State v. Caster

• Decision Date: 12 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015AP1965–CR.,2015AP1965–CR.
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Darren Wade CASTER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

372 Wis.2d 458

888 N.W.2d 246 (Table)

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Darren Wade CASTER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2015AP1965–CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Oct. 12, 2016.

¶ 1 HRUZ, J.¹

Darren Caster appeals a judgment of conviction for second-offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Caster argues the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to suppress when it determined officer Carlos de la Cruz of the City of New Richmond Police Department did not violate Caster's Fourth Amendment rights when de la Cruz conducted a traffic stop outside of New Richmond's municipal limits without being in "fresh pursuit" under WIS. STAT. § 175.40(2). We need not decide whether de la Cruz was engaged in fresh pursuit under that statute because we agree with the State's alternative argument. Namely, the evidence obtained following the stop should not be suppressed because there was no constitutional violation, and any determination that de la Cruz was not acting in his official capacity under § 175.40(2) does not, under the facts of this case, merit suppression as a remedy. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Caster was charged with OWI and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration, both as a second offense. He filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement resulting from the traffic stop on the grounds that de la Cruz acted outside of his jurisdiction and, according to Caster, lacked reasonable suspicion to make a valid stop. The circuit court held a motion hearing at which de la Cruz was the only witness.

¶ 3 De la Cruz testified that on the early morning of June 27, 2014, he was monitoring traffic in his squad car. He was parked parallel to County Highway A in New Richmond's city limits. At 1:33 a.m., de la Cruz observed a Jeep, later determined to be driven by Caster, drive south past his location. De la Cruz testified his radar reported Caster as travelling thirty-nine miles per hour when Caster passed him, which was six miles below the speed limit, and he observed Caster's vehicle abruptly go over the fog line on the right side of the road as Caster neared 174th Avenue. After witnessing the lane deviation, de la Cruz decided to follow and monitor the vehicle. He observed Caster's vehicle was weaving within the lane as they passed West Richmond Way. De la Cruz radioed for a St. Croix County officer to come to his location because he was aware Caster's vehicle was approaching the New Richmond city limits. De la Cruz explained he attempted to contact county authorities because he "wasn't comfortable with what [he] had observed to conduct a traffic stop at that time," but he believed Caster's driving was "suspicious enough for [him] to continue following [Caster] for the public safety overall...."

¶ 4 As Caster and de la Cruz approached a curve to the west on County Highway A, de la Cruz observed Caster's vehicle "take that curve wide" and put its "side tires ... across the center line ." According to de la Cruz, this particular curve represented a "gray area" between the City of New Richmond limits and general St. Croix County land, in that "as soon as [County Highway A] curves, it becomes county property." De la Cruz continued to follow Caster along an approximately half-mile straightaway before they approached a second curve, at which point de la Cruz observed Caster's vehicle "take the curve a little low" and again cross the center line with its tires. Shortly after that observation and after he had made radio contact with a county deputy, de la Cruz conducted a traffic stop and pulled over Caster on county property. De la Cruz approached the vehicle and only requested Caster's identification while he awaited the arrival of county authorities.

¶ 5 De la Cruz testified two St. Croix County Sheriff's Department officers, deputy Fowler and sergeant Thomason, arrived at the scene a short time after he had stopped Caster. According to the police report filed by Fowler and attached to the criminal complaint, Fowler approached Caster's vehicle after making initial contact with de la Cruz. Fowler observed that Caster exhibited a strong alcohol odor, bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech. As a result, Fowler conducted field sobriety tests and also administered a preliminary breath test with de la Cruz's assistance. Fowler arrested Caster, after which he transported Caster first to a hospital for a blood draw and then to the St. Croix County Jail. Neither Fowler nor Thomason testified at the hearing on Caster's motion to suppress.

¶ 6 The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, concluding de la Cruz had reasonable suspicion to believe Caster committed or would continue to commit traffic violations. Regarding specific and articulable facts that could give rise to reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, the circuit court found de la Cruz observed Caster's Jeep:

(1) swerve abruptly to the right; (2) cross the fog line with both passenger side tires; (3) weave within its own lane of travel; (4) negotiate a curve in a wide manner; (5) cross the center line with both driver side tires; (6) cross the fog line again with both passenger side tires; and (7) cross the center line again with both driver side tires .... including the fact that it was 1:33 a.m.

