State v. Caplinger
Decision Date | 04 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-CA-850,94-CA-850 |
Citation | 105 Ohio App.3d 567,664 N.E.2d 959 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CAPLINGER, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Rocky A. Coss, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, for appellee.
Hapner & Hapner and John H. Hapner, Hillsboro, for appellant.
This is a delayed appeal of a judgment of the Highland County Court of Common Pleas sentencing appellant, Martin Caplinger, to an indeterminate prison term of five to ten years for a violation of R.C. 2903.06(A), aggravated vehicular homicide.
Appellant assigns three errors for our review:
On May 7, 1992, appellant, Martin Caplinger, was the driver of an automobile involved in a single-car accident which resulted in the death of his passenger. Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.
Subsequently, Caplinger was indicted by the Highland County grand jury on four separate counts:
"COUNT ONE: Aggravated Vehicular Homicide, with physical harm specification, in violation of Section 2903.06(A) ORC, a fourth degree felony; COUNT TWO: Involuntary Manslaughter, in violation of Section 2904.03 ORC, an aggravated felony of the third degree; COUNT THREE: Operating a Motor Vehicle Without Reasonable Control, in violation of Section 4511.202, a minor misdemeanor, and COUNT FOUR: Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence, in violation of Section 4511.19(A)(1) ORC, a first degree misdemeanor."
The indictment incorrectly indicated that count one, aggravated vehicular homicide, with a physical harm specification, was a fourth degree felony; R.C. 2903.06(B) states that appellant's violation of R.C. 2903.06(A) was a third degree felony. After the indictment, a warrant, listing count one as a fourth degree felony, was issued for appellant's arrest. Appellant pled not guilty to all counts and his plea appears in the trial court's journal entry listing count one as a fourth degree felony.
Appellant and the state engaged in plea bargaining. At a change of plea hearing, both the court and the prosecutor informed appellant that count one was a fourth degree felony. At the change of plea hearing, the court also informed appellant of the minimum and maximum penalties for a fourth degree felony, stating that the penalty for count one would be "either a year-and-a-half, two, two-and-a-half or three years, up to five years." The prosecutor made a similar statement. The relevant portions of the plea bargain required appellant to plead guilty to counts one and four of the indictment in exchange for the state's dismissal of counts two and three. The court approved the plea bargain, accepted appellant's guilty pleas to counts one and four, and ordered a presentence investigation. The trial court's entry journalizing the plea agreement and appellant's change of plea refers to count one of the indictment as a fourth degree felony.
Several months later at the sentencing hearing, the court correctly referred to count one in the indictment as a third degree felony, and sentenced appellant to an indefinite term of five to ten years of imprisonment on that count. No objection was raised by appellant.
After serving almost two years of his sentence, appellant filed a motion for supershock probation, which was denied. Appellant then filed a motion for a delayed appeal with this court, which we granted on December 27, 1994. 1
Appellant's first assignment of error asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to indicate to him the maximum sentence for the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide with a physical harm specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A).
Because appellant did not raise an objection at sentencing to the error in the indictment and the trial court's compounding of that mistake, he has potentially waived the issue on appeal. State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 22 OBR 199, 201-202, 489 N.E.2d 277, 278-279. In order for this court to afford appellant any relief upon his appeal, the impropriety which he contests must rise to the level of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B). Notice of plain error is to be taken with utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus. The plain error doctrine permits correction of judicial proceedings when error is clearly apparent on the face of the record and is prejudicial to the appellant.
As stated above, aggravated vehicular homicide with a physical harm specification is a third degree felony, the maximum prison sentence for which is ten years. R.C. 2929.11. Both the court and the prosecutor informed appellant that aggravated vehicular homicide was a fourth degree felony, carrying a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment. Appellant asserts that by neglecting to inform him of the maximum sentence for aggravated vehicular homicide, the trial court violated Crim.R. 11(C), 2 and that had he known that the maximum penalty for aggravated vehicular homicide was ten years of imprisonment, he would not have pleaded guilty. Rather, appellant contends that he would have elected to go to trial, forcing the state to prove its case against him beyond a reasonable doubt.
The portion of Crim.R. 11(C) at issue here is Crim.R. 11(C)(2), which states:
In addition to the constitutional requirements set forth in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, Crim.R. 11 also requires trial courts to make additional inquiries of and determinations regarding criminal defendants entering guilty pleas. We direct our attention to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) which required the trial court to inform appellant of the maximum sentence which he could face.
Ohio courts have determined that although literal compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) is preferred, it is not an absolute requirement. Rather, the trial court's actions will be reviewed for "substantial compliance" with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Johnson (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 532 N.E.2d 1295, 1298; State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474, 476-477. "Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving." State v. Carter (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 38, 14 O.O.3d 199, 201, 396 N.E.2d 757, 759-760; Nero, supra, at 108, 564 N.E.2d at 476, citing State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 5 O.O.3d 52, 364 N.E.2d 1163. In other words, if it appears from the record that the defendant appreciated the effect of his plea and his waiver of rights in spite of the trial court's error, there is still substantial compliance. Nero, supra, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108-109, 564 N.E.2d at 476-477. Furthermore, an appellant who challenges his plea on the basis that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect. Nero, supra, citing Stewart, supra, at 93, 5 O.O.3d at 56, 364 N.E.2d at 1167; Crim.R. 52(A). The test is whether the plea would have otherwise been made. Stewart, supra, at 93, 5 O.O.3d at 56, 364 N.E.2d at 1167.
In general, the failure of a trial court to properly inform a defendant of the maximum penalty applicable to his offense is reversible error. State v. Gibson (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 146, 146-148, 517 N.E.2d 990, 991-992. In State v. Calvillo (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 714, 603 N.E.2d 325, the trial court incorrectly stated the maximum penalties for the crimes charged in two separate counts of the...
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