State v. Casey, 20001067.
| Decision Date | 12 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 20001067.,20001067. |
| Citation | 2002 UT 29,44 P.3d 756 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Patrick William CASEY, Defendant and Appellee, M.R. By and Through His Guardian, Cynthia F. Casey, Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Walter F. Budgen, Jr.
Tara L. Isaacson, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
Paul G. Cassell, Douglas E. Beloof, Gina McClard, for appellant.
¶ 1 The central issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court deprived M.R., a victim of sexual abuse, of his constitutional and statutory right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing. At that hearing, defendant pleaded guilty to lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor. He had previously been charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, and had pleaded not guilty. The reduction in the charge was the result of a plea bargain negotiated between defendant and the State. Prior to the change of plea hearing, M.R.'s mother had advised the prosecutor of M.R.'s and her own desire to make a statement to the court. M.R. and his mother both attended this hearing and, during a recess, M.R.'s mother reiterated to the prosecutor that she and M.R. wished to be heard. The prosecutor did not, however, advise the court of this request. In addition, neither M.R. nor his mother petitioned the court directly for an opportunity to speak. Unaware of M.R.'s request to be heard, the court accepted the defendant's guilty plea to the reduced charge and set the matter for sentencing.
¶ 2 Following this change of plea hearing, M.R.'s mother, acting on behalf of M.R., obtained legal assistance and filed two motions to set aside the plea bargain. In response, the State and defendant filed separate motions to strike M.R.'s pleadings. At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard from M.R. and his mother regarding the appropriateness of the plea bargain, and permitted argument from M.R.'s counsel. Thereafter, the court "informally reopen[ed] the plea for the purpose of [accepting M.R.'s and his mother's] testimony." The court then accepted the testimony that it had just heard. Having accepted M.R.'s and his mother's testimony, the court "reaffirm[ed defendant's] plea at the class A level." The court then denied both of M.R.'s pending motions and sentenced defendant to eight months in jail on the class A misdemeanor charge. Based on these facts, we conclude that M.R. was initially denied his right to be heard at the change of plea hearing in violation of the Utah Constitution and related statutes, but that the court thereafter remedied this violation by reopening the change of plea hearing and receiving testimony from M.R. and his mother, and permitting argument from M.R.'s counsel. We therefore affirm.
¶ 3 On November 3, 1999, the Tooele County Attorney's Office charged defendant with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, in violation of section 76-5-404.1(3) of the Utah Code. Following a preliminary hearing in which both the victim, M.R., and his mother testified, the district court bound defendant over for trial.
¶ 4 A few weeks later the prosecutor handling defendant's case sent M.R.'s mother a letter explaining that defendant had requested a plea bargain. After receiving this letter, M.R.'s mother, according to her affidavit, met with the prosecutor and obtained an assurance that the first degree felony charge would not be reduced due to the strong evidence of guilt compiled against defendant.
¶ 5 Nevertheless, the prosecutor subsequently offered to reduce the first degree felony charge to lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor, in return for a guilty plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (1999). M.R.'s mother, upon learning of the State's extension of this offer and defendant's acceptance, contacted the prosecutor and expressed a desire to tell the district court how her family, including M.R., felt about the proposed plea. The prosecutor advised her to attend the change of plea hearing scheduled for October 24, 2000.
¶ 6 M.R. and his mother appeared at this change of plea hearing as directed. At a recess during this proceeding, M.R.'s mother approached the prosecutor, objected to the reduced charge, and reiterated M.R.'s, and her own, desire to make a statement.1 She later testified that she believed the prosecutor was going to inform the district court of her request. Acknowledging that he did not know that M.R. had a right to be heard either directly or through his legal guardian, the prosecutor maintained the following: (1) he did not intentionally deprive M.R. of his right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing, (2) he did not tell M.R.'s mother she and M.R. had no right to testify at the plea hearing, and (3) he told M.R.'s mother that she would eventually have an opportunity to address the court in the pre-sentence report and at the sentencing hearing. ¶ 7 Notwithstanding his conversations with M.R.'s mother, the prosecutor did not inform the district court that M.R. and his mother had requested to be heard at the change of plea hearing. M.R. and his mother also failed to bring the issue to the court's attention. The court therefore proceeded with defendant's change of plea hearing unaware of M.R.'s request. Noting the "dramatic" reduction in the charge, the court refused to be limited to the four-month sentence recommended in the stipulated plea agreement. The State and defendant responded to the court's concern by agreeing to delete the stipulated sentence provision. The court then accepted defendant's guilty plea to the class A misdemeanor charge and set the matter for sentencing.
