admitted. Mr. Goodhart: Exception, please. The Court: Exception noted. Witness: She did. Q. She did? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then you replied, after the court had interrupted, to the following question, ‘ Is that the woman?’ and you said, ‘ I guess that's the woman all right.’ Is that right? A. Yes, sir."

In the course of its instructions the court charged the jury as follows:

" Upon all the questions arising in the case, except the one of the falsity of the testimony of the accused, a single witness, if his testimony satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt, will be sufficient; but upon the question of the truth or falsity of the testimony of the accused, if there was no other testimony but that of one witness against the testimony of the accused, a conviction would not be justified, for there would be merely one oath against another. But the testimony of one credible witness accompanied with proof of independent and material facts and circumstances tending directly to corroborate the testimony of the one credible witness, however, justifies a conviction, if the jury be thereby satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the falsity of the testimony of the accused, and if the jury be also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the truth of all the essential elements of the offense charged, as I have just outlined them to you."

Robert C. Stoddard, of New Haven, for appellant.

Arnon A. Alling, State's Atty., and Walter M. Pickett, Asst. State's Atty., both of New Haven, for the State.

PRENTICE, C.J. (after stating the facts as above).

Several of the reasons of appeal relate to the same general subject and involve the same general question. They grow out of the admission, over the defendant's objection, of portions of the testimony given upon the former trial which the state offered for the sole purpose of showing the materiality of the testimony given upon that trial by this accused and charged to have been perjured. The objections made to the admission of this testimony were that it was irrelevant and immaterial. That these objections-in so far, at least, as any of the former testimony was concerned which tended in any degree to establish the materiality of the claimed false testimony to the issues involved in the former case-were not well taken, is fully established by State v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 201, 206, 58 A. 715, 1 Ann. Cas. 161, where it was held that, in prosecution for perjury committed in court upon a former trial, evidence of the testimony given upon that former trial, offered for the sole purpose of showing the materiality of the alleged false testimony, was properly admissible if carefully limited by the trial judge to the purpose for which it was offered. That the testimony admitted in the present case was so offered, admitted, and limited in its purpose and use cannot be questioned and is not questioned by the accused's counsel. The court's repeated and explicit injunctions and instructions forbid that.

Counsel's contention that the court erred in admitting the testimony as it is presented in his brief is supported by three reasons. One is that the testimony admitted was not confined to what occurred in the bedroom or bore directly upon what there took place, but embraced all the testimony bearing upon the conspiracies for which conviction was sought. This claim overlooks the nature of the charges against Triplett. It is indeed true that this defendant's testimony dealt only with the occurrences in the bedroom. But however important that matter was in the determination of the case, the issue raised by the evidence concerning it was only a subordinate one. It was only incidental to the larger and ultimate issue as to the then accused's guilt of the crimes charged against him. He was charged with participation in conspiracies to commit an assault and a rape and with the commission of the assault with intent to commit rape through being an abettor. The state made no attempt to prove that he was a direct participant in an overt criminal act. It could not have claimed Triplett's conviction by reason of anything he or any one else did in that room standing by itself. If it hoped for such conviction, it was necessary that it give a far wider range to the testimony so that in some way the accused be criminally connected with what was there done to and concerning Mrs. Triplett by another hand than his. For the purpose of making that connection, all of the evidence now objected to was properly offered and admitted. It was therefore admissible in the present case under the principle established in State v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 201, 58 A. 715, 1 Ann. Cas. 161, for the purpose of showing the vital bearing of the accused's testimony upon the ultimate issue in the former case and thus establishing its materiality in the determination of the issue therein.

It may be that the materiality of his testimony would have been amply established had some portions of the testimony offered and admitted been omitted. But we...