State v. Carter

• Decision Date: 06 March 1974
• Citation: 316 A.2d 449,64 N.J. 382
• Parties: The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Milton CARTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 382

64 N.J. 382

316 A.2d 449

The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Milton CARTER, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Sept. 25, 1973.

Decided March 6, 1974.

[316 A.2d 451] Rosemary K. Reavey, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for defendant-appellant. (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender).

Robert D. Clarke and Elson Kendall, Asst. Prosecutors, for plaintiff-respondent (Karl Asch, Union County Prosecutor).

David S. Baime, Deputy Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae Atty. Gen. of N.J. (George F. Kugler, Jr., Atty. Gen., William Welaj, Deputy Atty. Gen., on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by PASHMAN, J.

This appeal calls upon us to consider the propriety of conditional release for those adjudicated insane both at the time of the commission of an offense and at trial, necessitating commitment to the state hospital and dismissal of the indictment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:163--2.

On January 10, 1969, Milton Carter walked into police headquarters in Plainfield, New Jersey and shot and wounded a police officer. Prior to this incident, Carter was withdrawn and had a history of psychiatric care. On June 5, 1970, the Union County Court found Carter both legally insane under the M'Naghten test at the time of the offense and incapable of standing trial. He was committed to the state hospital in Trenton 'until such time as he may be restored to reason.' N.J.S.A. 2A:163--2. The criminal indictment was dismissed. In April 1971, Carter filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court, Mercer County seeking discharge from the hospital. After hearing the testimony of a staff psychiatrist at the state hospital, the court ordered Carter's release and transfer to the Union County Jail to await trial. This order was apparently entered eithout knowledge or reference to the June 5, 1970 commitment order. Carter's parents began a separate action in Union County Court, Probate Division to have appellant declared mentally incompetent. On September 7, 1971, they were appointed as Carter's guardians. The court approved his voluntary commitment to a school for retarded persons; however, adjustment problems resulted in his being returned to the state hospital. On the basis of further examinations and being of the opinion that Carter's problem was one of mental deficiency rather than mental illness, the hospital director, without court approval, ordered Carter's release in his parents' custody. Finally in March 1972, the Union County prosecutor requested the judge who had entered both the June 5, 1970 and September 7, 1971 orders to review the matter. This resulted in a hearing on the issue of appellant's sanity pursuant to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:163--2 as interpreted by State The Appellate Division affirmed this judgment on March 2, 1973 in a Per curiam opinion, Judge Halpern dissenting. This appeal follows as a matter of right pursuant to R. 2:2--1(a). Appellant's recommitment was stayed by this Court on March 13, 1973 pending disposition of the appeal.

v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972). Appellant was not deemed to have been 'restored to reason' and was again ordered returned to the state hospital in July 1972, never having been tried for the crime for which he was indicted.

At the hearings prior to the entry of the July 1972 order, there was medical testimony indicating that Carter spoke repeatedly about killing himself or others. It was suggested that while he may improve, his condition would not stabilize to such a degree as to warrant his return to the community. Carter's condition was diagnosed as both mental defective with incipient schizophrenia and a catatonic type of schizophrenia. While supervision and medication may reduce the frequency of attacks, there was evidence to indicate that the accurate prediction of future occurrences would be impossible. There was also some indication that the psychotic episodes could be related to appellant's use of alcohol, which is dangerous to those with his condition. In addition, it was stated that with proper supervision, Carter could continue to function without the likelihood of his condition disintegrating.

The trial judge found that Carter's condition had not been cured or neutralized and that defendant was still suffering from schizophrenia and mental retardation. The possibility of release accompanied by supervision was considered indefinite and uncertain; in any event, the court regarded any form of release under supervision as indequate to protect the public. The court held that there existed the danger of recurring psychotic episodes at any time. The testimony failed to satisfy the trial judge that such episodes would be predictable. In view of the court's findings, Carter was ordered to be returned to the state hospital.

The Appellate Division held that the lower court's findings were more than adequately supported by credible evidence The dissent assumed that Carter had been restored to that degree of reason which he is capable of reaching. The issue then became whether this level of reason could be expected to prevail over his underlying illness so that he would not be a threat to his own or society's safety. In this sense, Judge Halpern argues that Maik places a responsibility upon the courts to 'make considered judgments and take calculated risks in releasing defendants.' The alternative is to 'condemn this 25 year old defendant to a State mental institution for life because his underlying illness (schizophrenia) is incurable.' Judge Halpern would remand the case for a full hearing to determine whether conditional release is warranted in that the court has inherent power 'to do justice when the circumstances require it.'

and that a conditional release would not be utilized unless authorized by this Court or the Legislature. The court noted that even if conditional release was availble, the trial court's findings did not justify its use.

Public safety is the primary concern in shielding the public from both criminals and those adjudicated insane. '(T)he aim of the law is to protect the innocent from injury by the sick as well as the bad.' State v. Maik, Supra at 213, 287 A.2d at 720. The criminal is punished by a prison term and hopefully deterred from further unlawful acts. Another object of confining the insane is treatment and rehabilitation. They are an 'exceptional class of people' who have demonstrated their threat to society by committing an act harmful to others. Overholser v. Leach, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 257 F.2d 667, 669 (1958).

Since Marik, release is based on a test more demanding than the M'Naghten standard required for initial commitment. Confinement to a state institution is to continue not only until manifestations of the illness have abated and the offender once again can distinguish right from wrong, but until the underlying illness from which psychotic episodes emerge is cured. Given an individual's demonstrated capacity to violate the law, coupled with his susceptibility to phychotic While the Court recognizes the overriding concern for public safety involved in commitments subsequent to an adjudication of insanity, we do not believe that the commission of an offense against the laws of this State by one subsequently adjudicated insane and committed to a state hospital is a Carte blanche justification for lifetime commitment where the underlying mental condition is incurable. We recognize that some patients will be faced with lifetime commitment; however, we can discern no legislative intent to confine others for those periods during which they may be capable of functioning in society so long as reasonable assurances are provided that no harm will come to the public. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court for a hearing on the propriety of conditional release. The question as to conditional release now before this Court arises under commitment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:163--2. The statute provides in part:

episodes depriving him of reason, anything short of confinement 'would fail to protect the citizens from further acute episodes.' State v. Maik, Supra at 217, 287 A.2d at 723. The underlying illness is the defect of reason which must be restored prior to release.

If any person in confinement under commitment, indictment or under any process, shall appear to be insane, the assignment judge, or judge of the county court of the county in which such person is confined, may, upon presentation to him of the application and certificates as provided in Title 30, chapter 4 of the Revised Statutes, instituted an inquiry and take proofs as to the mental condition of such person. The proofs herein referred to may include testimony of qualified psychiatrists to be taken in open court by the judge, either in the presence of a jury specially impanelled to try the issue of insanity alone, or without a jury, as the judge in his discretion may determine. It shall be competent for the judge if sitting without a jury, or the jury, if one is impanelled, to determine not only the sanity of the accused at the time of the hearing, but as well the sanity of the accused at the time the offense charged against him is alleged to have been committed.

If it shall be determined after hearing as aforesaid, that the accused was insane at the time the offense charged against him is alleged to have been committed, the charge against him shall be dismissed on this ground and the records of the proceedings so noted. In this event, the judge or jury, as the case may be, shall also find separately whether his insanity in any degree continues, and, if it does, shall order him into safe custody and direct him to be sent to the New Jersey state hospital at Trenton, to be confined as otherwise provided by law, and maintained as to expense as is otherwise provided for the maintenance of the criminal insane, until such time as he may be restored to reason, and no...