¶ 8 Subsequently, M.R.'s mother, acting on behalf of M.R., obtained legal assistance and filed two motions with the district court: a motion for a misplea and a motion to reject the plea bargain. In response, the prosecutor and defendant filed separate motions to strike M.R.'s pleadings, claiming that M.R. lacked standing to set aside the plea because he was not a party to the criminal proceeding.2
¶ 9 Without ruling on whether M.R. had standing to challenge defendant's guilty plea, the district court held defendant's sentencing hearing on November 27, 2000. At the start of this hearing, M.R.'s counsel moved the court to set aside the accepted plea. The court initially questioned whether M.R. had the right to be heard but then allowed M.R. and his mother to testify regarding the propriety of the plea bargain. Despite its reservations, the court also permitted extensive argument from M.R.'s counsel.
¶ 10 M.R. and his mother testified that the court should have rejected the plea bargain. Specifically, M.R. declared, M.R.'s mother testified that "the [c]ourt should reject the plea bargain [because] a misdemeanor sentence d[id] not truly reflect the seriousness of the offenses committed by [defendant] the same way that a felony conviction would."3 She further averred that she believed the prosecutor was going to inform the court of M.R.'s, and her own, desire to make a statement at defendant's change of plea hearing. She also stated that she did not know she could interrupt the change of plea hearing and address the court directly.
¶ 11 After M.R. and his mother had testified, the district court turned its attention to M.R.'s attorney and inquired whether M.R. was entitled to use counsel to assert his right to be heard. In response to the court's query, M.R.'s counsel argued that the Victims' Rights Amendment of the Utah Constitution placed M.R. on equal footing with defendant and envisioned that M.R. could employ an attorney in exercising his legal rights. M.R.'s counsel then argued that (1) M.R. had the right to be heard before the court's acceptance of defendant's plea, (2) M.R.'s right to be heard had been violated, and (3) the court should grant a misplea and hear from M.R. before accepting any subsequent plea between the State and defendant. The prosecutor and defendant both objected, asserting that M.R. lacked standing to challenge the accepted plea and that the prosecutor had discretion to determine how defendant's case was negotiated.
¶ 12 Following these objections, the district court noted that it had not been previously informed by M.R. or his representative, i.e., his mother, that M.R. desired to be heard at the change of plea hearing. Despite this lack of notification, the court decided to "informally" reopen the plea hearing in order to accept the testimony that it had just heard from M.R. and his mother. Having accepted this testimony, the court "reaffirm[ed defendant's] plea at the class A level." The court then denied both of M.R.'s pending motions, sentenced defendant to eight months in jail on the class A misdemeanor charge, and fined him.4
¶ 13 M.R. immediately appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which certified M.R.'s appeal to us, concluding that a "petition for writ of certiorari would likely be ... granted [because] resolution of the case ha[d] potentially broad-reaching impact." See Utah R.App. P. 43(c)(1).
¶ 14 On appeal, M.R., by and through his legal guardian, contends that (1) he had the right to seek appellate review of the district court's adverse rulings on his two motions, (2) he had the right to be heard through counsel with respect to legal issues related to the constitutional and statutory rights afforded him as a victim, (3) he had a constitutional and statutory right to be heard regarding the appropriateness of the plea bargain, (4) he properly invoked his right to be heard at defendant's change of plea hearing by submitting a request to the prosecutor,...
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