State v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 17 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 70099,70099 |
| Citation | 875 P.2d 1010,19 Kan.App.2d 778 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Douglas C. CAMPBELL, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Although there are no specific statutes or regulations authorizing or governing the inspection of rental trucks for purposes of determining compliance with applicable motor carrier laws and regulations, the Kansas Highway Patrol, in the exercise of the State's general police power, has full authority pursuant to K.S.A. 74-2108, subject only to Fourth Amendment constraints, to inspect such vehicles to determine and enforce their compliance with applicable motor carrier laws.
2. K.S.A. 66-1,108(e)-(i) defines "motor carriers" as persons who use motor vehicles to transport persons for hire, or property sold or to be sold, in the furtherance of any commercial enterprise.
3. A person who rents a truck to haul personal belongings is not a motor carrier as defined by K.S.A. 66-1,108(e)-(i).
4. The random stop and inspection of a rental truck by a highway patrol trooper for the limited purpose of determining compliance with applicable motor carrier laws and regulations are, in the absence of neutral criteria or guidelines governing the discretion of the officer in making such stops, constitutionally impermissible under Fourth Amendment proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Jeffrey L. Shaw, Asst. Appellate Defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Tony W. Rues, Asst. Dist. Atty., Joan M. Hamilton, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., LARSON, J., and JAMES W. BOUSKA, District Judge, assigned.
Douglas C. Campbell, Jr., appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress.
After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Campbell was convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, both class A misdemeanors. He appeals, claiming the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress based upon an illegal traffic stop.
On June 17, 1992, Kansas Highway Patrol Troopers Smith and Jones stopped Campbell, who was driving a rental truck, on Interstate 70 to conduct a random spot check for compliance with state laws and regulations relating to "motor carriers." Prior to his being stopped by the troopers, Campbell had not violated any traffic laws, and the troopers did not suspect that he was involved in any illegal activities. Campbell was moving his personal belongings from Arizona to Michigan. After checking the truck rental papers, Smith determined that Campbell was not violating any laws relating to motor carriers. After returning Campbell's license, rental papers, and truck inspection form, Smith told Campbell that his documentation was proper.
Then, according to the State's evidence, Campbell was told by Smith that he was free to leave. This is disputed by Campbell. Campbell contended Smith then asked him if he would answer some questions, and Campbell agreed. Smith asked Campbell if he was hauling drugs, weapons, contraband, or large sums of money. Campbell stated he was carrying some guns in the truck. Smith asked if he could check the serial numbers on the guns. Campbell agreed and opened the truck for Smith. While Smith was retrieving the guns, he found a small amount of marijuana and a bong.
Campbell moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the traffic stop constituted an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment. After a hearing, the trial court denied Campbell's motion to suppress.
Our standard of review requires us to uphold a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, Syl. p 4, 853 P.2d 34 (1993). The trial court's findings are not in dispute here. Because Campbell appeals from the legal conclusion of the trial court that the random traffic stop employed by the highway patrol troopers was authorized by Kansas statutes and was permitted by the Fourth Amendment, our review of this matter is unlimited. See State v. Dorsey, 13 Kan.App.2d 286, 287, 769 P.2d 38, rev. denied, 244 Kan. 739 (1989).
Campbell relies primarily upon Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), in which it was held that law enforcement officers, acting on their own, could not constitutionally stop automobiles to determine if drivers were licensed or automobiles registered unless the stop was accompanied by an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the drivers were unlicensed or the automobiles unregistered or otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law. 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. The Court indicated that alternative methods of conducting spot checks for this purpose may be constitutional, provided they do not involve the "unconstrained exercise of discretion" of the officers in the field. 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. The Court, however, qualified its holding in a footnote: "Nor does our holding today cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." 440 U.S. at 663 n. 26, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 n. 26.
The trial court relied on two Kansas cases which upheld the constitutionality of spot checks for ensuring compliance with motor carrier laws. In the first case, State v. Williams, 8 Kan.App.2d 14, 648 P.2d 1156, rev. denied 231 Kan. 802 (1982), we found specific statutory authority for such stops in K.S.A. 74-2108(b), which states:
"[T]he superintendent and members of the Kansas highway patrol are hereby authorized and directed to execute and enforce the laws of this state relating to public and private motor carriers of passengers or property, including any rules and regulations relating to such laws, and shall have the power and authority to require the driver of any motor vehicle owned or operated by any such carrier to stop and submit such vehicle to an inspection to determine compliance with such laws and rules and regulations."
Although we acknowledged Prouse, we considered the random stop of a motor carrier distinguishable from the automobile stop that was at issue in Prouse. In comparing a stop of a motor carrier to a permissible regulatory search of a mine operator in a pervasively regulated business, we quoted Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981):
8 Kan.App.2d at 19, 648 P.2d 1156.
Because we considered motor carriers in Kansas to be a pervasively regulated industry, we upheld the constitutionality of the spot checks authorized by K.S.A. 74-2108(b). We, however, confined the scope of such searches to determining if there was compliance with the law and the rules and regulations furnished to and known by the commercial business being inspected. 8 Kan.App.2d at 22, 648 P.2d 1156.
In the second case, State v. Moore, 237 Kan. 523, 701 P.2d 684 (1985), our Kansas Supreme Court considered a similar claim by two defendants who were convicted of driving overweight vehicles in violation of K.S.A. 8-1908. The Department of Revenue had set up temporary scales outside a landfill and required all private trash haulers to submit to a weighing. Defendants were given overweight tickets and were later convicted. The court, in approving the Williams holding, stated: "When the driver of a motor carrier operates on a public highway per se he does so with the knowledge that his property will be inspected from time to time." 237 Kan. at 528, 701 P.2d 684. The court concluded that "designated agents of the Kansas Department of Revenue have the authority to stop motor carriers for spot checks as to their compliance with weight limitations provided under K.S.A.1984 Supp. 8-1908 without prior knowledge that a violation exists." 237 Kan. at 529, 701 P.2d 684.
Turning our attention to this case, we find extensive regulation of Kansas motor carriers arises from statutes and regulations. See K.S.A. 66-1,105 et seq.; K.S.A. 66-1302 et seq.; K.A.R. 82-4-1 et seq. K.S.A. 66-1324 and K.A.R. 82-4-2 have both been cited as authority for permitting the random stop of the rental truck in this case.
K.S.A. 66-1324 relates to the operation of motor carrier inspection stations. The last paragraph of the statute states:
"Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the superintendent of the highway patrol or any member of the state highway patrol from stopping any or all motor carriers, trucks or truck tractors for the purpose of conducting spot checks to insure compliance with any state law relating to the regulation of motor carriers, trucks or truck tractors...."
K.A.R. 82-4-2 reads as follows:
The quoted ...
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