State v. Carter, 39392–1–II.

Decision Date27 April 2011
Docket NumberNo. 39392–1–II.,39392–1–II.
Citation161 Wash.App. 532,255 P.3d 721
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Appellant,v.Marcus Alton CARTER, Respondent.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jeremy Aaron Morris, Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office, Port Orchard, WA, for Appellant.Marcus Alton Carter, pro se.JOHANSON, J.

[161 Wash.App. 534] ¶ 1 The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of a machine gun possession charge against Marcus Alton Carter. It argues that the trial court erred when it (1) ruled that the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption to the possession of an unlawful weapons statute, RCW 9.41.190(1), is an element of the offense the State had the burden of disproving; (2) ruled that RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) allows gunsmiths licensed under 18 U.S.C. § 923 and who have repaired machine guns for the military and local law enforcement agencies to possess personal machine guns without first showing that such possession is allowed under federal law; and (3) dismissed the case after finding that the State had not demonstrated that the exemption did not apply to Carter. We hold that (1) the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption is not an element of the offense but, rather, a defense that Carter had the burden of establishing; (2) the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption does not allow for private possession of a machine gun unless the defendant shows that such possession is authorized under federal law; and (3) Carter failed to establish that the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption applied. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS
I. Background

¶ 2 On May 15, 1999, two off-duty criminal investigators attended a certified firearms instructor course in Kitsap County that Carter was teaching. State v. Carter, 151 Wash.2d 118, 121–22, 85 P.3d 887 (2004). During the course, they became aware that Carter had what appeared to be an illegally-modified automatic firearm. Carter, 151 Wash.2d at 121–23, 85 P.3d 887. The investigators confronted Carter, took the gun, and contacted law enforcement. Carter, 151 Wash.2d at 123–24, 85 P.3d 887.

¶ 3 The State charged Carter with possession of a machine gun in violation of RCW 9.41.190(1). Carter, 151 Wash.2d at 124, 85 P.3d 887. Carter successfully moved to suppress the weapon based on an unlawful warrantless search. Carter, 151 Wash.2d at 124, 85 P.3d 887. The State appealed, and our Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Carter, 151 Wash.2d at 121, 124, 129–30, 85 P.3d 887. On remand, the trial court granted Carter's Knapstad 1 motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. State v. Carter, 138 Wash.App. 350, 353, 157 P.3d 420 (2007). In May 2007, we affirmed the dismissal but “clarif[ied] that the order of dismissal [was] without prejudice.” Carter, 138 Wash.App. at 368, 157 P.3d 420. In August 2007, the State re-charged Carter with possession of a machine gun.

II. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 4 On March 20, 2009, Carter moved to dismiss,2 this time arguing that he was exempt from prosecution under RCW 9.41.190(2)(b)(i) and (ii) because he was a “federally licensed gunsmith, a firearms instructor and inventor,” who had worked on machine guns for law enforcement agencies and the military.3 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 55. RCW 9.41.190(2) provides:

(2) [The prohibition against owning or possessing a machine gun stated in RCW 9.41.190(1) ] shall not apply to:

(a) Any peace officer in the discharge of official duty or traveling to or from official duty, or to any officer or member of the armed forces of the United States or the state of Washington in the discharge of official duty or traveling to or from official duty; or

(b) A person ... who or which is exempt from or licensed under federal law, and engaged in the production, manufacture, repair, or testing of machine guns ...:

(i) To be used or purchased by the armed forces of the United States; (ii) To be used or purchased by federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement agencies; or

(iii) For exportation in compliance with all applicable federal laws and regulations.

(Emphasis added.) In support of his motion, Carter submitted a personal declaration in which he claimed to have worked on machine guns for law enforcement agencies and the military; and a copy of a title 18 U.S.C. federal firearms dealer's license.

¶ 5 Characterizing Carter's motion as a Knapstad motion, the State argued that (1) the motion was improper because Carter was alleging an affirmative defense that required him to show that he had complied with federal law, which was a jury question; (2) Carter failed to show that he was in compliance with federal law; and (3) to be entitled to the exemption, Carter had to show that he was licensed under title 26 U.S.C.4 rather than under title 18 U.S.C. CP at 69–71.

¶ 6 On April 7, the trial court heard Carter's motion. Although it concluded that the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption was an element of the offense and that Carter had demonstrated that he was “licensed under federal law” at the relevant time, it denied Carter's motion after finding that Carter had failed to show that he had worked on machine guns for the armed forces or law enforcement. Report of Proceedings (RP) (Apr. 7, 2009) at 45–46.

