State v. Canedy

• Decision Date: 09 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-2132-CR,89-2132-CR
• Citation: 161 Wis.2d 565,469 N.W.2d 163
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. David CANEDY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 163

469 N.W.2d 163

161 Wis.2d 565

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. David CANEDY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-2132-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 27, 1991.

Decided May 9, 1991.

Thomas J. Balistreri, Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald J. Hanaway, Atty. Gen., on briefs, for plaintiff-respondent-petitioner.

Glenn L. Cushing, Asst. State Public Defender, on briefs, for defendant-appellant.

DAY, Justice.

This is a review of an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for Rock County, Honorable J. Richard Long, presiding. The circuit court denied defendant David Canedy's motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea to a charge of endangering safety by conduct regardless of life. It found that Canedy knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea and understood the nature and elements of the charge against him. Therefore, the circuit court held that Canedy failed to meet his burden of presenting a fair and just reason for setting aside his plea. The court of appeals reversed. It held that Canedy's "plausible" explanation of his confusion when he pled guilty and his assertion of innocence constituted a fair and just reason to allow him to withdraw his plea.

The issue on review is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Canedy's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because of Canedy's claim that at the time he entered the plea Canedy did not have a good recollection of the facts which were a basis of the charge and he misunderstood an element of the charge. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Canedy's motion to withdraw his plea. We therefore reverse the court of appeals.

On December 29, 1988, Canedy was charged as a habitual criminal with endangering safety by conduct regardless of life, while armed, contrary to secs. 941.30 [161 Wis.2d 568] and 939.63, Stats. 1985-86 ¹ and resisting an officer, contrary to sec. 946.41(1), Stats. 1985-86. ² The charges stemmed from allegations that on December 27, 1988, Canedy, in the presence of police officers, held a knife to his wife's chest and threatened to cut her throat. In his struggle with his wife he cut her hand.

At the arraignment, on February 6, 1989, Canedy stood mute to the charges against him, and the court entered pleas of not guilty.

On March 23, 1989, Canedy entered into a plea agreement. He pled guilty to the charge of endangering safety, and the prosecutor withdrew the charge of resisting an officer and the repeater allegations. In conjunction with the plea, Canedy told the court that he was thirty-four years old; that he completed three years of college; that he had never been committed to a mental institution and was not suffering from any mental illness; and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

The court informed Canedy of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The court then inquired whether Canedy's plea was voluntary and was assured by the defendant that it was. The court then questioned defendant's attorney:

THE COURT: Mr. Sanborn, are you satisfied that the defendant's plea of guilty in this case is not the result of any force or coercion of any kind that's been used upon him?

MR. SANBORN: Yes, I'm so satisfied.

THE COURT: Are you also satisfied that his plea of guilty is made knowingly by him and voluntarily by him?

MR. SANBORN: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Are you also satisfied as his attorney that it is in his best interests that he does enter a plea of guilty to this charge?

MR. SANBORN: Yes, I think so.

(Transcript of Proceedings, March 23, 1989, p. 16).

Then the prosecutor, at the request of the court, summarized the facts which he was prepared to prove at trial:

THE COURT: Mr. Dumke, had this matter gone to trial, what would the State have been prepared to prove?

MR. DUMKE: Your Honor, Officers Dunkin and Pittman report that on December 27, 1988, shortly after midnight, they and other officers went to the Canedy residence at 115 Merrill in the City of Beloit, County of Rock and State of Wisconsin. The officers were informed that David Canedy had cut his wife, Sandy Canedy. Upon their arrival, they knocked repeatedly on the door but got no answer. They continually knocked. Finally the door was opened and Sandy Canedy appeared. The officers observed David Canedy come up behind Sandy Canedy with his right hand behind his back. When he reached her, he grabbed her around the neck and told the police that if they come any closer, he would kill Sandy. Sandy tried to get away and there was a scuffle with the knife. The knife was pointed at Sandy's chest with the pointed tip facing her chest. The officers drew weapons and told him to drop his--drop the knife. He refused to do so, told the officers to back off or he would cut her throat. At that period of time a struggle ensued. Sandy attempted to get away from David. Officer Pittman joined the scuffle. He continually struck Mr. Canedy with his baton trying to make him release Sandy or his grip on the knife. Eventually Sandy slipped from David's grasp, but he then grabbed her by the hair and held on to her and continued to struggle with the officers. Sandy indicated to the officers that they had been arguing--both Sandy and David Canedy had been arguing in the residence. He pulled out a knife and told her, it's all over, and that was sort of the straw that broke the camel's back. He then poked her in the arm with the knife and the struggle then ensued in which her hand was cut.

