State v. Carter
| Decision Date | 15 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-0896-19 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PAUL A. CARTER, a/k/a PAUL ANTHONY CARTER, PAUL A. CARIER, PDOT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted April 14, 2021.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Salem County, Indictment No. 17-05-0203.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Ruth E Hunter, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (David M. Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Fuentes, Whipple and Rose.
Tried to a jury, defendant Paul A. Carter was convicted of murder aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, resisting arrest, drug, and weapons offenses for the execution-style shooting death of Anthony Johnson on a Salem City street in November 2016. During the seven-day trial, the State presented the testimony of fourteen witnesses and introduced in evidence more than one hundred exhibits. But the case turned on the multiple video and audio recordings: the murder was depicted on home surveillance video; defendant's spontaneous admissions were captured on the police car's mobile video recorder (MVR). And two local officers on routine patrol saw a muzzle flash, heard the shots, chased defendant, and arrested him immediately after they saw him toss the murder weapon into a pile of leaves. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sixty-five years with a parole disqualifier of fifty-two and one-half years.
Defendant now appeals, arguing:
We reject these contentions and affirm. I.
On appeal, defendant first argues the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on aggravated and reckless manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of murder as charged in the indictment, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1). We disagree.
An offense is a lesser-included offense when:
A trial court "shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). For that reason, when a defendant requests a charge on a lesser-included offense, the trial court must apply a twopronged test to determine if the charge is appropriate. As to the first prong the court must determine whether the requested charge satisfies the statutory definition of an included offense and, if so, there must "be a rational basis in the evidence to support a charge on that included offense." State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 178 (2009) (quoting State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 131 (2006)). The second prong is satisfied "when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense." State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004).
The applicable standard is different where, as here, a charge has not been requested. Because of constitutional concerns, a court is limited in its ability sua sponte to instruct a jury that it could convict a defendant of uncharged lesser offenses. See Thomas, 187 N.J. 132-34. "An unrequested charge on a lesser included offense must be given only where the facts in evidence 'clearly indicate' the appropriateness of that charge." State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002) (quoting State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 298 (1985)). "[T]he need for the charge must 'jump off the proverbial page." State v. R.T., 205 N.J. 493, 510 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, a "trial court does not 'have the obligation on its own [to] meticulously . . . sift through the entire record' to find appropriate charges." Choice, 98 N.J. at 299; see also Savage, 172 N.J. at 397.
Aggravated and reckless manslaughter are lesser-included offenses of murder. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 361. The lesser-included offense analysis in the present case therefore involves the respective elements of murder and manslaughter. "Murder requires proof that [a] defendant caused death purposely, i.e., with the intent to cause or conscious object of causing death, or knowingly, i.e., with an awareness that death is practically certain to result." State v. Gaines, 377 N.J.Super. 612, 621 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Cruz, 163 N.J. 403, 417 (2000)).
By contrast, "[a] lower degree of culpability is required to prove aggravated manslaughter, for which the prosecution must show that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death, i.e., a probability that death would result, and that the defendant manifested extreme indifference to human life." Cruz, 163 N.J. at 417 (citing N.J. S.A. 2C:11-4(a)). "The elements of aggravated and reckless manslaughter are identical except for the difference in the degree of risk of death." State v. Sanchez, 224 N.J.Super. 231, 240 (App. Div. 1988). "The degree of risk in reckless manslaughter is a mere possibility of death." Ibid.
In the present matter, the facts did not clearly indicate the jury could have convicted defendant of aggravated or reckless manslaughter while acquitting him of murder. As evidenced by home video surveillance footage, around 10:00 p.m. on November 19, 2016, defendant approached Johnson on a public street in Salem City and fired a shot at close range from a six-shot defaced revolver, causing Johnson to fall to the ground. Defendant then stood over Johnson, firing the five remaining shots. No one else - except the officers who saw a muzzle flash and heard the gunshots - was in the vicinity.
According to the autopsy report, one bullet grazed Johnson's skull, two entered his left upper chest, and the remaining bullets entered his extremities. The State's ballistic expert confirmed all six bullets were fired from the revolver that defendant tossed as he ran from the police. Within two minutes of the shooting, officers recovered the revolver and arrested defendant. Following a search incident to defendant's arrest, police seized four cartridges from defendant's pocket that matched the ammunition fired from the revolver.
To support his belated argument, defendant summarily references: the trial testimony of two law enforcement officers, who described the crime scene as a "high crime area" and an "open air drug market"; the officers' acknowledgment that police did not investigate the owner of a car parked on the corner when the shooting occurred; the absence of an eye-witness; Johnson's post-mortem toxicology results, indicating he tested positive for several narcotics; and the seizure of "five baggies containing suspected marijuana" from Johnson's person. Defendant's undeveloped contentions undercut his argument.
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that, for example, Johnson was the aggressor or otherwise threatened defendant, warranting the lower-culpability manslaughter charges. See Cruz, 163 N.J. at 419. Instead, the trial evidence clearly demonstrated that defendant shot Johnson six times, with three shots aimed at his head and chest, thereby evidencing defendant's purposeful or knowing intent to kill. See State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 450 (1999) ( "common sense informs us that when someone shoots at another person in the upper body region . . . the shooter's purpose is either to cause serious bodily injury that results in death or to actually cause death, especially where no other plausible explanation is given").
Moreover en route to the police station, defendant spontaneously uttered: Notwithstanding these admissions, the defense strategy focused on questioning the State's proof. As one notable example, defense counsel acknowledged defendant possessed six bags...
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