State v. Carter
| Decision Date | 12 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 860063,860063 |
| Citation | 776 P.2d 886,108 Utah Adv.Rep. 12 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Douglas CARTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Gary Weight, James P. Rupper, Thomas H. Means, Provo, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Lionel H. Frankel, Salt Lake City, for ACLU.
On February 27, 1985, Eva Oleson was found dead in her home. Following an investigation, defendant was arrested in Nashville, Tennessee, and charged with the murder. After confessing to officers that he committed the crime, defendant was extradited to Provo, Utah, where he was tried and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.
Defendant's original appellate counsel filed two briefs on appeal. After defendant filed a pro se motion with this Court, replacement counsel was appointed to brief additional issues defendant raised. Also, the American Civil Liberties Union was permitted to file an amicus brief in this case.
In reaching the issues on appeal, we reiterate that
[t]his Court will review errors raised and briefed on appeal in death penalty cases, even though no proper objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction based upon such errors only if they meet the manifest and prejudicial error standard. In addition, this Court has the power to notice manifest ("palpable") error apparent in the record and correct a conviction based upon the same if the error is prejudicial, even though such error is not objected to at trial or assigned on appeal. 1
In addition to correctly reflecting this Court's responsibility and approach in reviewing death penalty cases, this rule also impliedly recognizes another established principle generally applicable to all civil and criminal cases, namely, that this Court need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal. Rather, it is a maxim of appellate review that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is largely discretionary with that court. 2
This was essentially the view of the North Carolina Supreme Court in stating:
It is our duty to decide all cases brought before us, but whether a written opinion shall be filed is entirely within our discretion. A failure to do so is in no sense a reflection upon counsel, nor is it any criterion as to the ability or learning with which the case may have been argued. It simply means that we do not think it necessary.... If the essential principles upon which a case depends have been already settled, we can add but little, if anything, to what has already been said; while the discussion of questions not essential to its determination, even if argued by counsel, may well be omitted in the interest of time and space. 3
Similarly, in holding that California's constitution did not require its appellate courts to "set forth and dispose of, seriatim, each and every item which appellant's counsel chooses to characterize as an 'issue' in the case," the California Court of Appeals eloquently stated:
Our statement that these other contentions 'did not merit discussion' is an indication that we necessarily and carefully analyzed the contentions in order to reach that conclusion....
....
In an era in which there is concern that the quality of justice is being diminished by appellate backlog with its attendant delay, which in turn contributes to a lack of finality of judgment, it behooves us as an appellate court to "get to the heart" of cases presented and dispose of them expeditiously. Unnecessary verbiage and redundant literary exercises are counter-productive. 4
In applying this principle to cases before us, we have, after fully considering the substance of particular claims raised on appeal, summarily (and often without written analysis) dismissed the same as meritless or of no effect. 5 Use of this rule in capital punishment and other cases continues to be appropriate and important in acknowledging established principles while enabling this Court, after fair and comprehensive review, to expeditiously focus judicial resources and energy on those critical or outcome-determinative issues which may be raised in any given case and/or which have not in substance been previously urged upon this Court and rejected. 6 Accordingly, after fully reviewing every claim raised in the instant case, we discuss at length only those issues critical to this appeal. 7
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not suppressing his confession. Several months after the murder occurred, Tennessee police officers received information from an anonymous source that defendant was at a female friend's Nashville residence. After confirming that defendant was wanted in connection with the case, officers proceeded to the friend's residence and there arrested defendant.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, a Nashville police officer testified that he gave defendant a Miranda warning after arresting him. At the police station later that day, he again advised defendant of his Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver of those rights from him. The officer then questioned defendant for several hours over the next two days; during those times, defendant was allowed to smoke, drink water, and use restroom facilities.
The officer testified that he did not threaten defendant. He also denied that he used the friend's situation or that of her children in any manner to intimidate defendant into confessing, stating that he offered information about her status only in response to defendant's frequent questions regarding her.
A police officer from the Provo police department was sent to Tennessee to extradite defendant. At the suppression hearing, the Provo officer testified that when he interviewed defendant in Tennessee, he advised defendant of his Miranda rights and soon obtained a confession from him. Thereafter, the officer apparently dictated the confession, stopping after every few lines to ask defendant whether what was dictated was accurate. The confession was then reduced to writing and signed. Although acknowledging at the suppression hearing that he had interviewed defendant's friend prior to questioning defendant, the officer denied making any threats or promises to defendant concerning her.
In contrast, defendant testified that he never received Miranda warnings from the Nashville or the Provo officer and that he could not recall signing written waivers of his constitutional rights. Defendant did acknowledge, however, that his signature appeared to be on documents waiving those rights. On appeal, he reiterates his claim that the officers repeatedly threatened that his friend would be charged with a felony, go to prison, and be separated from her children unless he confessed.
In State v. Bishop, 8 we recently noted that the State bears the burden of proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession is voluntary. 9 Voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances of the accused and his or her interrogation. 10 Applying this standard, we have examined the record and reviewed the totality of the circumstances and now conclude that defendant's statements were voluntarily made. 11 The trial court was presented with significantly different accounts of the circumstances of defendant's confession. However, defendant has not shown that the court abused its discretion in assessing the evidence presented and drawing a reasonable conclusion therefrom. 12
Defendant further claims that the court erred in admitting his confession, given the manner in which it was dictated. He also contends that the prosecutor's statements which attributed to defendant the specific words of the confession that the Provo officer dictated undermined his constitutional right not to testify and denied the court a true version of his statement, all of which substantially prejudiced his trial.
After reviewing the record, we are convinced that there is no proof to support a determination that any significant item was omitted from the statement, that defendant's rights were violated, or that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments. In fact, defendant's own detailed statements to two other witnesses immediately after the crime parallel and substantially support the confession given to the police. Further, defendant signed the document, and he was not denied a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the officers concerning the accuracy of the writing as a reflection of his oral confession. 13
While we hold that admission of the confession was not prejudicial error, we do not sanction the particular manner in which it was recorded in this case. In Bishop, that defendant's confession, together with statements made by the police officers, was recorded verbatim. This process not only helped insure that the defendant's confession was not coerced, but also provided both the trial court and this court with the correct tools for effectively and efficiently reviewing the defendant's contentions, as well as the totality of the circumstances of his confession. 14 Such a process guarantees that constitutional rights are protected and justice is effected. Nevertheless, while the dictation process that occurred in this case could conceivably amount, in other instances, to deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights, that was not the case here.
Next, we turn to defendant's claim that the prosecutor indirectly commented on defendant's failure to testify at trial and suggested to the jury that his silence implied guilt. Defendant refers to the following comment which the prosecutor made in his summation to the jury during the guilt phase of trial:
I heard no evidence, evidence, [sic] from the witness stand about coercion or about inducing somebody to say anything about something that didn't happen. I...
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