State v. Carroll

Decision Date19 January 1982
Docket NumberNo. 21630,21630
Citation286 S.E.2d 382,277 S.C. 306
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Lamar CARROLL, Appellant.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Asst. Appellate Defender Tara D. Shurling, of S. C. Commission of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Lindy P. Funkhouser and Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Columbia, and Asst. Sol. F. Truett Nettles, II, Charleston, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

A jury found appellant guilty of breach of trust with a fraudulent intention. He was sentenced to six (6) months' imprisonment, to be reduced to three (3) months upon return of the victim's property. Appellant asserts that the trial judge should have granted the request for a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence because the State relied solely on circumstantial evidence to prove the intent element of the charged offense. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

In this case the State relied on direct evidence to prove the identity of appellant and the acts of the charged offense. The State presented evidence of circumstances and facts from which the jury could infer intent. The trial judge properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof in a criminal case and on the intent element of the crime. The judge refused appellant's request for an instruction on circumstantial evidence.

When a request is made for a circumstantial evidence instruction, the trial judge may exercise discretion and deny the request when the crime and the identity of the perpetrator are established by direct evidence and the circumstances introduced are merely corroborative. State v. Jenkins, 270 S.C. 365, 242 S.E.2d 420 (1978); State v. Simmons, 269 S.C. 649, 239 S.E.2d 656 (1977). It has been held that an instruction on circumstantial evidence is not necessary when the evidence is introduced only to show intent. Belcher v. State, 504 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1250 (1961). Intent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must ordinarily be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is, by facts and circumstances from which intent may be inferred. State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 185 S.E.2d 607 (1971). When all the salient facts of the prosecution's case, including the facts from which intent is inferred, are proved by direct evidence, the prosecution is not relying on circumstantial evidence to an extent requiring a special jury instruction.

We hold that a trial judge may refuse to give...

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6 cases
  • State v. Salisbury
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 17 Febrero 1998
    ...of charging circumstantial evidence in a driving under the influence scenario is novel under South Carolina law. In State v. Carroll, 277 S.C. 306, 286 S.E.2d 382 (1982), the South Carolina Supreme Court When a request is made for a circumstantial evidence instruction, the trial judge may e......
  • May v. Hopkinson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 24 Marzo 1986
    ...element [ Mylin v. Allen-White Pontiac, Inc., 281 S.C. 174, 314 S.E.2d 354 (Ct.App.1984) ] and the fifth element [ State v. Carroll, 277 S.C. 306, 286 S.E.2d 382 (1982) ] usually must be proved circumstantially. With particular reference to the eighth element, we also recognize that a buyer......
  • State v. Salisbury
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 16 Enero 2001
    ...the perpetrator were established by direct evidence and the circumstances introduced were merely corroborative. See State v. Carroll, 277 S.C. 306, 286 S.E.2d 382 (1982); State v. Jenkins, 270 S.C. 365, 242 S.E.2d 420 (1978); State v. Simmons, 269 S.C. 649, 239 S.E.2d 656 Prior to Grippon, ......
  • State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc. Today, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 21 Mayo 1986
    ...S.E.2d 258 (1958). The intent to violate the law or another's rights may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Cf., State v. Carroll, 277 S.C. 306, 286 S.E.2d 382 (1982). Ordinarily, the word "willful" as used in a statute has the same meaning as it has at common law. Reeves v. Carolina Fou......
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