State v. Carbon County

• Decision Date: 09 March 1911
• Docket Number: 2220
• Citation: 38 Utah 563,114 P. 522
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HORSLEY v. CARBON COUNTY et al

114 P. 522

38 Utah 563

STATE ex rel. HORSLEY v. CARBON COUNTY et al

No. 2220

Supreme Court of Utah

March 9, 1911

Application by the State of Utah on the relation of A. W Horsley, for prohibition against Carbon County and others.

WRIT DENIED.

C. C McWhinney and G. Iverson for plaintiff.

D. D Houtz for defendants.

STRAUP, J. FRICK, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

STRAUP, J.

The relator applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the county commissioners of Carbon County from issuing and negotiating certain bonds voted for at a special election. It is claimed that the commissioners are unauthorized to issue or negotiate the bonds for the reasons that the notice of election was insufficient, and that two purposes for which the indebtedness is to be created were stated and no opportunity given the voters to vote separately upon them. In support of the first, it is contended that the published notice of the election was bad because the polling places of the voting districts were not designated in that notice. Such a question was decided against the relator's contention in the case of State ex rel. v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 25, 99 P. 255.

In support of the second, it is urged that two purposes for the proposed indebtedness were stated, and for that reason it was essential to submit, to the voters, the propositions to create the indebtedness, in such manner as that the voters could vote separately upon them. The statute (Comp. Laws 1907, section 518) provides that: "The board shall by order specify the particular purpose for which the indebtedness is to be created, and the amount of bonds which it is proposed to issue; and shall further provide for submitting the question of the issue of said bonds to the qualified electors of the county," etc. The purpose of the proposed indebtedness, in the order or resolution of the board of the county commissioners, and in the notice of the election, was stated to be "for the purpose of voting bonds in the sum of thirty thousand dollars as follows: Twenty-five thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of bridges in course of construction in Carbon County," naming and describing three bridges, the places and streams at and over which they are building, "and for permanent bridges and culverts over the following streams in said county," naming and describing nine bridges and five culverts, the places of their proposed construction, and the streams over and at which they are intended to be built, "and five thousand dollars for the purpose of completing, improving and repairing the county road through Castle Gate, running through Helper, Spring Glen, Carbonville, Price, Wellington, and thence to Sunnyside." It is said that the stated purpose is double because of the statement that twenty-five thousand dollars of the created indebtedness is to be used to build bridges and culverts, and five thousand dollars to build and repair roads. This, it is claimed, stated two distinct and separate objects or purposes, and proposed two separate and distinct appropriations for them.

If the relator is right in his contention, then, it may be assumed the commissioners were required to submit to the voters the proposition of creating the indebtedness in such manner as to give the voters an opportunity to vote separately upon such objects or purposes. It is conceded that no such opportunity was afforded them. The proposition was submitted in such manner as that the voter in voting upon it was compelled to vote for or against the whole of it. As submitted he could not vote for bonds for bridges and against bonds for roads, or for roads and against bridges. Under our statute, as under most statutes, the "particular purpose" was required to be stated. In the case of McMahon v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Cal. 214, a notice in which the stated purpose was the "construction and improving of the highways in said township, for building bridges," and improving two roads named and specified, was held bad because too general. It was there said that "the specific object as contradistinguished from the general purpose for which the money is to be expended" was required to be stated. In the case in hand it cannot well be said that the purpose stated in the notice was too general for the particular bridges to be completed and those to be constructed, and the roads to be built, were specified and particularly described. The notice was sufficiently definite in that particular. It readily conveyed to the voter the information of the particular bridges and roads...