¶ 7 The circuit court next evaluated whether de la Cruz was in "fresh pursuit" of Caster under WIS. STAT. § 175.40(2) and, as a result, had authority as an officer of a political subdivision to arrest anyone outside his jurisdiction.² The court concluded de la Cruz was in fresh pursuit because de la Cruz did not delay in pursuit after his observation of a traffic violation in New Richmond city limits, had begun "continuous and uninterrupted pursuit" of Caster once observing that violation, and acted with minimal delay in performing a traffic stop. The court also found that after de la Cruz "effectuated the traffic stop[,] Officer Fowler arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and took over the investigation."

¶ 8 Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Caster pled no contest to the OWI charge. He now appeals pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10).

DISCUSSION

¶ 9 A motion to suppress evidence resulting from a traffic stop presents a question of constitutional fact, to which we apply a two-step standard of review. See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶ 8, 301 Wis.2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. Namely, we review the circuit court's findings of historical fact as clearly erroneous, while we review the application of law to those historical facts de novo. Id. In addition, when presented with application of a statute to a set of facts, we review that application de novo. City of Brookfield v. Collar, 148 Wis.2d 839, 841, 436 N.W.2d 911 (Ct.App.1989).

¶ 10 As framed by Caster, the primary dispute in this case involves whether de la Cruz was in "fresh pursuit" under WIS. STAT. § 175.40(2) when he stopped Caster outside of the City of New Richmond.³ See Collar, 148 Wis.2d at 841–42, 436 N.W.2d 911. In particular, Caster contends the validity of the traffic stop turns upon whether de la Cruz had reasonable suspicion to stop Caster before he left the jurisdiction. Caster argues that because de la Cruz left the jurisdiction in the midst of his observations and, according to de la Cruz's own testimony, had not formed the intent to stop Caster before leaving his jurisdiction, de la Cruz did not observe an offense within his own jurisdiction and thus possessed no lawful authority to conduct a traffic stop under a theory of fresh pursuit. The State responds that the plain text of § 175.40(2) makes no reference to the location of the offense relative to the jurisdiction.⁴ It further contends de la Cruz had reasonable suspicion Caster committed a specific traffic violation within his authorized jurisdiction, and he was authorized to continue pursuit anywhere in the state as a result.

¶ 11 We do not reach the question of whether de la Cruz was in "fresh pursuit" under WIS. STAT. § 175.40(2). Instead, we focus on the State's alternative argument regarding the use of suppression as a remedy, further explained below, and affirm on those grounds. See State v. Earl, 2009 WI App 99, ¶ 18 n. 8, 320 Wis.2d 639, 770 N.W.2d 755.

¶ 12 We first observe that Caster asks us, on appeal, to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a purported statutory overreach by de la Cruz in the form of an extra-jurisdictional traffic stop. Under WIS. STAT. § 62.09(13)(a), police officers are granted authority to arrest persons within their designated municipality for any violation of state or local law.⁵ WISCONSIN STAT. § 175.40(2) extends this authority to officers who are in "fresh pursuit" of a suspect outside their respective jurisdictions.

¶ 13 Regarding fresh pursuit, Caster asserts that because de la Cruz acted to seize Caster outside of the city limits, and did not meet the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 175.40(2) in doing so, de la Cruz did not have any power granted to him by the Wisconsin legislature to conduct a valid seizure. In its response brief, the State argues that even if de la Cruz was not engaged in "fresh pursuit" as that phrase is understood in § 175.40(2), suppression is improper. Summarizing the State's argument the best we can, suppression is inappropriate for three reasons: (1) the statutory grant of power in § 175.40(2) is distinct from any constitutional prohibition governing police authority; (2) suppression does not naturally flow from a "violation" of § 175.40(2) ; and (3) in all events, under the facts of this case, including that de la Cruz did not actually accomplish the arrest at issue, suppression would be an inappropriate remedy.

¶ 14 We agree with the State. The framework of Caster's argument may be correct to the extent it questions whether de la Cruz had statutory authority to arrest him outside of New Richmond, and detain him in that sense, in which the detention is beyond that of an initial traffic stop. See...