State v. Casady

• Decision Date: 21 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1577,91-1577
• Citation: 491 N.W.2d 782
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William CASADY, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 782

491 N.W.2d 782

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William CASADY, Appellant.

No. 91-1577.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 21, 1992.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Thomas S. Tauber, Asst. Atty. Gen., John P. Sarcone, County Atty., and Steven Foritano, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

SNELL, Justice.

Appellant, William Casady, appeals his conviction of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. Casady contends the trial court erred in permitting testimony about facts surrounding his prior crimes. Casady also contends the evidence produced by the State was insufficient to support the bench trial finding of an intent to commit sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

On February 18, 1991, S.O., a thirteen-year-old girl, was walking near her home in Des Moines, Iowa. Casady, who had stopped his car in a church parking lot, asked S.O. for directions to the freeway. S.O. said that she could not advise Casady, but that her stepfather was at home and could help.

Casady followed S.O. in his car as she walked home. When S.O. approached the driveway of her home, Casady motioned for her to come to the car to show her a piece of paper. S.O. approached the passenger side of the car to see the paper. When S.O. leaned next to the car, Casady reached through the window. He grabbed S.O. by the arms and tried to pull her into his car. She does not remember if Casady said anything to her at that time. S.O. screamed and tried to pull away.

Clifford Ketch, a friend of S.O.'s family, saw Casady attempting to pull S.O. into his car. Ketch rammed the rear of Casady's car with his own car. Casady then released S.O. and she ran to Ketch's car. Casady attempted to escape but became stuck after his car struck an embankment in a neighbor's yard.

On March 21, 1991, the State filed a trial information charging Casady with kidnapping in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code section 710.4 (1991) and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11. Casady waived his right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the charge of kidnapping and found Casady guilty of assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse. Casady filed a motion for new trial. On September 26, 1991, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced Casady to prison for a term not to exceed two years. Casady has appealed.

I. Casady contends the trial court erred in permitting testimony about the facts surrounding two prior convictions. The State presented evidence that in May 1976, Casady attempted to sexually assault a thirty-year-old woman in Nebraska. The testimony was given by a police officer who questioned Casady about the incident. Casady asked the woman to enter his car; the woman refused. Casady got out of his car and struck the woman. She was knocked to the street, lying on her stomach. Casady then pulled down her pants and underwear. A passer-by intervened, and Casady fled. Once Casady was apprehended and taken into custody, he stated to the testifying officer that he intended to have sex with the woman. Casady pleaded nolo contendere to assault with intent to inflict a bodily injury and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He was paroled in Missouri in August 1979.

The State also presented the testimony of Roslyn DeMoss. DeMoss testified that on October 4, 1979, in Kansas City, Missouri, Casady struck the rear of DeMoss's car while he followed her home from a convenience store. DeMoss parked her car and approached Casady's car. Casady was holding his driver's license to show DeMoss, but kept the license inside the car so DeMoss would need to lean into the car to see it. As she leaned in, Casady grabbed her neck and pulled her into his car. Casady drove to a remote area and repeatedly sexually assaulted DeMoss in his car. DeMoss was seventeen years old at the time. Casady subsequently pleaded guilty to kidnapping with intent to terrorize or cause injury and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Casady was paroled in Iowa on November 20, 1989.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible under certain circumstances. Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

The key is "whether the challenged evidence is relevant and material to some legitimate issue other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts." State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1988); State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1987). If the evidence is relevant, then the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229; State v. Kern, 392 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Iowa 1986). In the process of employing this two-step analysis, the trial court must exercise its discretion. We will reverse its decision only when we find a clear abuse of discretion. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229; Kern, 392 N.W.2d at 136.

We first consider whether the evidence concerning Casady's two prior convictions is relevant. In the present case, the crucial issue is whether Casady intended to commit sexual abuse when he attempted to pull S.O. into his car. Casady argues that the facts surrounding the 1976 and 1979 incidents are irrelevant as bearing on his intent to commit sexual abuse. Casady contends the facts of the prior crimes are too dissimilar and the incidents too remote in time to bear on Casady's intent when he grabbed S.O. We find neither argument persuasive; the prior crimes meet the test of relevancy as bearing on Casady's intent to commit sexual abuse.

The basic test of relevancy is whether the evidence offered would make the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Engeman, 217 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa 1974). It follows that the facts of the prior crimes entered into evidence must be sufficiently similar to the assault upon S.O. so that it is reasonable to infer, from Casady's intent to commit sexual abuse in the earlier crimes, that Casady also had the intent to commit sexual abuse against S.O. See State v. Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Iowa 1985); State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84, 92 (Iowa 1972); State v. Coen, 382 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa App.1985).

Casady pleaded nolo contendere and guilty to the prior crimes. There are many factual similarities between the prior crimes and the present case. In all three cases Casady approached his victim in his car, accosted his victim in a public place, and attempted to force his victim to enter his car. In the DeMoss case and the present case, Casady displayed a paper to draw his victim close to his car, grabbed his victim through the open passenger-side window of his car, and attempted to pull his victim inside. In the DeMoss case and the present case, the victim was a teenaged girl.

The remoteness of evidence generally affects the weight rather than admissibility of the remote evidence. State v. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 1974). However, remoteness may render evidence irrelevant where the elapsed time is so great as to negate all rational or logical connection between the fact sought to be proved and the remote evidence offered to prove that fact. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d at 251; Engeman, 217 N.W.2d at 639. The lapse of time between the prior crimes and the present incident is indeed significant fifteen years and twelve years before the incident with S.O. However, Casady was incarcerated during most of this time. Casady's "period of opportunity" to commit crimes is considerably less. State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1982). Only a few months passed between Casady's parole from his imprisonment from the 1976 crime and commission of the 1979 crime. Only about fifteen months passed between Casady's parole in November 1989 and his assault upon S.O. in February 1991. "[A]ny issue as to remoteness of the prior incident is almost completely defused by the fact that during the time gap between the prior incident and the [present offense], defendant was in confinement in a correctional institution." Id. at 187 (quoting Sanford v. State, 76 Wis.2d 72, 81-84, 250 N.W.2d 348, 352 (1977)); see also Coen, 382 N.W.2d at 706. Coupled with the factual similarities, Casady's prior crimes are not too remote in time. The evidence was relevant and admissible.

The next question is whether the probative value of this testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229; Iowa R.Evid. 403. "Probative value" gauges the strength and force of the relevancy of the evidence presented; "unfair prejudice" has been defined as "an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one." Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231. In balancing probative value and unfair prejudice as applied to other-crimes evidence, we have previously followed one commentator's suggestion:

[B]alancing, on the one side, the actual need for the other-crimes evidence in the light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution, the convincingness of the evidence that the other crimes were committed and that the accused was the actor, and the strength or weakness of the other-crimes evidence in supporting the issue, and on the other, the degree to which the jury will probably be roused by the evidence to overmastering hostility.

Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 232 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 453 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).

The State's need of the evidence of prior crimes was great. The facts of the assault on S.O. provided no...