State v. Castillo

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard CASTILLO, Defendant-Respondent.
• Citation: 433 P.3d 467,295 Or. App. 121
• Docket Number: A164077
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 28 November 2018

295 Or.App. 121

433 P.3d 467

STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Richard CASTILLO, Defendant-Respondent.

A164077

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted September 18, 2018.

November 28, 2018

Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.

Before Hadlock, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.

AOYAGI, J.

This is a state’s appeal of an order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. See ORS 138.045(1)(d). Defendant is charged with 12 counts of first-degree assault, ORS 163.185. Before trial, he moved to suppress evidence of statements that he made during three police interviews, asserting that all of the statements were made involuntarily and that some of the statements were made after he invoked his right to remain silent. The trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion. It concluded that defendant had equivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interview and that the police had failed to ask clarifying questions, so it suppressed defendant’s statements after the invocation. As to voluntariness, the court concluded that all of defendant’s statements before the invocation were voluntary, and it did not rule on the voluntariness of his statements after the invocation because it had already ruled to suppress those statements. The state appeals the order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

The relevant facts are undisputed. On September 22, G, a three-month old baby, was admitted to Rogue Valley Medical Center with serious injuries. G had a subdural hematoma and had eight bone fractures to his skull, arms, shoulders, ribs, and one leg. G also was suffering from anemia, vomiting, fever, and a bulging fontanelle. The next day, G was transported to OHSU Doernbecher Hospital in Portland for additional treatment. He was discharged from that hospital on September 25, but then was readmitted on September 30 because he was having seizures. On October 3, G was again discharged and returned home with his mother.

During the same time period, the police interviewed defendant, G’s father, on three occasions. The first two interviews took place at the hospital in Portland on September 24 and 25. The details of those interviews are not relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The third interview took place at the sheriff’s office in Medford on September 30. That interview began at 12:33 p.m. After defendant heard and waived his Miranda rights, Detective Denney questioned defendant regarding G’s life, G’s current situation, and what could have caused G’s injuries. Along the way, Denney told defendant that, based on her conversations with the doctors and a child abuse specialist, "there’s absolutely no way this child was injured accidentally or by a child." Denney also said that "the more the doctors know about how [the brain injury ] was caused, the better they can treat that and so we’ve got to find that out." Defendant denied any knowledge of how G had been injured,¹ and he agreed to take a polygraph examination.

At 1:57 p.m., after a short break, Denney said that they had a few more questions while the polygraph was being set up. Detective Sigler—who had been present during Denney’s earlier questioning—then gave a lengthy explanation as to why he felt that defendant’s demeanor was inconsistent with his claims that he knew nothing about how G was injured. Sigler stated that he found defendant’s description of his weekends alone with five children difficult to believe, given his own experiences alone with two children. Sigler noted defendant’s lack of emotion and seeming lack of interest in the details of G’s injuries, which was "not normal" in Sigler’s view and "tells me some things and tells Detective Denney some things." He also pointed out to defendant that defendant had "never expressed any anger over how this might have happened to [his] child, which is very telling." All of that led Sigler to conclude that defendant was "the reason that [G] has his injuries," and he encouraged defendant to admit if he was lying and had lost his temper. After hearing out Sigler, defendant responded:

"[Defendant]: I’m sorry that—and anybody who knows me will vouch for this, I am very reserved. Am I pissed? Absolutely. Am I sad? Absolutely. I don’t know what to do at this point. I’m tired of these interviews. I want to be with my family.

"[Sigler]: Okay.

"[Defendant]: And bring in a lie detector test. I don’t know. I’m at—I—I want my—I want normalcy. I want my family.

"[Sigler]: Okay. We can do that. We’ll do it today."

Defendant continued to deny injuring G. Defendant then took a 12-question polygraph examination, administered by Strickland, three times in a row.

At 5:18 p.m., Strickland told defendant that the polygraph results indicated that he was "clearly and conclusively not telling [Strickland] the truth to the questions about [G]." Upon being urged to tell the truth, defendant again denied injuring G.

At defendant’s request, they took a break from 5:52 p.m. until 6:31 p.m. When the interview resumed at 6:31 p.m., defendant began making incriminating statements. Those statements resulted in defendant’s arrest around 8:00 p.m.²

A grand jury indicted defendant on 12 counts of first-degree assault of G. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress all of his statements from the three police interviews. Defendant argued that he made the statements involuntarily as a result of coercion, particularly related to G’s medical treatment. As an alternative or additional basis to suppress some of the statements, defendant argued that he had invoked his right to remain silent at 2:05 p.m. in the third interview when he said, "I’m tired of these interviews. I want to be with my family." He claimed that that statement was either an unequivocal invocation, in which case the officers were required to stop questioning him immediately, or an equivocal invocation, in which case the officers were required to ask clarifying questions, which they did not. The state responded that what defendant said was not an invocation at all. Alternatively, the state argued that, if it was an invocation, it was equivocal, and that defendant’s immediate next statement clarified his intent and obviated the need for the officers to ask clarifying questions.

The trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion to suppress. It addressed the invocation issue first. The court rejected defendant’s argument that the statement at issue ("I’m tired of these interviews. I want to be with my family.") was an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent, ruling that "that’s not an unequivocal invocation." The court concluded that the statement was, however, an equivocal invocation. As for whether the officers needed to ask clarifying questions, the court concluded that they did, notwithstanding that defendant had reinitiated the conversation by requesting to take the polygraph:

"[PROSECUTOR]: State v. Holcomb [213 Or. App. 168, 159 P.3d 1271 (2007) ] says that the defendant validly waived his right to remain silent by voluntarily reinitiating conversation with detectives about the investigation.

"THE COURT: * * * [T]he question is, in your case, is when he said, ‘I just want to take the poly.’ Was that reinitiating it right off the bat? He did not give the other side—the detective—an opportunity to inquire further before he started back into his interview process is what you’re telling me. That’s what your argument is.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Correct. And that is in line with State v. Meade [327 Or. 335, 963 P.2d 656 (1998) ] on that.

"THE COURT: I do find though that the officer could have inquired after that just to cover their bases and not put this at issue. That would have been the way to go. But could have inquired after that. You know, ‘You just said, before you take the poly, you just said you were tired of this,’ you know.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Mmm-hmm.

"THE COURT: You know, I believe the officer should have done that. So any statements—so I am going to find that that—any statements after that statement was given are suppressed."

The trial court then addressed the voluntariness of defendant’s statements in the three interviews. It concluded that all of defendant’s statements up until 2:05 p.m. on September 30, when defendant said that he was tired and wanted to be with his family, had been voluntary. Because it had already ruled to suppress the statements that defendant made after 2:05 p.m., the court did not rule on the voluntariness of those statements. Defendant asks us to "assume" that the court concluded that his statements after 2:05 p.m. were involuntary. However, based on the court’s oral ruling and its written order, we understand that the court did not rule on the voluntariness of defendant’s statements after 2:05 p.m.

On appeal, the state argues that defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent or, if he did, that he invoked equivocally and promptly reinitiated the interview and thus obviated the need for the officers to ask clarifying questions. Defendant counters that the trial court correctly suppressed his statements based on his invocation of the right to remain silent.³ Alternatively, defendant urges us to affirm the suppression ruling on the alternative basis that defendant’s statements were involuntary.

INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

Under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, individuals have a right against compelled self-incrimination in criminal prosecutions, including the right to remain silent. State v. Schrepfer , 288 Or. App. 429, 435, 406 P.3d 1098 (2017). To protect the right, law...