State v. Carr

• Decision Date: 11 November 1895
• Citation: 28 Or. 389,42 P. 215
• Parties: STATE v. CARR.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

42 P. 215

28 Or. 389

STATE v. CARR.

Supreme Court of Oregon

November 11, 1895

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county; T.A. Stephens, Judge.

John A Carr was convicted of bribery of a juror, and appeals. Reversed.

J.N. Dolph, R. Williams, and Geo. H. Durham, for appellant.

W.T Hume, Dist. Atty., for the State.

BEAN, C.J.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of offering to bribe one Thomas Huntington, a juror in a criminal action against Joseph Kelly, and from the judgment upon such conviction brings this appeal. The verdict was based upon the evidence of Mrs. Huntington, the wife of the juror, who testified, in substance, that on the morning after her husband had been accepted as a juror the defendant called at her house, and, after telling her where the jurors boarded, asked her to go there, and intercede with her husband for Kelly, and told her he would give her $50 if she would do so; that on the afternoon of the same day she called at the restaurant, as requested by the defendant, and had a conversation with her husband,--whether about the case in which he was a juror or some other matter does not appear. The next morning the defendant called, and, when told that her husband "would have nothing to do with the matter," he said, "That will end it." A few days later, however, while the trial was still in progress he accosted her on the street, and asked her, "How about that affair of Kelly's?" to which she replied "I don't know." About 6 o'clock of the same evening, as she was going to see her husband on some private business, she met the defendant, who gave her five $20 gold pieces, and told her to give them to her husband "to help Kelly." She proceeded immediately on her errand, and, meeting her husband on the steps of the courthouse, had a conversation with him, during which she held the money in her hand, where he could see it. As the result of this conversation she returned the money to the defendant the next morning, and told him, "Mr. Huntington would have nothing to do with it." Two or three days later she again met the defendant on the street, and he put $10 in her hand, nothing being said at the time either by the defendant or witness. This money she retained, and gave to her husband after his discharge from the jury, and requested him to return it to the defendant, but he testified on the trial that he gave it to his boy, who wanted to go fishing. The court below ruled--whether properly or not we shall not stop to inquire--that under section 712, Hill's Ann.Laws, the witness could not testify as to any conversation between herself and husband, and therefore it is not very clear from the evidence that she ever complied with the request of the defendant by offering to her husband the money in question to influence his verdict; but we shall assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that she did. This is, in substance, all the evidence upon which the state relied for a conviction. At the close of the testimony the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict of not guilty, on the ground that Mrs. Huntington was an accomplice, and therefore no conviction could be had upon her uncorroborated testimony. The motion was overruled, and the court submitted the question as to whether she was an accomplice to the jury for their determination, and this ruling is the principal error relied upon for a reversal of the judgment.

At common law, juries might convict upon the testimony of an accomplice alone if it carried conviction to their minds, although it was deemed so unreliable that the courts generally advised them not to do so unless it was corroborated by other evidence. But the credit to be given to the testimony of such a witness, and the corroboration necessary to render it satisfactory, were matters to be considered and determined by the jury, and, if they were fully convinced thereby, the conviction was legal though without other support than the testimony of an accomplice. But in this state the rule has been so changed by statute that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, however satisfactory to a jury, is insufficient to convict. Section 1371, Hill's Ann.Laws, provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely show the commission of the crime or the circumstances of the commission." This statute absolutely prohibits a conviction in a criminal case upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, even although the jury may believe such testimony to be entirely true, and that it establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It proceeds upon the theory that experience in the administration of the criminal law has shown the sources of such testimony to be generally so corrupt as to render it unworthy of belief, and that it is therefore better as a matter of public policy to forbid a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, although the guilty may thereby sometimes escape punishment, than to leave it possible for the conviction of an innocent person on such testimony. Whether this rule of law is wise or unwise is not for us to inquire. It is so written, and must be applied by the court. As said by Mr. Justice Strahan in his opinion in the case of State v. Jarvis, 18 Or. 364, 23 P. 251: "The statute has made corroboration of an accomplice necessary, so that the court has no control over the subject except to apply the statute. The court has no discretion, but is bound to apply the statute...