State v. Cantrell (Ex parte State)
| Decision Date | 20 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | CR-18-0536 |
| Citation | 295 So.3d 140 |
| Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama (In re: STATE of Alabama v. Jarod Chase CANTRELL) |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Henry N. Cook, deputy dist. atty., 25th Judicial Circuit, Double Springs, for petitioner.
Stella J. Wennberg of Wennberg Law Firm, LLC, Winfield, for respondent.
J. Patrick Lamb, gen. counsel, Alabama District Attorneys Association, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama District Attorneys Association.
The State of Alabama filed this petition for a writ of mandamus requesting this Court to direct Judge Talmage Lee Carter to set aside that portion of his order of February 27, 2019, dismissing with prejudice the indictment against Jarod Chase Cantrell. We dismiss the State's petition.
On May 23, 2017, the Winston County grand jury returned a 12-count indictment against Cantrell. Cantrell faced three counts of second-degree rape, see § 13A-6-62, Ala. Code 1975, three counts of second-degree sodomy, see § 13A-6-64, Ala. Code 1975, three counts of being a school employee who engaged in a sex act with a student under the age of 19 years, see § 13A-6-81, Ala. Code 1975, and three counts of third-degree burglary, see § 13A-7-7, Ala. Code 1975. Cantrell's charges arose from allegations that he, a teacher, had engaged in sexual acts with K.E.B., a 15-year-old student.
On February 18, 2019, Judge Carter granted two of Cantrell's pretrial motions that are relevant to the State's petition. First, Judge Carter granted Cantrell's motion in limine asking the trial court to restrict the State's witnesses from using the words "rape" and "sodomy." Second, Judge Carter granted Cantrell's motion to suppress a statement he had given to Double Springs Chief of Police Kim Miller on February 27, 2017, following his arrest.1 Judge Carter made the following findings in support of his judgment:
(State's petition, Exhibit F.)
Cantrell's trial began the next day. Officer Tim Hale of the Double Springs Police Department testified during the State's case-in-chief. On direct examination, Officer Hale was asked how he had become involved in the case. Officer Hale responded: "[Chief Miller] called and stated that I needed to get out to [Ca.B.] and [Ch.B.]'s house, that their daughter had been raped." (State's petition, Exhibit H.) Defense counsel objected and asked for a curative instruction. The prosecutor, who expressed surprise at Officer Hale's testimony, stated that he had informed the victim and her parents about the court's prohibition but had failed to discuss the issue with other witnesses. The prosecutor suggested that Officer Hale's offending statement be stricken. Judge Carter struck the answer from the record and issued a lengthy curative instruction to the jury.
The trial progressed, and the State completed its case-in-chief. Cantrell elected to testify in his own defense. During the direct examination of Cantrell, defense counsel asked Cantrell if he had ever climbed through the victim's window. (State's petition, Exhibit I at 41.) Cantrell denied having done so. (State's petition, Exhibit I at 41.) This testimony, however, conflicted with a statement Cantrell had made to Chief Miller following his arrest. During the State's cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to impeach Cantrell based on his conflicting statements:
(State's petition, Exhibit I at 63-64.) Defense counsel objected to the question and moved for a mistrial. The prosecutor argued that, pursuant to the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), "voluntary statements taken in violation of Fifth Amendment prophylactic rules, while inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, may nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's conflicting testimony." Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). The State's argument was abruptly ended by Judge Carter, who stated, (States's petition, Exhibit I at 68-69.) When trial resumed, Judge Carter stated: (States's petition, Exhibit I at 69.)
On February 22, 2019, Judge Carter issued the following bench order: "February 21, 2019: This day came the District Attorney and the Defendant with counsel, ... and the trial resumed and concluded; Defense Motion for Mistrial granted." (State's petition, Exhibit K.) On February 27, 2019, Judge Carter amended his order to state: (State's petition, Exhibit L.) The State timely filed the instant petition asserting that Judge Carter lacked authority to dismiss the indictment against Cantrell with prejudice. This Court offered the respondents an opportunity to answer the allegations in the State's petition. Cantrell filed an answer, and this Court has considered his response.
In its petition, the State asserts that Judge Carter lacked the authority to sua sponte dismiss with prejudice the indictment against Cantrell.3 By dismissing the indictment against Cantrell with prejudice, Judge Carter's order purports to bar the Winston County District Attorney from re-indicting Cantrell on the 12 charges contained in the indictment. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary 570 (10th ed. 2014) ( that the dismissal of a case with prejudice "remove[s] [the case] from the court's docket in such a way that the plaintiff is foreclosed from filing a suit again on the same claim or claims").
Initially, this Court must address whether there is any relief that can be granted. Cantrell's answer asserts, in part, that the issue before this Court is now moot because no stay has been granted in this case.
The Alabama Supreme Court has held that "[t]he filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus against a trial judge does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, stay the case, or toll the running of any period for obeying an order or perfecting a filing in the case." State v. Webber, 892 So. 2d 869, 871 (Ala. 2004) (). Instead, "[t]he petition for a writ of mandamus, if meritorious, merely prompts the appellate court to exercise its supervisory power to tell the trial judge, as an official, as distinguished from the trial court itself, to do his or her duty when that duty is so clear that there are no two ways about it." Webber, 892 So. 2d at 871 (citing Ex parte Little, 837 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 2002) ). Thus, in the absence of a stay, a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify or vacate its order after 30 days, and the issue before the appellate court becomes moot. Webber, 892 So. 2d at 870-71. See also Ex parte Denson, 57 So. 3d 195, 198 (Ala. 2010) ().
In the circuit court, the State moved for a stay, but that motion was denied. (State's petition, Exhibit N.) Contemporaneous with the filing in this Court of its petition for writ of mandamus, the State filed a motion to stay. This Court, however, did not rule on the motion for a stay; consequently, the circuit court no longer has jurisdiction over Cantrell's case. Because the circuit court no longer has jurisdiction over Cantrell's case, this Court has "lost all possibility of acquiring appellate jurisdiction to remand the case for the trial court's judgment to be vacated." Ex parte Denson, 57 So. 3d at 198. Accordingly, the State's petition is due to be dismissed. Id.
In dismissing this petition, we note that " ‘the denial [of a petition for a writ of mandamus] does not operate as a binding decision on the merits’ " and " ‘does not have res judicata effect.’ " Ex parte Shelton, 814 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 2001) (citations omitted).
PETITION DISMISSED.
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