Id. at 16-17. Canedy did not deny any of the facts the State said it was prepared to prove. The court explained the charge against Canedy:

THE COURT: First, there are three elements to this offense.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: First, that your conduct was imminently dangerous to another.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: And you stop me if I go too fast.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: The first element of this offense requires that your conduct was imminently dangerous to another, that is, conduct dangerous in and of itself. It must have been conduct inherently and consciously dangerous to life and not such as might casually produce death by misadventure. That's the first element of the offense. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do understand up to the part where you said consciously doing this, I guess. That's what--

THE COURT: Well, it must be conduct inherently and consciously dangerous to life.

THE DEFENDANT: That--

THE COURT: In other words, it must be conduct that was in and of itself dangerous to the life of another person.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: All right. And the second element of this offense requires that your conduct was of such a character that it evinced a depraved mind regardless of human life. ³ Depraved mind regardless of human life does not mean that your mind must have been diseased or that you must have had a mental disorder generally described as insanity or feeblemindedness. The depravity of mind referred to exists when the conduct endangering the safety of the other demonstrated an utter lack of concern for the life and safety of the other and for which conduct there is no justification or excuse. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And the third element of the offense requires that your conduct actually endangered the safety of the other by conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing depraved mind regardless of human life. Now, realizing that those are the three elements of this offense, do you still wish to enter a plea of guilty to this charge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Very well. Based upon the statements made to me by the Court, [sic] by Mr. Dumke, I find that there is a factual basis for the defendant's plea of guilty, and I also find from the statements of the defendant, and upon his plea of guilty, I will adjudge that he is guilty of the offense of endangering another's safety while armed, contrary to the provisions of Sections 941.30 and 939.63 of the Wisconsin Statutes, that offense having occurred on the 27th day of December, 1988, as alleged in Count 1 of the Information dated January 17th, 1989.

MR. SANBORN: Your Honor, may I make a statement here?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SANBORN: I don't know when the appropriate time is. I want this clear that this is David's decision to enter this plea. I know his wife does not want him to. She disagrees with his decision. She's here now today in the courtroom and--

THE COURT: Well, this is David's decision.

MR. SANBORN: No, no, I understand that but I--

THE COURT: And I've asked him whether or not this is being freely and voluntarily done.

MR. SANBORN: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: And I understand your answer to that is that this is your plea of guilty and you are doing it of your own free will and you are doing it freely and voluntarily; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, It was.

THE COURT: Very well. Then I think that's satisfactory. Is there anything else you want to say in that regard?

MR. SANBORN: I just--We've discussed this many times and I haven't urged him either way. I've told him that--that I felt that he probably would be found guilty, and I think that's a factor in his decision, but I don't know what would happen at trial.

THE COURT: Well--

MR. SANBORN: And I feel uncomfortable with this and--But I just want him to make up his own mind.

THE COURT: Well, my understanding is, Mr. Canedy, that you are 34 years of age, you've had 3 years of college, and that you are doing this freely and voluntarily and this is your plea and you wish to plead guilty to this charge.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And I've explained the charge to you and you understand that charge to which you're pleading guilty, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Very well. Based upon the record then, I have adjudged him guilty of this offense, and based upon the motion of the State, I will dismiss the habitual criminality...