State v. Carver
Decision Date | 21 July 2021 |
Docket Number | 2021-UP-278 |
Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Jason Franklin Carver, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2017-002011 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted June 1, 2021
Appeal From Anderson County R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge
Donald Loren Smith, of Attorney Office of Donald Smith, of Anderson for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney General Donald J Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
In this criminal matter, Jason Franklin Carver appeals his conviction for murder. Carver argues the trial court violated his due process rights and erred in (1) denying his motion for a new trial, (2) charging the jury on "the hand of one, hand of all" doctrine, and (3) failing to direct a verdict in his favor. We affirm.
1.We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carver's motion for a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence. See State v. Garrett, 350 S.C. 613, 619, 567 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he grant or refusal of a new trial is within the trial discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion."); State v. Hughes, 346 S.C. 339, 342, 552 S.E.2d 35 36 (Ct. App. 2001) ().
The evidence that Carver asserts warrants a new trial was not material and is merely cumulative to the evidence presented at trial; it would not have changed the result if a new trial was granted. See State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 619-20, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1999) ().
2.We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carver's motion for a new trial on the basis that he was deprived of a fair trial. See Garrett, 350 S.C. at 619, 567 S.E.2d at 526 ("[T]he grant or refusal of a new trial is within the trial discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion.").
The State filing different charges against Carver and his two codefendants did not deprive him of a fair trial. The State has prosecutorial discretion, and Carver failed to establish a claim for selective prosecution. See Ex parte Littlefield, 343 S.C. 212, 218, 540 S.E.2d 81, 84 (2000) ("The South Carolina Constitution and case law place the unfettered discretion to prosecute solely in the prosecutor's hands."); State v. Geer, 391 S.C. 179, 195, 705 S.E.2d 441, 449 (Ct. App. 2010) ; id. at 194, 705 S.E.2d at 449 ( ).
The trial court also did not err in denying Carver a new trial based on his codefendant's deferred sentencing. State v. Wright, 269 S.C. 414, 417, 237 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1977) ("An unsentenced codefendant is a competent witness for the State.").
Further, the State's failure to provide Carver with a recording of its meeting with his codefendant prior to trial or with information regarding his codefendant's plea bargain did not deprive Carver of a fair trial. The court adjourned for the day to allow Carver the opportunity to review the tape-recording that was withheld from him prior to trial. Therefore, Carver was aware of his codefendant's plea bargain and sentence deferment, and Carver was able to cross-examine him regarding any negotiations with the State. See Rule 5(a)(2), SCRCrimP ("[T]his rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of . . . statements made by prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses."). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Carver a new trial. See State v. Newell, 303 S.C. 471, 476, 401 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Rule 5(d)(2), [SCRCrimP] . . . gives the court a broad discretion in deciding what should be done whe[n] material that should have been produced in response to an earlier request does not become known until during or just before the trial."); id. at 476, 401 S.E.2d at 423-24 (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to suppress statements because the court recessed trial to allow the defendant the opportunity to interview a witness) ; State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 150, 498 S.E.2d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 1998) ().
3. We find the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict in Carver's favor because the State produced evidence of Carver's presence at the scene of the shooting as a result of an arranged plan to undertake an illegal act. See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) (); id. (); State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 235, 781 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2016) ("ourt's review is limited to considering the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); Weston, 367 S.C. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 (); State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ct. App. 2002) (); State v. Thompson, 374 S.C. 257, 262, 647 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Ct. App. 2007) .
4. We find the trial court did not violate Carver's due process rights when it refused Carver the opportunity to call his codefendant as a witness. Because Carver's codefendant made clear he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination on the stand, it was desirable that the jury not have the ability to draw any inferences from the invocation. See State v. Hughes, 328 S.C. 146, 150, 493 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1997) (); id. at 152, 493 S.E.2d at 823 ().
5. We find the trial court neither abused its discretion nor denied Carver his right to due process when it denied his motion for a continuance to present his codefendant's nephew as a witness because the testimony of that witness would have been cumulative.[1] See State v. Colden, 372 S.C 428, 437, 641 S.E.2d 912, 917 (Ct. App. 2007) (); id. at 435, 641 S.E.2d at 916 ; State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989) (...
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