State v. Carter

• Decision Date: 15 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. CX-95-1368, No. C9-95-1765.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Wayne Thomas CARTER, Appellant, Melvin Johns, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

596 N.W.2d 654

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Wayne Thomas CARTER, Appellant, Melvin Johns, Appellant.

Nos. CX-95-1368, C9-95-1765.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 15, 1999.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Scott Swanson, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, Bradford Colbert, Asst. State Public Defender, St. Paul, for appellants.

Michael A. Hatch, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Atty., Phillip D. Prokopowicz, Hastings, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

These cases return to us on remand from the United States Supreme Court. On September 11, 1997, we ruled that the police violated the constitutional rights of appellants, Wayne Thomas Carter and Melvin Johns, when an Eagan police officer stood 12 to 18 inches from a window of an apartment and looked through a gap in the blinds, spotting the appellants packaging cocaine in the kitchen with a woman who was later identified as Kimberly Thompson, the sole lessee of the apartment. We reversed the district court and the court of appeals, holding (1) that the search of the apartment was illegal and (2) that appellants had "standing" to challenge the search. State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn.1997) (citing Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution).¹ Three members of this court dissented, agreeing with the majority that the search was illegal but contending that appellants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the search of Thompson's apartment. Id. at 179-81.

The United States Supreme Court granted review and, in a 5-4 decision delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed this court, holding that appellants, as short-term business guests, did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge any search of Thompson's apartment. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 474, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). The Supreme Court differentiated between an overnight guest who may claim Fourth Amendment protection, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), and one who is "merely `legitimately on the premises'" who may not. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 473-74 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). The Supreme Court also noted that an expectation of privacy in commercial property is less than an expectation of privacy in a home. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 474 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987)).

The Supreme Court remanded the case to this court. Although we referenced both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of our state constitution in our prior decision of State v. Carter, our analysis was based entirely on Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we asked the parties to brief the issue of whether Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution affords the appellants greater protection than provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. We conclude, on the facts of this case,² that appellants' rights to challenge any search under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution are coextensive with appellants' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, we now hold that appellants do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge the search of the apartment under the Minnesota Constitution.

We reach this conclusion for two primary reasons. First, our decision in State v. Carter was predicated on an application of federal case law and implicit in our decision was the understanding that, on the facts of this case, any rights protected by the Minnesota Constitution were coextensive with the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Second, we are not persuaded in this case to accord greater protections under the state constitution than provided by the federal constitution.

Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." This language is identical to the search and seizure language of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

We have stated that a decision of the Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the United States Constitution that is identical to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is "of inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force." State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn.1985); see also State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn.1988)

. We

may interpret the Minnesota Constitution to afford more protection than provided under the U.S. Constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (explaining that states may "adopt in [their] own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution") (citation omitted). We view with great import our role of protecting the rights of Minnesota's citizens:

It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution. Indeed, as the highest court of this state, we are " `independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens.'" State courts are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system.

Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 726 (citations omitted). We have stated, however, that a decision to interpret the Minnesota Constitution differently than the federal constitution should not be made "cavalierly." Id.

On two occasions we have reached conclusions regarding Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution that departed from decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the identical language of the Fourth Amendment.³ In so doing, we interpreted the Minnesota Constitution as according greater protection than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment because we viewed the Supreme Court's decisions as "radical" or "sharp" departures from precedent. In In the Matter of the Welfare of E.D.J., we departed from Supreme Court precedent regarding what constitutes a "seizure" under the Minnesota Constitution, concluding that the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), represented a "sharp departure" from its previous decisions which warranted a separate, more protective standard under the Minnesota Constitution. 502 N.W.2d 779, 780 (Minn.1993). One year after E.D.J., we again departed from the Supreme Court, ruling in Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety that the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), allowing the use of temporary road blocks to investigate driving under the influence, represented a "radical" departure from the previous rule. 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn.1994). We reiterated the long-standing requirement that police need an objective individualized articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before making an investigative stop in Minnesota. See id. at 187.

We are not persuaded by appellants' arguments that the Supreme Court's analysis in this case represents a radical or sharp departure from Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court's decision in this case is a logical extension of Minnesota v. Olson, which held that an overnight guest could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another while a person merely "legitimately on the premises" may not. 495 U.S. at 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684.

In this case, the Supreme Court reasoned that the "purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of previous connection between [appellants] and the householder, all lead us to conclude that [appellants'] situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 474.⁴ Unlike our decisions in E.D.J. and Ascher, we are not convinced that a separate rule is necessary under the Minnesota Constitution. Today's decision is consistent with our previous decisions analyzing whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. We have said on numerous occasions that a defendant who cannot demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the area searched or the item seized may not contest the legality of the search or seizure. See, e.g., State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn.1996)

(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-48,

99 S.Ct. 421); State v. Tungland, 281 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Minn.1979) (also citing Rakas).

In our prior opinion in State v. Carter we relied exclusively on United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the scope of Fourth Amendment protection as applied to the facts of these cases, with the implicit conclusion that the scope of Article I, Section 10 was coextensive in these circumstances. On remand, confronted with the same facts, our conclusion that the protections afforded by Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution should be coextensive with the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has not changed.

Therefore, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998), the judgments of this court in State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.1997), and in State v. Johns, 569 N.W.2d 180 (Minn.1997), are hereby vacated. The judgment of the court of appeals in State v. Carter...