State v. Casavina

• Decision Date: 18 October 1978
• Citation: 163 N.J.Super. 27,394 A.2d 142
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul CASAVINA, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 27

163 N.J.Super. 27

394 A.2d 142

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul CASAVINA, Defendant-Respondent.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted Oct. 10, 1978.

Decided Oct. 18, 1978.

John J. Degnan, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellant (David S. Lieberman, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

Dietz, Allen & Sweeney, Mount Holly, for defendant-respondent (John A. Sweeney, Mount Holly, on the brief).

Before Judges FRITZ, BISCHOFF and MORGAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRITZ, P. J. A. D.

This matter comes before us on the State's motion for leave to appeal an order in the trial court holding, in essence, that the trial judge had no discretion to deny defendant's application for release on 10% Cash bail under the county program and for a motion for stay pending appeal. We had granted a stay on an emergent basis. We advised the parties of our intention to grant leave to appeal and decide the appeal on the papers submitted in accordance with R. 2:11-2. Enjoined by the rule so to do, we offered an opportunity for oral argument which the parties waived.

The sole question presented in this matter of first impression is whether the implementation of a 10% Cash bail program under R. 3:26-4(a) wholly and completely divests a judge of any exercise of discretion in connection with the application of a defendant to be released on the payment of 10% Cash bail. The judge of the trial court answered that question affirmatively. We are in respectful disagreement with that determination.

Basic to a consideration of any of the delicate problems and conflicting policy concerns which continue to surface with respect to pretrial bail is a genuine recognition of at least three fundaments: (1) the primary purpose of such bail is to assure the presence of the accused at trial; (2) the constitutional right to bail must not be unduly burdened, and (3) the sound discretion of the trial judge is inexorably invoked toward the assurance of the achievement of the first two of these principles. State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972). We are of the opinion that to remove the discretion of the trial judge from the process is no more productive or permissible than would be the removal from consideration of the purpose of pretrial bail or alleviation of the constitutional right to it.

This being so, the only way in which this important element can remain a viable factor in the formula is to permit a conditioning of the right to 10% Cash bail or, indeed, in the appropriate case, the disallowance of it. Otherwise the discretion of the trial judge is wholly unavailable to measure the likelihood of flight. ¹ The only other manner in which the exercise of discretion in this regard might be attempted would be a fixing of bail in the first place in an amount whereby 10% Cash would be sufficient to motivate return, and we have already condemned that practice. State v. McNeil, 154 N.J.Super. 479, 381 A.2d 1214 (App.Div.1977).

Beyond the policy considerations which mandate this result, the plain language of R. 3:26-4 foresees as inevitably desirable the availability of judicial discretion in the bail process. For instance, the rule expressly permits the judge to require one or more sureties. Nothing limits the application of this prerogative to other than 10% Cash bail situations. The right to impose an obligation to provide a surety (or several of them) reaches down into the 10% Cash bail program, although in State v. Moncrieffe, 158 N.J.Super. 528, 386 A.2d 886 (App.Div.1978) we left for another time an examination of the "special circumstances" under which this might be required....