State v. Castaldi
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-39554 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAWN CASTALDI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ROOSEVELT COUNTY Donna J. Mowrer District Court Judge
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Leland M Churan, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
Harrison, Hart & Davis, LLC Nicholas T. Hart Ramón A. Soto Daniel J. Gallegos Albuquerque, NM for Appellant
{¶1} Defendant Shawn Castaldi appeals his conviction for one count of receiving stolen property (NMSA 1978, § 30-16-11 (2006)). Defendant argues: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because law enforcement's entry onto the property in question was unlawful; (2) his retrial violated his right to be free from double jeopardy due to prosecutorial misconduct that occurred at his first trial; and (3) his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.
{¶2} Acting on a tip, members of the Roosevelt County Sheriff's Office arrived at a property to investigate the theft of a trailer.[1] While standing outside a livestock gate at the entrance of the property, deputies observed a moving vehicle near a barn on the property, indicating that someone was present. The deputies climbed over the gate and walked a distance before making contact with Defendant.[2] Defendant voluntarily led officers to the stolen trailer inside a barn on the property. After receiving Defendant's consent to search the remainder of the property, deputies found equipment that had been reported stolen along with the trailer.
{¶3} Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that he was subjected to a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. At the suppression hearing, Defendant clarified that he was contending "it was unlawful for deputies to climb over the gate and enter the property without a warrant." The district court denied Defendant's motion in a written order. The court observed there was no testimony "regarding the distance from the barn to any home, and there was no argument . . . that the barn was curtilage." The court ruled that the deputies' entry onto the property was similar to a permissible "knock and talk" and was lawful. The court further ruled that Defendant's consent was voluntary and not coerced.
{¶4} Because the area in question was not protected under the Fourth Amendment and Defendant has failed to advance a timely and developed argument why we should extend broader protections under Article II, Section 10, we affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (); see also State v. Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, ¶ 32, 150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734 ( the right for any reason doctrine in deciding whether to affirm a district court's suppression ruling).
{¶5} "The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area searched. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With respect to land, an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is coextensive with the boundaries of curtilage, "the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 182 n.12 (1984); see also State v. Sutton, 1991-NMCA-073, ¶ 9, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518 (). Unoccupied, undeveloped lands beyond the curtilage of a home are considered "open fields" not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. See Sutton, 1991-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 7, 10. In this case, Defendant concedes in his reply brief, and we agree, that the record does not support a determination that the area in question was curtilage, rendering it "open fields" unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., id. (). Absent evidence that the officers entered into constitutionally-protected curtilage, there was no unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (); Sutton, 1991-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 7, 10 (providing that "the 'open fields' doctrine permits police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant" because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to open fields).
{¶6} Having conceded that he has no viable Fourth Amendment claim, Defendant asks us to depart from federal precedent and interpret Article II, Section 10 as requiring a case-specific inquiry into whether an individual demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in lands beyond curtilage. We decline to do so in this case. Claims that a state constitutional provision provides broader protection than its federal counterpart are governed by the interstitial framework outlined in State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. Under Gomez, we may depart from federal precedent in interpreting a state constitutional provision for one of three reasons: "a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics." Id. ¶ 19. Defendant's argument for diverging from the federal "open fields" analysis is raised for the first time in his reply brief.[3] We typically do not address such arguments, see State v. Fairweather, 1993-NMSC-065, ¶ 32, 116 N.M. 456, 863 P.2d 1077, because doing so deprives the appellee of the opportunity to respond as contemplated by the rules of appellate procedure, see State v. Martinez, 2005-NMCA-052, ¶ 7, 137 N.M. 432, 112 P.3d 293 (). Even were we to consider the reply brief, however, Defendant fails to present a developed argument justifying departure from federal precedent in this case.[4] {¶7} In light of our holdings that Defendant has not made a viable Fourth Amendment claim and that he has failed to advance a timely or developed Article II, Section 10 claim, we need not consider Defendant's remaining arguments pertaining to the district court's denial of Defendant's suppression motion, including that the deputies acted outside the proper scope of a "knock and talk" and that Defendant's consent was tainted by the deputies' unlawful entry. We affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.
{¶8} Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial after the prosecutor asked a sheriff's deputy on direct examination whether any stolen property was found in a second barn searched by officers. [5] The deputy's answer implied that additional stolen property had been found, and Defendant requested a mistrial on the basis that the deputy's testimony was highly prejudicial given that Defendant was on trial for receipt of stolen property. The State argued that any error could be cured through additional questions, but the district court granted Defendant's request for a mistrial. Defendant was convicted after his retrial.
{¶9} On appeal, Defendant argues the prosecutor's question constituted prosecutorial misconduct warranting a bar to retrial under the double jeopardy clause of the New Mexico Constitution. Although the State correctly notes that Defendant did not raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim below, we nevertheless address his double jeopardy argument. See NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963) (); see also State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (). Such a claim State v. McClaugherty, 2008-NMSC-044, ¶ 39, 144 N.M. 483, 188 P.3d 1234.
To continue reading
Request your trial