State v. Carta

• Decision Date: 13 January 1916
• Citation: 90 Conn. 79,96 A. 411
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CARTA.

96 A. 411

90 Conn. 79

STATE

v. CARTA.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 13, 1916.

Wheeler and Roraback, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; William L. Bennett, Judge.

Ignatio Carta was convicted of assault with intent to kill, and he appeals. No error.

Daniel J. Donahoe, of Middletown, for appellant. Frank D. Haines, State's Atty., and Ernest A. Inglis, both of Middletown, for the State.

THAYER, J. After the verdict in this case had been returned by the jury and accepted by the court, the attorney for the accused presented to the court a copy of a newspaper, stating that it had been found in the jury room, and that he wished to protest against sentence in the case upon the ground that the newspaper contained an attack upon Italians, Irish, and Catholics. Several reasons of appeal are based upon the court's action in accepting the verdict and rendering judgment in the case after attention had thus been called to the finding of this newspaper in the jury room. There was no evidence that any of the jurymen had seen the newspaper, and upon inquiry all of them stated that they had not seen it and knew nothing about it. If, as thus stated by them, they had not seen the paper, they could not have been prejudiced or influenced thereby against the accused, and he was not harmed by its being in the jury room. The court therefore committed no error, after it had satisfied itself that none of the jurors had any knowledge of the contents of the newspaper, in proceeding to pass sentence upon the accused in accordance with the verdict.

The findings show that the state produced evidence tending to prove that after some words had passed between the accused and the complainant, Bartolotta, the former stabbed the latter in the shoulder, and that the latter then stabbed the accused, and then turned and went away from him, and that the accused pursued him for some distance until Bartolotta fell, when the accused came up to him and stabbed him in the side and back. The defendant claimed and offered evidence to prove that he' pursued Bartolotta through excitement for a few steps, when the latter turned, as the defendant thought, to come back and further assault him, whereupon, in self-protection, he ran for Bartolotta and struck him as he fell, and the blows were struck in self-defense. The court charged the jury clearly as to the law relating to self-defense as applicable to the evidence and claims of the parties, and no complaint is made as to the charge as given.

Error is assigned upon the court's refusal to charge certain requests which were filed by the defendant. So far as these requests contained statements of law applicable to the facts in evidence, they were covered by the charge as given, and the defendant was not harmed by the court's neglect to charge in the precise language Of the requests. These assignments of error have not been much pressed upon the argument.

The ground of error most insisted upon in the case is that which relates to the court's action in permitting the state, against the defendant's objection, to prove from the record in the case that the accused had previously in the superior court entered a plea of guilty to the same information upon which he was being tried, but had withdrawn that plea by leave of court and entered a plea of not guilty. The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony upon the ground that it was not proper to go before the jury, claiming that the plea of guilty had been entered by reason of a misunderstanding between his attorney and the state's attorney, and also upon the ground that it was immaterial to the issue and injurious to his rights. The objection was overruled, and the evidence admitted.

The record shows that the case was tried to the jury at the same term to which the information was brought, so that the leave to enter the plea of guilty and to withdraw it and to enter the plea of not guilty was given by the same judge who presided at the trial of the case. A court will not allow a party to enter a plea of guilty until it is satisfied that it is freely made and that the party making it understands its purport and effect; for the entry of such a plea is a conviction and the equivalent of a finding of guilty by a jury. State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 308, 41 Atl. 820. When entered, such a plea cannot be withdrawn (in the absence of a statute permitting it), except by leave of court. It is within the court's discretion to permit it to be done.

We suppose that the universal practice in this state has been for the court to exercise that discretion in favor of the accused and to permit him to change his plea and have a jury decide the question of his guilt. It does not appear from the record whether at the time the plea was withdrawn any hearing was had to determine whether the plea of guilty was entered by reason of a misunderstanding between the attorney for the defendant and the state's attorney. If there was none the parties to the misunderstanding were officers of the court, were before the court at the time the evidence was objected to, and it must be presumed that, if the court was not already familiar with the circumstances under which the plea was entered and leave obtained to withdraw it, it at once made itself familiar with them and ascertained whether the plea was, in fact, entered by reason of any misunderstanding which in any way affected the defendant's action in making the confession. The court will be presumed to have done its duty in the first instance and to have satisfied itself that the plea of confession was made voluntarily and without mistake on the part of the accused before ordering such plea to be entered.

The fact that the plea was accepted is prima facie proof that the confession was voluntary, and, as before stated, if not withdrawn, is conclusive of the guilt of the accused.

Where, as in this case, the plea had been withdrawn, it was not conclusive, and it was open to the accused to show, if he could, that the plea was mistakenly entered.

It is apparent from the record that the state offered the proof that the defendant entered the plea of guilty, and afterward withdrew it not as proof of a judicial confession which would be conclusive upon the defendant, but as showing conduct on the part of defendant which was inconsistent with his claim of innocence before the jury. It was manifestly so regarded and treated by the defendant's attorney and by the court. The state proved not only the fact that the plea was entered, but that it had been withdrawn, snowing that the proof was not offered as showing the conviction of the accused by his own plea; and the objection to it was not that a judicial confession so given in the trial court was not admissible under any circumstances, but that it was entered through a misunderstanding. It was thus by all parties treated as an extrajudicial confession or admission. Such an admission or confession is not conclusive, and, unless further proof to establish the corpus delicti is offered, is not sufficient to justify a conviction. State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 308, 41 Atl. 820. It appears from the record that such further proof was offered by the state in the present case. When the fact was established that the admission had been made by the accused, the admission was not before the jury as testimony by the accused establishing the truth of all or any of the allegations of the information, but the fact that he had made it, had pleaded guilty, was before them, and was relevant, as being inconsistent with his claim to the jury that he stabbed Bartolotta in self-defense and was not guilty.

The defendant made no claim in the superior court, nor on his appeal here, that the fact that a plea of guilty had been entered and withdrawn in the trial court could not be proved in any case against the accused. But we have been referred to some authorities which hold that a plea of guilty which the court refused to accept, or which had been entered, and afterward withdrawn, and a plea of not guilty entered, is not admissible against the accused. In People v. Ryan, 82 Cal 617, 23 Pac. 121, a plea of guilty was entered and afterward withdrawn, a statute giving the accused the right to withdraw such a plea before sentence. It was held error for the trial court to permit a plea of guilty to be given in evidence upon the trial to the jury upon the plea of not guilty subsequently entered. It does not appear in the report of the case that the evidence was offered to establish a judicial confession, but it appears that no conviction could have been obtained without it, and the court speaks of it as a confession. In State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 117, 12 S. W. 516, the court had refused to accept a plea of guilty, but afterward permitted the state to prove that the accused at first pleaded guilty to the charge upon which he was on trial. This was held to be error, the court saying that the trial court properly refused to accept the plea, and that the plea "should never have been heard of again." In the case the court treats the plea of guilty; when proved, as conclusive evidence of the defendant's guilt. He says:

"By refusing to receive the plea and granting the defendant a trial, this of necessity meant a trial with the issues of fact to be determined by a jury, and not to be determined by the previous plea of the defendant which admitted all that the state desired to prove."

The court thus treats the evidence as received as a judicial confession of the accused, and so conclusive upon him. Wharton, in his Criminal Evidence (10th Ed.) vol. 2, pp. 1326, 1327, says that, where a plea of guilty has been withdrawn, it is not binding upon the accused, and cannot be used in evidence against him. In a case in Kentucky (Commonwealth v. Ervine, 8 Dana [38 Ky.] 30) a sentence upon a plea of guilty had been reversed, and upon a trial thereafter had upon a plea of not guilty entered...