State v. Campbell, No. A08-0218.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. A08-0218.
• Citation: 756 N.W.2d 263
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Timothy Alan CAMPBELL, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

756 N.W.2d 263

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Timothy Alan CAMPBELL, Respondent.

No. A08-0218.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

September 30, 2008.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Jennifer J. Hasbargen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Charles A. Ramsay & Assoc., P.L.L.C., Roseville, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge; MINGE, Judge; and MUEHLBERG, Judge.^*

OPINION

MINGE, Judge.

Appellant State of Minnesota challenges a district court decision (a) finding Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1) (2002), unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondent; and (b) dismissing charges against respondent for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Respondent argues that if we conclude the statute is constitutional, we should apply the rule of lenity and construe the statute narrowly so as not to apply to respondent's conduct. Because we conclude that the statute is constitutional and that application of the rule of lenity is not appropriate, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

This case arises from appellant State of Minnesota's prosecution of respondent Timothy Alan Campbell for violations of Minn.Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1) (2002),¹ which criminalizes the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Respondent, a former investigator in the financial crimes unit of the Duluth Police Department, was the younger son of L.C., the vulnerable adult. L.C. was a longtime resident of Duluth. She died November 7, 2004. L.C.'s older son and only other child is Scott Campbell, who also served as a Duluth police officer.

L.C. began having cognitive difficulties in 2002 and was diagnosed with dementia, likely Alzheimer's, following a hospitalization in November 2002. After this diagnosis, L.C. briefly lived with Scott Campbell. Scott had been her attorney-in-fact pursuant to a power of attorney (POA) executed in 1998. In early 2003, L.C.'s psychiatrist urged the family to arrange for her to live in an assisted-living facility or nursing home. L.C. had worked as a nurse in such facilities for much of her career and opposed such a move. Suspecting Scott of being a proponent of such a change, on January 20, 2003, L.C. revoked Scott's status as attorney-in-fact.

On February 6, 2003, L.C. opened new joint checking and savings accounts with respondent and transferred all of her money into those accounts. There is no claim that respondent contributed anything to the accounts. On February 17, 2003, respondent brought L.C. to an attorney for preparation of a new POA, appointing respondent as L.C.'s attorney-in-fact. On March 24, 2003, L.C. executed the new POA, which allowed self-gifting. The law office that prepared the POA sent respondent a letter outlining his obligations as attorney-in-fact, but held the POA until September 3, 2004, when respondent obtained a copy.

The state introduced evidence that, between February 2003 and September 2004, respondent exhausted the joint accounts. The state also introduced evidence that, within ten days after respondent received a copy of the POA appointing him attorney-in-fact for his mother, respondent closed the joint savings account and withdrew $18,048.48 from the joint checking account for his use. Respondent's defense at trial was that L.C. consented to the criticized withdrawals, that a significant portion of the money was used to build an addition to his home that included a living space which L.C. would have used had her health allowed, that all of L.C.'s expenses were otherwise paid, and that as the only other person on the joint accounts he would succeed to any remaining balances upon L.C.'s death.

In September 2004, Scott Campbell became aware of the depletion of L.C.'s accounts. Scott brought the matter to the attention of the Duluth Police Department and filed a vulnerable-adult report with social services. Toward the end of September 2004, Scott brought L.C. to an attorney, where she revoked the POA naming respondent attorney-in-fact and executed a new POA reappointing Scott. Scott took steps to establish a guardianship or conservatorship for L.C., but L.C.'s November 7 death occurred before the process was completed.

After L.C.'s death, there was a criminal investigation into respondent's actions regarding L.C.'s finances. Scott Campbell was involved with the investigation and referred a Duluth police officer working on the case to the Minnesota Attorney General's office. The Attorney General's office subsequently investigated and ultimately charged respondent with three counts of theft by false representation and three counts of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1).

A jury trial was held. During the trial, respondent moved to dismiss the financial-exploitation charges on the ground that Minn.Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1) is unconstitutional. The district court reserved ruling on the motion until the conclusion of the jury trial. After the prosecution rested, the district court dismissed the three counts of theft by false representation, leaving the three counts of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult to go to the jury for a verdict. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on those charges, and the district court declared a mistrial. Following the mistrial, the district court requested briefing on the constitutional issue. The district court found that the challenged provision is unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondent and dismissed the vulnerable adult charges against him. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by ruling that Minn.Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1) (2002) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondent's expenditure of funds from joint accounts established by his mother?

II. Is application of the rule of lenity appropriate to narrow the reach of Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1) (2002) so as not to cover respondent's conduct?

ANALYSIS

I.

The posture of this case is that there has been a jury trial, the jury deadlocked, the case was expected to be retried, and before retrial, the district court ruled the applicable statute unconstitutional. Thus, what was a posttrial determination has become a pretrial order barring the state from retrying the case. In effect, this appeal is from a pretrial order, and as such, the state must (1) establish clearly and unequivocally that the district court's order will have a critical impact on the state's ability to prosecute respondent successfully; and (2) show that the district court erred. State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn.1987); see also Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(1).

Because the district court's constitutional ruling has resulted in dismissal, the ruling clearly has a critical impact on the state's case, and the first requirement is met. See State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Minn.1997) (stating that the dismissal of a charge following suppression of all the evidence clearly meets the critical impact element). The second requirement presents the crucial question: Did the district court err by ruling that the challenged provision was unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondent's conduct? Constitutional challenges are questions of law, which we review de novo. State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.2007). In conducting this review, we recognize that "Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional, and our power to declare a statute unconstitutional [is] exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989).

The state argues that the district court erred by concluding that Minn.Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. The statute provides:

Subdivision 1. Crime. Whoever does any of the following commits the crime of financial exploitation:

(1) in breach of a fiduciary obligation recognized elsewhere in the law, including pertinent regulations, contractual obligations, documented consent by a competent person, or the obligations of a responsible party under section 144.6501 intentionally fails to use the financial resources of the vulnerable adult to provide food, clothing, shelter, health care, therapeutic conduct, or supervision for the vulnerable adult.

Minn.Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1).

"The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a legislative enactment define a criminal offense with sufficient definiteness and certainty that `ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State, City of Minneapolis v. Reha, 483 N.W.2d 688, 690-91 (Minn.1992) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). Statutes imposing criminal penalties require a higher standard of certainty. Id. at 691. However, "the vagueness doctrine is based in fairness and is not designed to `convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.'" Id. (quoting Colten v. Ky., 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). We do not expect mathematical certainty from the English language, and a statute that is flexible and reasonably broad will be upheld if it is clear what the statute, as a whole, prohibits. Id. Furthermore, although there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls, that difficulty does not provide sufficient reason to hold the challenged language too vague to define a criminal offense. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn.1992).

We note that our scrutiny is more demanding when a defendant challenges a statute implicating fundamental constitutionally...