State v. Carpenter

• Court: Arizona Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McFARLAND; LOCKWOOD
• Citation: State v. Carpenter, 467 P.2d 749, 105 Ariz. 504 (Ariz. 1970)
• Decision Date: 08 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 1884,1884
• Parties: The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James L. CARPENTER, Appellant.

Page 749

467 P.2d 749

105 Ariz. 504

The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James L. CARPENTER, Appellant.

No. 1884.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

April 8, 1970.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., William J. Schafer, III, former Pima County Atty., Rose S. Silver, Pima County Atty., by Fred N. Belman, Deputy County Atty., for appellee.

Erik M. O'Dowd, Tucson, for appellant.

James L. Carpenter, pro se.

McFARLAND, Justice.

James L. Carpenter, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged in Count I with the crime of kidnapping; Count II with the crime of robbery of Malcolm Mills while armed with a deadly weapon--in violation of § 13--641 and § 13--643, subsec. B, A.R.S., as amended; Count III with the crime of grand theft while armed with a deadly weapon. He entered his plea of guilty to Count II, and upon motion of the county attorney Count I and Count III were dismissed. He was sentenced to a term of not less than twenty years nor more than thirty years in the Arizona State Penitentiary. From the judgment and sentence he appeals.

Defendant was represented by counsel at the time of his arraignment, at the time he entered this plea, and also upon this appeal. His present counsel certified that he has reviewed the entire transcript of record on appeal, and finds no substantial error in the proceedings below. He states that he sent a copy thereof, together with a copy of the entire transcript of record on appeal to defendant. Counsel also requests this Court to review the record for fundamental error, and permit the defendant an opportunity to submit briefs on appeal in his own behalf. Counsel, in conformity with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, set forth the matters which he stated might arguably support the appeal--that the defendant was sentenced under the provision of § 13--643, subsec. B, A.R.S., as amended, for a first offense, and was not told that if he were convicted of a future offense the imposition of sentence would be a minimum of ten years in prison. Counsel also stated that defendant was not fully apprized of the consequences of his guilty plea, and that he should now have an opportunity to withdraw his plea and enter a plea of not guilty as charged. He further states that at the time of the entry of the plea of guilty defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney had an arrangement whereby if defendant would plead guilty to Count II the county attorney would dismiss Counts I and III.

The defendant, in a letter which he stated was at the request of his attorney, submitted as error the matters contained in the minute entries. First, in regard to the complaint presumably referring to the charge of a violation of § 13--641 and § 13--643, subsec. B. In support of his contention he called attention to the transcript of the proceedings setting forth the colloquy between the judge and the county attorney as to the section under which defendant should be sentenced. The last contention was that the sentence was excessive. As per his request, his letter was made part of the record.

Both matters referred to by counsel and by defendant in propria persona are involved in what is usually termed 'plea bargaining' and whether the proper safeguards were followed in the acceptance of the plea. The record shows that the court followed the safeguards necessary for a determination as to the voluntariness of the plea and a determination of whether the defendant understood the nature and consequences of the plea. The court carefully questioned defendant in order to make these determinations.

The court, in determining for itself that the defendant understood the constitutional rights which he was waiving, advised defendant that he had the right to trial by jury, and asked defendant if he wished to waive such right, to which defendant replied in the affirmative. The court read the statutes--s 13--641 and § 13--643, subsec. B--and explained them. This answers the matter raised by defendant that he was not advised of the fact that a future offense carries a minimum ten-year sentence. The court also asked defendant if he admitted to the robbery, to which the reply was 'yes, sir.'

With regard to voluntariness the record shows the following:

'THE COURT: Has anybody coerced you or threatened you in any way in order to change your plea?

'MR. CARPENTER: No, sir.

'THE COURT: Has anybody promised you that the Court would be lenient to you?

'MR. CARPENTER: No, sir.

'THE COURT: Has anybody said to you that if you plead guilty to this, the Court will put you on probation and not send you to the state prison?

'MR. CARPENTER: No, sir.

'THE COURT: Has there been some arrangement, gentlemen? I'm asking you two, has there been some plea agreement of some kind?

'MR. WALKER: Yes.

'THE COURT: What was that agreement?

'MR. WALKER: That agreement was if there was a plea of guilty to Count 2, that the other two counts would be dismissed as far as the County Attorney is concerned.

'THE COURT: This all involves the same person?

'MR. CRISMON: Yes, it does involve the same person.

'THE COURT: And the same acts?

'MR. CRISMON: The same acts. The kidnapping arose out of the robbery itself.

'THE COURT: That's what your agreement is, Mr. Crismon?

'MR. CRISMON: Yes, Your Honor, it was our understanding that if he did plead guilty to this, we would dismiss the other two charges.

'THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Carpenter, are you satisfied with the...