State v. Carson

• Decision Date: 19 February 1919
• Docket Number: No. 32056.,32056.
• Citation: 170 N.W. 781,185 Iowa 568
• Parties: STATE v. CARSON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

185 Iowa 568

170 N.W. 781

STATE

v.CARSON.

No. 32056.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 19, 1919.

Appeal from District Court, Lucas County; D. M. Anderson, Judge.

Conviction for seduction. Defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.J. A. Penick and W. Collinson, both of Chariton, for appellant.

H. M. Havner, Atty. Gen., and F. C. Davison, Asst. Atty. Gen., and C. F. Wennerstrum and E. S. Wells, both of Chariton, for the State.

SALINGER, J.

I. For the sake of prosecutrix, as well as because it would serve no useful purpose to do otherwise, we refrain from detail. Prosecutrix was but 17 at the time of her alleged seduction, and defendant about 20. But the record shows conclusively that beginning at 15 she had such relations with men as that, while it may be true that such relations were not criminal, they were such as made her sufficiently familiar with the “way of a man” to understand the peril of permitting the defendant to take improper liberties with her at their first meeting, one had after they had just been introduced--to enable her to rate at its true value such promise of marriage as she testifies to. She testifies defendant solicited sexual intercourse almost at the beginning of this first meeting; that he took indecent liberties, and, in connection “with carrying on that way,” he began to “love” her; that she does not remember just what he said, except that while taking these liberties “he made the remark that he loved me and cared for me that way”; that at one stage of soliciting intercourse he said he thought a whole lot of her, and asked her if she could not learn to love him; that she told him she did not know whether she could or not, that “the way he treated me and asked me to do business with him and talked that way to me I did not believe that I could”; that by what he said and the taking of the liberties he got her to lose control of herself; that she guesses he thought or knew she had lost control of herself, and thereupon “he went ahead and did his business”; that the only objection she made was she was afraid she would get herself into trouble and did not want that to happen, and he said that if she did he would get her out of it. Up to this point nothing was said about marriage. As to a promise of marriage, her testimony was this:

“He said if he got me into trouble he would marry me--if he could not get rid of it he would marry me. Q. Now, you would never have had intercourse with him unless he had either promised to marry you. A. No, sir. Q. And now you state that is the reason that you had intercourse with him, because he made these promises. A. Yes, sir; because he let on like he cared for me. He told me he loved me.”

The quality of the “caring” and of the protestations of love has been sufficiently set forth. It suffices to say that they were not naturally calculated to induce a fall from chastity; that the “caring” was rather brutal, and the protestations quite casual and incidental. The important factor was the belated promise of marriage. That promise was this:

“Q. He told you if he got you into trouble he would get you out of it. A. Yes, sir. Q. Or he would marry you, one or the other. A. Yes, sir. Q. That is the promise of marriage you speak of when you say he promised to marry you. A. Yes, sir. Q. That is the first time you were ever with him. A. Yes, sir.”

[1] In acting upon this record we must bear in mind, too, that this testimony should not be strained against defendant; for, in the words of State v. Haven, 43 Iowa, 181:

“It is perfectly natural and to be expected that prosecutrix should as far as possible shield herself and cast the blame, if any there was, on the defendant.”

[2] It is conceded that we should interfere with a conviction, though the verdict is not wholly without support, if it be clearly against the weight of the evidence. See State v. Pray, 126 Iowa, 249, 99 N. W. 1065;State v. Hessenius, 165 Iowa, 415, 146 N. W. 58, L. R. A. 1915A, 1078, and State v. Young, 158 Iowa, at page 652, 138 N. W. 871.

In State v. Saling, 177 Iowa, 555, 556, 155 N. W. 255, the cases governing the review of a conviction are collated, and held that, while we will not set aside a verdict of guilty readily for being contrary to the weight of the evidence, we will do so more readily than if the verdict were on the civil side; that, while we will not interfere where there is clear conflict in the evidence, we will not support the verdict if proceeding carefully and cautiously we must find that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. We point out in the Saling Case that in State v. O'Donnell, 176 Iowa, 337, 157 N. W. 870, we reversed a conviction of murder in the first degree because we find the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction in that degree, and that State v. Nolan, 92 Iowa, 491, 61 N. W. 181, is to the same effect. We conclude in the Saling Case that--

“It will no more do to make the verdict of a jury conclusive in a criminal conviction of a grave felony than it would do to try criminal cases de novo. That neither is permissible does not in the least affect either our duty or our power to interfere with the verdict of a jury in a case where such interference is proper.”

[3] And we cannot agree that, in...