State v. Carter

• Decision Date: 20 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-1271.,04-1271.
• Citation: 733 N.W.2d 333
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kenneth Dale CARTER, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

733 N.W.2d 333

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kenneth Dale CARTER, Appellant.

No. 04-1271.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 20, 2007.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant State Appellate Defender, and Travis Johnson, Drake Student Intern, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy N. Schott, County Attorney, and Jonathan Beaty, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Kenneth Carter appealed his conviction for drug possession, claiming that evidence seized from his home was erroneously admitted into evidence. The district court rejected his argument, as did the court of appeals. On further review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Kenneth Carter was charged with drug offenses based on evidence seized in a March 1997 search of his home. That case was dismissed on application of the State and is not involved in this appeal. After the case was dismissed, the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance (department) began proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 453B (1997) to collect drug taxes in the amount of $6060, based on Carter's possession of marijuana plants observed during the March 1997 search. Despite the fact that the criminal case arising out of that possession had been dismissed, the department, on December 4, 1997, obtained an administrative search warrant to search Carter's home again. A representative of the department and a police officer served the warrant and, in the process, noted marijuana odor and a marijuana pipe. Based on this information, the police officer applied for, and obtained, a criminal search warrant to search Carter's home again. This search yielded the marijuana that provided the basis for the present prosecution. Carter was convicted, and he appealed. His conviction was affirmed by this court in an unreported decision in 1999. In that decision, we reserved his ineffective-assistance claim for possible postconviction relief proceedings.

On Carter's postconviction application, the district court set aside his conviction and ordered a new trial. Prior to the new trial, Carter filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the marijuana evidence was seized in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. The motion did not provide specific grounds for the constitutional arguments, but the district court at the hearing on the motion put the issue in sharp focus:

My understanding is that the legal issue is rather narrowly defined, that says if the officer had the right to be in the place where he was when he made the observations at the time of the execution of the administrative warrant, then the criminal warrant is not invalid. If, on the other hand, he had no right to be where he was because of something improper about the execution or granting of the administrative warrant, then the criminal warrant is no good.

As the district court noted, the administrative search warrant provided the basis for the later issuance of the criminal warrant. Carter contends that the administrative warrant was invalid and the evidence seized as a result of it was therefore inadmissible under the principle of fruit of the poisonous tree.

II. Standard of Review.

We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a challenger must prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; Schroeder Oil Co. v. Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 458 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Iowa 1990). The challenger must refute every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found constitutional, and if the statute may be construed in more than one way, we adopt the construction that does not violate the constitution. Iowa Code § 4.4 ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: (1) Compliance with the Constitutions of the state and of the United States is intended."); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665.

III. The Statutes.

A. The drug-tax statute in general. Iowa Code chapter 453B imposes an excise tax on dealers of certain controlled substances, including marijuana. See Iowa Code §§ 453B.1(3)(c) (covering marijuana plants), 453B.7 (imposition of tax). The statute does not require a conviction, or even an arrest, for drug dealing in order to impose the excise tax. Id.; see State v. Eames, 565 N.W.2d 323, 324 (Iowa 1997) (conviction of mere possession). At the time of the administrative search in this case, there was not even a pending criminal case.

B. Jeopardy assessments in general. Iowa Code section 422.30 provides for the collection of taxes through jeopardy assessments:

If the director believes that the assessment or collection of taxes will be jeopardized by delay, the director may immediately make an assessment of the estimated amount of tax due, together with all interest, additional amounts, or penalties, as provided by law. The director shall serve the taxpayer by regular mail at the taxpayer's last known address or in person, with a written notice of the amount of tax, interest, and penalty due, which notice may include a demand for immediate payment. Service of the notice by regular mail is complete upon mailing. A distress warrant may be issued or a lien filed against the taxpayer immediately.

A jeopardy assessment, which is in the nature of an emergency-collection procedure, is defined as "[a]n assessment by the [taxing authority]—without the usual review procedures—of additional tax owed by a taxpayer who underpaid, based on the [tax authority's] belief that collection of a deficiency would be jeopardized by delay." Black's Law Dictionary 112 (7th ed.1999). Jeopardy assessments are part of what we have described as "the department's sweeping tax collection authority." Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. State, 564 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 1997).

C. Drug taxes and the jeopardy assessment statute. Section 422.30, our general jeopardy assessment statute quoted above, is limited by its terms to cases in which collection by ordinary means will be jeopardized by delay. However, Iowa Code section 453B.9 creates a special presumption that all assessments in drug-tax cases are jeopardy assessments:

All assessments of taxes made pursuant to this chapter shall be considered jeopardy assessments or collections as provided in section 422.30. The director shall assess a tax, interest, and applicable penalties based on knowledge or information available to the director; serve the taxpayer by regular mail at the taxpayer's last known address or in person, a written notice of the amount of tax, interest, and penalty due, which notice may include a demand for immediate payment; and immediately proceed to collect the tax, interest, and penalty by any method prescribed in section 422.30. The period for examination, determination of amount of tax owed, and assessment is unlimited. Service of the notice by regular mail is complete upon mailing.

(Emphasis added.) The effect of this statute is to eliminate in all drug cases any requirement that the director establish the need for the jeopardy assessment or even that he "believes" the assessment is in jeopardy as required by Iowa Code section 422.30 for other jeopardy assessments.

D. The administrative search. Pursuant to section 453B.9, the director issued a distress warrant, directed to the sheriff, ordering him

to forthwith distrain, seize, garnish or levy upon . . . any and all real or personal property belonging to the above said delinquent account . . . sufficient to satisfy said Tax Liability, plus sheriff & court costs, and to make due and prompt return to the Department of Revenue and Finance in Des Moines, Iowa or the District Court under Chapters 626 & 642, all taxes, penalty, interest penalty, interest and accrued costs so collected . . . .

To assist the sheriff in locating assets from which to satisfy the amount of drug tax due, the department applied for an administrative search warrant under Iowa Code section 453B.11:

[t]he director may petition the district court or a magistrate for an administrative search warrant as authorized by section 808.14 to execute a distress warrant authorized by section 422.26.

Section 808.14, in turn, provides authority for courts to issue administrative search warrants "in accordance with the statutory and common law requirements for the issuance of such warrants."

IV. The Issue.

The issue is whether the criminal search warrant, which yielded the evidence in question in this case, was valid, and that, in turn, depends on whether the administrative search that preceded it was valid. If the administrative search was not valid, the fruits of that search were inadmissible under the principles of the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); cf. Adams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ind.2002) (preliminary search under distress warrant revealed drugs leading to criminal warrant).

The defendant argues the searches were invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the rights protected by the federal and state constitutions collectively as "Fourth Amendment rights." The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The scope and purpose of Iowa's search and seizure clause is coextensive with the federal court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1995). In State v. Eames, we examined ...