State v. Casares
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-39921 |
| Decision Date | 21 December 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. CASARES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAUL A. CASARES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1-CA-39921
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
December 21, 2023
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY Lisa B. Riley, District Court Judge
Raul Torrez, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General Erica Schiff, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GERALD E. BACA, Judge
{¶1} Following a jury trial, Defendant Paul A. Casares was convicted of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (firearm), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-5(C) (1969); conspiracy to commit aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (firearm), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979); and possession of a firearm by a
felon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-16(A) (2019, amended 2022). On appeal, Defendant argues that the admission of propensity evidence related to his possible involvement in other shootings warranted a mistrial. For the following reasons, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} Defendant, Angel Saiz, and Tyler Kelley shot at Agapito Araujo on Diamondback Road in Artesia, New Mexico (Diamondback Road shooting) and again on Highway 285 (Highway 285 shooting). Mr. Araujo was shot in the leg during the Diamondback Road shooting. In a statement to Detective Guevara, Mr. Araujo stated that he was unaware of his shooters' identities. However, after later learning that Defendant had been incarcerated, Mr. Araujo identified Defendant as one of the shooters.
{¶3} At trial, the State called as its first witness Mr. Araujo, who explained that he was not initially forthcoming about his shooters' identities because he feared for his life. Subsequently, Detective Guevara, who was originally assigned to investigate the shootings, testified that he eventually handed the investigation off to Deputy Aranda. The State later called Deputy Aranda and asked why that transfer took place. Deputy Aranda explained that a lot of shootings occurred in the Artesia area over the summer of 2020 (Artesia shootings). It was during the Artesia shootings
investigation that law enforcement "interviewed a lot of the suspects and shooters. Some of the information related in those interviews led back to [Defendant]."
{4} The State then questioned Deputy Aranda in the following manner:
Prosecutor: Initially, Mr. Araujo was not consistent in his statements to law enforcement, is that correct
Deputy: Correct
Prosecutor: At some point something changed, so that we're here today. Correct?
Deputy: Yes ma'am.
Prosecutor: Now, do you know what that was?
Deputy: [Defendant] and Angel Saiz were arrested. [Defendant] had an outstanding warrant, so he was arrested on the day I encountered him in August . . . a press release was done by the Eddy County Sheriff's Office on social media ....
Defense counsel: Your honor. Court: [inaudible] objection.
Defense counsel: We're going down a road that is not relevant . . . basically, they are bringing in other things that are not pertinent to this case, in order to make [Defendant] look bad.
Prosecutor: And your Honor, [Defense counsel] multiple times has made a point of the fact that Mr. Araujo initially was not cooperative. So he opened the door in his opening statement . . . said there was inconsistency in his cross .... So he has repeatedly raised the factor or raised the issue of why Mr. Araujo was not
fully cooperative initially, and so the answer to that question is Mr. Araujo's testimony.
Court: If this question, if this testimony goes to that, the court will allow it. If it's veering from that, then I'll let [Defense counsel] renew his objection for relevance.
Prosecutor: Yes your honor. So you said there was press releases about the arrest of, among other people, [Defendant]?
Deputy Aranda: Yes ma'am.
Prosecutor: Okay. And so following the press releases, what happened?
Deputy Aranda: Uhm, [a task force agent] contacted Mr. Araujo and asked him if he wanted to cooperate with the investigation . . ., which he agreed to do, so myself and [another deputy] conducted an interview with Mr. Araujo. ....
Prosecutor: Okay. And now you heard Mr. Araujo's testimony today. Was that consistent with what he told you in August?
Deputy Aranda: Yes.
Prosecutor: And did you ask him why he didn't give you that information in May?
Deputy Aranda: Yes, he said he was in fear for his life and his mother's life as the individuals knew where he lives, and he resides with his mother and his father.
Prosecutor: Okay. And to be clear, at the time that you had the conversation with him, [Defendant] and the other defendants were in custody?
Deputy Aranda: Correct.
Prosecutor: Okay. How is it that your violent crimes unit knew to contact Mr. Araujo after [Defendant] and Mr. Saiz were taken into custody?
Deputy Aranda: It was just from information gathered that [Defendant] was involved with other shootings. From information that we were told we thought it'd be in our best interest to.
{¶5} Defense counsel here again objected, stating that "things are coming out here that have nothing to do with this. And they are using this to basically try and paint a picture of [Defendant]. I'm going to ask for a mistrial based on what the detective said about other." To address the motion, the district court called a sidebar conference. During the sidebar, defense counsel argued that the State's line of questioning was unnecessary to establish what they needed to, and would prejudice the jurors against Defendant. The State argued that defense counsel had opened the door by questioning witnesses as to why Mr. Araujo had changed his story and then attempted to suppress the answer to that inquiry. The recess for resolving the mistrial motion lasted approximately thirty-eight minutes.
{¶6} After consideration, the district court denied Defendant's motion for mistrial and permitted the State to cure by eliciting testimony from Deputy Aranda that
Defendant was never charged with, nor arrested for the Artesia shootings investigation.
DISCUSSION
I. The Denial of Defendant's Motion for Mistrial Constituted Abuse of Discretion
{¶7} We review the district court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Hernandez, 2017-NMCA-020, ¶ 14, 388 P.3d 1016. The district court abuses its discretion where it "acts in an obviously erroneous, arbitrary, or unwarranted manner, or when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The admission of propensity evidence is a nonconstitutional evidentiary error. See id. ¶ 20. When a nonconstitutional evidentiary error occurs, the harmless error standard of review mandates reversal only where there is a "reasonable probability" the inadmissible evidence contributed to the defendant's conviction. Id.
{¶8} Under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA, the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence is limited because it is unfairly prejudicial to the accused. State v. Ruiz, 2001-NMCA-097, ¶ 13, 131 N.M. 241, 34 P.3d 630. Rule 11-404(B) prohibits propensity evidence where its purpose is "to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Ruiz, 2001-NMCA-097, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Use of propensity evidence carries the risk
that the fact-finder may assign it more probative value than deserved and may "punish a bad person regardless of the evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where offered for a purpose other than propensity, the court balances the evidence's prejudicial effect against its probative value. See State v. Lovett, 2012-NMSC-036, ¶ 32, 286 P.3d 265. Specifically, as to other uncharged propensity evidence, unfair prejudice is the risk that, notwithstanding any limiting instructions, "the jury . . . will draw unfavorable inferences about [a] defendant's propensity for criminal conduct." State v. Kerby, 2005-NMCA-106, ¶ 25, 138 N.M. 232, 118 P.3d 740.
{¶9} The issues we must address are: (1) whether the error in admitting the propensity evidence was harmless; and (2) whether the district court's remedy cured the resulting prejudice. We address each in turn.
A. The Error in Admitting the Propensity Evidence Was Not Harmless[1]
{¶10} "When a non[]constitutional evidentiary error occurs, the harmless error standard of review only [mandates] reversal [where] there is a 'reasonable probability' the inadmissible evidence contributed to [the d]efendant's conviction." Hernandez, 2017-NMCA-020, ¶ 20. This standard of review requires a case-by-case analysis. Id. "Reviewing courts are to evaluate all of the circumstances surrounding the error, including examining the error itself, the source of the error,...
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