State v. Carter

Decision Date27 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. CR–01–0553550.,CR–01–0553550.
Citation55 A.3d 829,52 Conn.Supp. 452
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Anthony CARTER.
CourtConnecticut Superior Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Anthony Carter, pro se, the defendant.

Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, for the state.

GOLD, J.

The court has before it the following motions filed by the defendant: (1) a motion to correct an illegal sentence, dated October 8, 2010, later amended by a similarly entitled motion dated April 29, 2011; (2) two motions to open and set aside the judgment, dated respectively December 16, 2010, and June 3, 2001; and (3) a pleading entitled Bill in Equity,” dated May 20, 2011.1 Each of these motions, in primary part, reflects yet another attempt by the defendant to challenge his 2002 conviction and sentence through his advancementof a “conspiracy/perjury/misconduct theory” 2 alleged by him to have undermined the fairness of his trial and to have involved the Hartford police department, the Hartford state's attorney's office and the trial court. This theory has been the subject of a previous motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed with the trial court in 2007, as well as multiple petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, and has been summarily rejected in each and every forum both at the trial court level and on appeal.3 After consideration of the present motions, this court concludes that, with the exception of the second issue in his motion to correct, all of the defendant's claims have been ruled upon in prior proceedings and the doctrine of collateral estoppel therefore precludes their relitigation here. As to the second issue in the motion to correct, the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim. Accordingly, and as explained hereinafter, the defendant's motions are dismissed in their entirety.

IMOTION TO CORRECT

The defendant filed the present motion to correct and accompanying memorandum in support thereof dated October 8, 2010, as well as an amended request for relief dated April 29, 2011. In the motion, the defendant raises three claims: (1) his sentences for assault in the first degree and attempted assault in the first degree are illegal because they violate the principles against double jeopardy; (2) his sentence for assault in the first degree was illegally imposed because it violates the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions; and (3) his sentences were illegally imposed because the state's attorney failed to disclose to the judicial authority information favorable to the defendant. The court concludes that the defendant's first and third claims are barred by collateral estoppel, and that his second claim is not properly raised by way of a motion to correct.

The defendant's first issue, that his sentences for assault in the first degree and attempted assault in the first degree violate the principles against double jeopardy, was raised in the defendant's first petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court, Fuger, J., addressed the claim in the context of a procedural default analysis, a default the defendant sought to overcome by alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to address the double jeopardy issue at his trial and on direct appeal. The habeas court determined that there was no reason for either counsel to have raised the double jeopardy issue because there was no merit to the claim. Carter v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV–04–4000182, 2006 WL 1360018 (May 4, 2006, Fuger, J.), appeal dismissed, 106 Conn.App. 464, 942 A.2d 494, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 906, 953 A.2d 651 (2008).

The defendant's third issue, concerning the state's attorney's failure to disclose information favorable to the defendant, has been fully litigated in prior proceedings as well. This issue—which although not specifically labeled as such essentially involves an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)—generally concerns alleged inconsistencies between certain ballistics evidence offered against the defendant at trial and the contents of multiple reports relating to that evidence prepared by Hartford police Detective Edwin Soto that the defendant contends were not disclosed to him prior to trial. In the defendant's third habeas action, the court, Nazzaro, J., considered this broad claim in its entirety and deter-mined that any information allegedly withheld was immaterial and that any inconsistencies were “picayune” and at best nothing more than “scrivener's errors.” Carter v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV–07–4002005, 2010 WL 628440 (January 22, 2010, Nazzaro, J.).

Because the defendant's double jeopardy and Brady issues have previously been heard and decided, this court must first decide whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars their reconsideration here. “The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality.... Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim.... For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment....

“An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined.... An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered.... If an issue has been determined, but the judgment is not dependent [on] the determination of the issue, the parties may relitigate the issue in a subsequent action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Almedina, 119 Conn.App. 46, 51–52, 986 A.2d 1109, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 911, 989 A.2d 1074 (2010).

Applying these principles to the present case, the court concludes that the first and third issues contained within the defendant's motion to correct are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The first habeas court, Fuger, J., through its procedural default analysis, necessarily rejected the same double jeopardy claim that the defendant seeks to reassert in the present motion to correct. Similarly, the third habeas court, Nazzaro, J., through its analysis, rejected the defendant's contention that exculpatory or other favorable evidence and reports had been wrongfully withheld from him at trial. In each of these proceedings, the defendant's claim was fully and fairly litigated before the court, was actually decided by that court, and was necessary to that court's ultimate judgment. As such, the defendant is not entitled now simply to recycle these claims and have yet another court consider them. Rather, the claims are barred by collateral estoppel and therefore must be dismissed.

Finally, as to the second claim in the motion to correct, the defendant alleges that his sentence for assault in the first degree was illegally imposed because it violates the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions. Before the merits of this claim can be addressed, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim. “Jurisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 153, 913 A.2d 428 (2007). “It is axiomatic that, in a criminal case, the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a defendant's sentence has begun and a court may no longer take any action affecting a sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act.... Pursuant to Practice Book § 43–22: The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierce, 129 Conn.App. 516, 522, 21 A.3d 877, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 915, 27 A.3d 368 (2011).

“Sentences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but ... imposed in a way which violates [the] defendant's right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment ... or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn.App. 416, 444, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988). [T]hese enumerated examples [however] would not encompass rights or procedures subsequently recognized as man-dated by federal due process.... Nor would those examples encompass procedures mandated by state law that are intended to ensure fundamental fairness in sentencing, which, if not followed, could render a sentence invalid. Therefore, the examples cited in McNellis, are not exhaustive and the parameters of an invalid sentence will evolve.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 839–40, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010).

Here, the defendant seeks to attack the constitutionality of a penal statute and not the sentencing proceeding itself. Such challenges do not fall within the scope of the trial court's jurisdiction for a motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner; see State v. Henderson, 93 Conn.App. 61, 74–75, 888 A.2d 132, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 927, 895 A.2d 800 (2006); even with due consideration given to the expansion contemplated by Supreme Court...

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3 cases
  • State v. Carter
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 6 de novembro de 2012
    ...of this case, the issues properly were resolved in the court's complete and well reasoned memorandum of decision. See State v. Carter, 52 Conn.Supp. 452, 55 A.3d 829 (2011). We therefore adopt it as the proper statement of the relevant facts, issues and applicable law, as it would serve no ......
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    • Connecticut Superior Court
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    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 4 de dezembro de 2012

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