State v. Carlisle
| Decision Date | 23 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 55820,55820 |
| Citation | 315 So.2d 675 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. John W. CARLISLE. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Michael S. Ingram, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant, John W. Carlisle, was arrested on June 30, 1974, and charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating beverages. Thereafter, the State of Louisiana filed a bill of information charging the defendant with driving while intoxicated as a third offender under La.R.S. 14:98, based upon two prior convictions for the same offense. The bill of information sets forth that Carlisle was first convicted on December 6, 1972, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $400.00 and costs, or, in default, to serve eighty-five days in jail; and, on March 15, 1974, he was convicted as a second offender and sentenced to pay a fine of $300.00 and costs, or, in default, to serve sixty days in jail, and to serve six months imprisonment, which sentence was corrected on May 1, 1974, to six months imprisonment in the multi-parish prison with credit for time served. Defendant was tried by a jury and found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor. Upon appeal of his conviction and sentence to this Court, he relies upon two assignments of errors. A third assignment of error was reserved, but since it was not briefed or argued by defendant, it is considered abandoned. State v. Richmond, 284 So.2d 317 (La.1973); State v. Edwards, 261 La. 1014, 261 So.2d 649 (1972). We find reversible error in the first assignment of error, and we therefore pretermit a discussion of the second.
The defendant urges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the amended bill of information on the grounds that the December 6, 1972 conviction was obtained against him without the assistance of counsel, and without his having knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. We find merit in this contention.
The pertinent facts surrounding the December 6, 1972 conviction are these. Defendant appeared in the Monroe City Court on November 6, 1972, for his arraignment, at which time he pleaded not guilty. It is without dispute that he was not represented by counsel at the November 6, 1972 arraignment, or at the December 6, 1972 trial. It is his contention that he was not advised of his right to counsel and that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive that right. On November 6, 1972, the defendant and other defendants charged with various offenses who were present in court for arraignment were collectively advised of their rights by the City Judge in a standard opening speech made over a loudspeaker system at all arraignment sessions of that court. An excerpt from that opening address follows:
At the hearing on the motion to quash, Barbara Rhone, clerk of court, testified that it was the judge's practice to make an opening statement at the time of arraignment and not on the day of the trial. She testified that these opening statements were customarily made over a loudspeaker system, and were recorded. The defendant testified that at no time was he informed of his right to counsel, and further, that he was indigent at that time and could not have afforded to employ an attorney and, therefore, would have availed himself of a court-appointed attorney if he had been informed of his right to one. He testified that he was present in the courtroom on November 6, 1972, and that he had heard parts of the judge's introductory address, but that he had failed to hear the portion regarding the right to counsel. Defendant claims that he could not hear everything because he was seated in the rear of the courtroom. Subsequently, on December 6, 1972, he was tried, found guilty, and he served eighty-five days in jail in default of paying the fine and the costs imposed.
The trial court held that the defendant had been advised of his right to counsel, and he had knowingly and intelligently waived this right by not voicing a request for counsel to be appointed when he entered his plea. We reverse the trial court's decision because a mere failure to...
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