State v. Carrasquillo

• Decision Date: 27 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 17568.
• Citation: 962 A.2d 772,290 Conn. 209
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Pedro CARRASQUILLO.

962 A.2d 772

290 Conn. 209

STATE of Connecticut v.Pedro CARRASQUILLO.

No. 17568.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 13, 2008.

Decided January 27, 2009.

Suzanne Z. Curtis, assistant public defender, for the appellant(defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state's attorney, for the appellee(state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

PALMER, J.

The defendant, Pedro Carrasquillo, was arrested and charged with, inter alia, murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.¹Because the defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense, his case automatically was transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket in accordance with General Statutes(Rev. to 2003)§ 46b-127 (a).²A jury found the defendant guilty of murder,³ and the trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant to a term of thirty-five years imprisonment pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-35a(2),⁴ which requires a mandatory minimum prison term of twenty-five years for the crime of murder.⁵On appeal,⁶the defendant claims that (1) because he was only fifteen years old when he committed the murder, the statutory scheme subjecting him to a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence violates the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution,⁷ and (2) his right to a fair trial was violated when the state's attorney, during closing argument, improperly attributed a motive to the defendant that was unsupported by the evidence.We reject both claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.In the early evening of June 16, 2003, the victim seventeen year old Chauncey Robinson, drove his car to the Moon Mart convenience store on Whalley Avenue in New Haven to purchase cigarettes and candy.Samuel Redd, who was shopping in a nearby shoe store, saw the victim get out of his car and go into the convenience store.Although Redd did not know the victim personally, it was his understanding that the victim had fired a gun in Redd's neighborhood, which angered Redd.When the victim exited the convenience store, Redd, who was wearing a red shirt, followed him to his car with the intent of starting a fight.The victim, however, was able to enter his car before Redd could catch up to him.When Redd reached the victim's car, he kicked in the driver's side window and then fled.As Redd started to run away, he noticed the defendant, with whom Redd was on friendly terms, walking across Whalley Avenue in the direction of the victim's car.A few moments later, Redd heard gunshots.

At the same time that Redd was running from the victim's car, thirteen year old L.C.⁸ was coming out of a restaurant located across the street from the victim's parked car.He observed the defendant, whom he knew by name because they attended the same middle school, cross Whalley Avenue and head toward the victim's car.Shortly thereafter, L.C. heard gunshots and started running toward his home.As he was running, he looked back and saw the defendant fire several shots into the front driver's side window of the victim's car.When L.C. arrived home, he told his mother what he had seen, and she immediately telephoned the police.Ismail Nasser, the owner of the Moon Mart convenience store where the victim had purchased cigarettes and candy, also heard the gunshots and ran outside.When he arrived, he observed two people running away.One of them was wearing a red shirt and the other was carrying a gun in his hand.He also observed the victim, who had been shot, slouched in the front seat of his car.

The following procedural history also is relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claims.The defendant was arrested on July 2, 2003, and charged with the victim's murder.Because the defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense, his case was transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket in the judicial district of New Haven in accordance with § 46b-127 (a), which provides that a child of fourteen or fifteen years of age who has been charged with a class A felony shall be tried and sentenced as an adult.The defendant elected a jury trial.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a transfer of his case back to the juvenile docket for treatment as a delinquency matter.The defendant claimed that his automatic transfer to the regular criminal docket pursuant to § 46b-127 (a), and his exposure to the same twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence applicable to persons sixteen years or older under § 53a-35a(2), constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution.In support of his claim, the defendant relied primarily on Roper v. Simmons,543 U.S. 551, 568, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1(2005), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment forbids the execution of persons under the age of eighteen.The defendant maintained that the reasoning of that case applied equally to the present case.In particular, the court in Roper had identified three characteristics that distinguish juvenile offenders from adult offenders: (1) immaturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; (2) susceptibility to peer pressure and negative influences; and (3) transitory personality traits.Id., at 569-70, 125 S.Ct. 1183.The court explained that these characteristics "render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult....Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influence in their whole environment."(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183.The court further observed that, as a result of these characteristics, juveniles generally have "diminished culpability" for the crimes that they commit.Id., at 571, 125 S.Ct. 1183.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, explaining that the rationale and holding of Roper applied only to the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders and not to the imposition of any other type of punishment on juveniles.Following a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of the victim's murder.The defendant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's denial of his motion to dismiss and for permission to supplement the record with scientific research relating to the cognitive and psychosocial development of adolescents.The trial court granted the motion, and the defendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law in which he again asserted that §§ 46b-127(a)and53a-35a(2) violate the defendant's rights under the eighth amendment because, under Roper, subjecting juveniles to the same sentencing scheme as adults, without affording the trial judge discretion to impose a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum prescribed for persons sixteen years or older, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Prior to sentencing, the trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion.At the hearing, defense counsel adduced testimony from Karen Howard Brody, a psychiatrist, regarding the development of the adolescent brain generally and the defendant's cognitive development in particular.According to Brody, new technologies have revealed significant differences between the adolescent brain and the adult brain, including differences in psychosocial functioning.Brody testified that adolescents are more readily influenced by their peers and have different attitudes toward risk and risk taking, with less orientation toward the future than adults.Brody, who had examined the defendant on three occasions, opined that he was a typical teenager who still exhibited methods of thinking characteristic of an adolescent.Brody further testified that, although the legal system considers a defendant's actions in light of what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances, in her view, an adolescent's actions should be measured against what a reasonable adolescent would do under the circumstances.

Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.The trial court reiterated that Roper was inapplicable because it involved the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to juveniles and did not implicate the constitutional rights of juveniles who, like the defendant in the present case, are sentenced to a term of imprisonment.The court further noted that the United States Supreme Court, in declaring the execution of juveniles unconstitutional in Roper, had approved a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release for the juvenile defendant in that case.The trial court reasoned that if a life sentence without the possibility of release does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, then the defendant's exposure in the present case to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment cannot possibly violate the eighth amendment.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel urged the court to consider the defendant's age at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor.Defense counsel also requested that the court consider certain scientific studies that previously had been filed with the court in connection with the defendant's motion to dismiss and that supported the defendant's claim of "a biological basis" for diminished culpability in adolescents.Before imposing sentence, the trial court stated in relevant part: "[I]ntentional murder is the...