¶ 7 Two weeks later, Carter filed a supplemental motion to dismiss and provided the trial court with two affidavits stating that he had worked on machine guns for the Mason County Sheriff's Office and the military. In addition, these affidavits suggested that Carter sometimes used his “personal rifle” when training law enforcement officers and military personnel. CP at 137–38. The State responded that 18 U.S.C. § 922( o ) prohibited personal possession of machine guns and continued to argue that Carter had to establish that he had authorization under title 26 U.S.C. to lawfully possess a machine gun.

¶ 8 The trial court held a second hearing on Carter's motion to dismiss. At this hearing, Carter argued that the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption applied to him because his affidavits demonstrated that military and local law enforcement personnel had “used” his “personal rifle” in trainings. RP (May 1, 2009) at 9–10. The State argued, as it had before, that 18 U.S.C. § 922( O ) PROHIBITED POSSESSION OF A MACHIne gun except under two specific circumstances that did not apply to Carter, that Carter's title 18 U.S.C. federal license did not authorize him to personally possess a machine gun, and that Carter could own a machine gun only under title 26 U.S.C.

¶ 9 The trial court granted Carter's motion to dismiss. Again characterizing the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption as an element of the offense, it concluded that the State had failed to show that Carter did not qualify for the exemption, that Carter's title 18 U.S.C. license was enough to establish the exemption regardless of whether that license allowed him to possess a machine gun under federal law, and that Carter had shown that he had repaired or tested machine guns used by the military or local law enforcement. 5 It noted that the State did not dispute the license's validity, whether the license had been valid in May 1999, or the affidavits' contents.

¶ 10 The State appeals.

[161 Wash.App. 539 , 255 P.3d 725]

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The State argues that (1) the RCW 9.41.190(2)(b) exemption is an affirmative defense rather than an element of the offense of unlawful possession of a machine gun that the State had to disprove, (2) RCW 9.41.190's plain language demonstrates a legislative intent to make it unlawful for a person to privately possess a machine gun unless such possession is allowed under federal law, and (3) Carter not did qualify for the exemption because he failed to show that he was “exempt from or licensed under federal law” to privately possess a machine gun. RCW 9.41.190(2)(b). We agree.

I. Standard of Review and Statutory Interpretation

¶ 12 The core issues in this case involve the interpretation of RCW 9.41.190(2). RCW 9.41.190 provides in relevant part:

(1) It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, own, buy, sell, loan, furnish, transport, or have in possession or under control, any machine gun ...; or any part designed and intended solely and exclusively for use in a machine gun ..., or in converting a weapon into a machine gun....

(2) This section shall not apply to:

(a) Any peace officer in the discharge of official duty or traveling to or from official duty, or to any officer or member of the armed forces of the United States or the state of Washington in the discharge of official duty or traveling to or from official duty; or

(b) A person ... who or which is exempt from or licensed under federal law, and engaged in the production, manufacture, repair, or testing of machine guns ...:

(i) To be used or purchased by the armed forces of the United States;

(ii) To be used or purchased by federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement agencies; or

(iii) For exportation in compliance with all applicable federal laws and regulations.

(3) It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution brought under this section that the machine gun ... was acquired prior to July 1, 1994, and is possessed in compliance with federal law.

¶ 13 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo and interpret statutes to give effect to the legislature's intentions.” State v. Bunker, 169 Wash.2d 571, 577–78, 238 P.3d 487 (2010) (citing City of Spokane v. County of Spokane, 158 Wash.2d 661, 672–73, 146 P.3d 893 (2006)). We start our analysis by examining the statute's plain language as discerned ‘from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes [that] disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ Bunker, 169 Wash.2d at 578, 238 P.3d 487 (quoting Chadwick Farms Owners Ass'n v. FHC, LLC, 166 Wash.2d 178, 186, 207 P.3d 1251 (2009)). “When interpreting a statute, we must avoid unlikely, absurd, or strained results.” In re Det. of Coppin, 157 Wash.App. 537, 552, 238 P.3d 1192 (2010) (citing Morris v. Blaker, 118...

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    ...since it is a matter more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant himself, and more readily proven by him"); State v. Carter, 161 Wash.App. 532, 540-542 (2011), quoting State v. Moses, 79 Wash.2d 104, 110 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) (identifying as affirmative defens......

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