State v. Carlson
| Decision Date | 08 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 25100.,25100. |
| Citation | 3 P.3d 67,134 Idaho 389 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Douglas C. CARLSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Woolf, Combo & Thompson, Idaho Falls, for appellant. Stevan H. Thompson argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cude, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cude argued.
Douglas C. Carlson appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury verdict of guilty for first degree murder. I.C. § 18-4003(d). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Carlson became involved in a relationship with the mother of twenty-two-month-old Nicole, the victim in this case. Carlson often stayed the night at their apartment and baby-sat Nicole. On or about August 6, 1995, Carlson showed the mother some bruises on Nicole. At approximately the same time, it was also noticed that she was limping. During the night of August 6, Carlson was alone with Nicole. The next morning, Nicole's mother noticed additional bruising. Nicole was seen by a physician on August 7.
Between August 7 and August 15, Carlson was alone with Nicole on several occasions. On August 16, Nicole's mother left the apartment at approximately 10:40 a.m. and returned at approximately 12:40 p.m. Carlson was alone with Nicole while the mother was out of the apartment. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Nicole was found wheezing, limp, and unresponsive and was taken to the hospital. While attempting to treat Nicole, the doctors discovered that she had sustained severe brain injuries consistent with shaken-baby syndrome. Nicole died on August 17, 1995. An autopsy revealed that she also had a lacerated liver, healing rib fractures, and a healing fracture of the left tibia.
Carlson was arrested and charged with first degree murder. A jury found him guilty. Thereafter, Carlson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial. After a hearing, the district court denied Carlson's motions. Carlson appeals.
After the jury returned its verdict, Carlson moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. After a hearing on the matter, the district court denied the motion. Carlson asserts that the district court's denial was erroneous. Carlson's motion challenged the sufficiency of the state's evidence. In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether a reasonable mind would conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887 P.2d 57, 66 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 567, 768 P.2d 829, 830 (Ct.App.1989). This Court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App. 1991). On appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 163, 898 P.2d 615, 622 (Ct.App.1995).
Initially, Carlson argues that the district court, in ruling on his motion for judgment of acquittal, improperly applied the Holder instruction. In pertinent part, a Holder instruction states: "If the [circumstantial] evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to the defendant's innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and to reject the other which points to the defendant's guilt." ICJI 203.
On appeal, Carlson argues that it was just as reasonable for the district court to conclude that the fatal injury occurred while the mother was home alone with Nicole during the afternoon of August 16. When a defendant moves under I.C.R. 29 for a judgment of acquittal, the trial court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, must determine whether the inculpatory evidence presented as to any essential element of the crime is so insubstantial that jurors could not help but have a reasonable doubt. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 480, 482, 776 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Ct.App.1989).
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously addressed Carlson's argument and has held that the Holder standard does not apply to a district court's consideration of a defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. In State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998), the defendant argued that under Holder, the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Merwin Court held that when a jury verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence, it would be "improper for the trial judge to substitute his view of the facts for the jury's and grant the motion for a judgment of acquittal." Id. at 645, 962 P.2d at 1029.
Therefore, Holder is inapplicable to a district court's decision of whether to grant an I.C.R. 29 motion.2
Carlson challenges the district court's determination, in its order denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, that there was substantial evidence from which the jury could infer that he abused Nicole from August 5, 1995, until her death. Doctor Ellwein, the pathologist who performed the forensic autopsy testified at trial. According to Dr. Ellwein, four of Nicole's ribs had been broken on the left side. These ribs were broken within two weeks of Nicole's death. Doctor Ellwein also testified that Nicole had a tibia fracture that was less than two weeks old. Doctor Britton, an expert in child abuse, also testified. According to Dr. Britton, Nicole suffered physical abuse over the last few weeks of her life.
During the trial, there was testimony that Carlson was alone with Nicole on several occasions between August 5 and August 16. On August 5, Carlson spent the night at the mother's apartment. The following day, Carlson showed the mother that Nicole had bruising "the size of fingertips" on her left side and on her back. According to the mother, during the night of August 6, Carlson took Nicole outside and was out of her sight for approximately ten minutes. The next morning, the mother noticed a bruise on Nicole's head. The mother also noticed approximately fifteen to twenty bruises in the same location on Nicole's left side as the other fingertip-sized bruises.
Carlson argues that "from reading the entire record that a number of people had access to Nicole during August 5 through August 16 and particularly her mother... who [was] the most likely individual to have inflicted these injuries." However, the jury could reasonably draw an inference that Carlson inflicted the injuries based on the timing of the injuries and Carlson's presence with the child. This inference is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the district court's consideration of this evidence, upon its denial of Carlson's motion for a judgment of acquittal, was not error.
Carlson also disputes the district court's determination that there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude that the fatal injury was inflicted before the mother returned to the apartment on August 16. Nicole arrived at the emergency room at approximately 3:00 p.m. on August 16. Doctor Britton testified that, in her expert opinion, the fatal brain injury occurred within six hours of Nicole's admission to the hospital.
At trial, several individuals testified to hearing screaming coming from the mother's apartment on the day of Nicole's death. One witness, who lived downstairs from the apartment, testified that he heard screaming sometime after 11:00 a.m. Another witness, who was also lived near the apartment, testified that he heard banging and two voices screaming sometime between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. He testified that the two voices were a little girl's and an angry male's. The witness testified that these sounds were coming from the direction of the apartment. Finally, a third witness, who lived across and down the street from Nicole's residence, testified that she heard a child screaming and a male's voice screaming back at the child shortly after 11:00 a.m. The witness identified Nicole's apartment as the origin of the screams and identified the male's voice as Carlson's.
Although contradicted by Carlson's testimony, the mother testified that, upon her return home, at approximately 12:40 p.m., Carlson informed her that Nicole got "crabby" and that he had put her down for a nap. The mother also testified that, at one point, Carlson entered the bedroom and looked at Nicole. According to the mother, Carlson then rolled Nicole over so that she was facing the wall. The mother was approximately one-half of the way into the bedroom when Carlson put his arm around her and guided her out.
Based on the above testimony, the jury could reasonably conclude that the fatal injury was inflicted somewhere between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. on August 16—a time during which Carlson was alone with Nicole before the mother returned home. Thus, Carlson has failed to demonstrate that the district court's consideration of this evidence was error.
Additionally, this Court's independent review of the record leads us to hold that a reasonable mind could conclude that the state proved Carlson's guilt as to each material element of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the district court did not err when it denied Carlson's motion for a judgment of acquittal.
After the jury returned its verdict, Carlson moved for a new trial pursuant to I.C.R. 34 and in the interest of justice. The...
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