State v. Castle
| Decision Date | 15 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-183.,98-183. |
| Citation | 982 P.2d 1035,1999 MT 141,295 Mont. 1 |
| Parties | The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Roger Edward CASTLE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Chad Wright, Assistant Appellate Defender, Appellate Defender Office; Helena, Montana, For Appellant.
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Pat Jordan, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, Mike McGrath, Lewis and Clark County Attorney; Helena, Montana For Respondent.
¶ 1 Roger Edward Castle was convicted of criminal endangerment in a two-day jury trial before the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. He appeals. We affirm.
¶ 2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of battered woman syndrome.
¶ 3 On August 9, 1997, Helena, Montana Police Department officers were dispatched to a basement apartment on Breckenridge Street to investigate a reported accidental shooting. Upon arrival, the officers found Kim Castle sitting on a sofa in the living room. She was holding her face and there was a large amount of blood on her face, neck, and chest. Roger Castle, her husband, was standing near her, talking to the 911 dispatcher on the telephone. The officers found a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol on the floor near the sofa where Kim was sitting. The weapon contained five live rounds of ammunition: four in the magazine and one in the chamber.
¶ 4 Roger told the officers that he was cleaning the weapon when it accidentally discharged. The officers noticed that Roger appeared very slow in his reactions; stunned as well as shocked. When asked if he had been drinking, Roger, a self-described chronic alcoholic, admitted to having consumed alcohol and consented to a blood test. The results indicated his blood alcohol concentration was .18.
¶ 5 Kim was transported to a hospital for treatment of wounds caused by a bullet which entered through her left cheek and exited through her right cheek. Because of the nature of her injuries and the need to get her to a hospital, she was not questioned by police officers at the scene. On the way to the hospital, she told an ambulance attendant that Roger accidentally shot her while cleaning his gun.
¶ 6 In subsequent police interviews, however, Kim changed her story. She seemed afraid of Roger and stated that he had pointed guns at her head in the past. Based upon her statements and upon the investigation of this event, Roger was charged with criminal endangerment.
¶ 7 At trial, Kim testified that earlier in the morning of the day she was shot, Roger had been cleaning the gun. Kim had unloaded the bullets from it because she was worried about what Roger might do, given that he had been drinking since the night before. She testified that he must then have put the bullets back into the gun, because while she was sitting on the couch reading, he simply put his arm out toward her head, pulled the trigger, and shot her.
¶ 8 On cross-examination by the defense, the ambulance attendant testified that on the way to the hospital Kim had stated that she was shot while Roger was cleaning his gun. Kim testified that she could not remember this statement to the ambulance attendant.
¶ 9 On rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of a clinical social worker experienced with battered woman syndrome. This expert testified that it is common for a victim of abuse to change her willingness to report the abuse, or to recant her story, during the course of the cycles of violence. It is the admission of this expert testimony upon which Roger bases his appeal.
¶ 10 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of battered woman syndrome?
¶ 11 This Court's standard of review of a question on the admissibility of evidence is whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stringer (1995), 271 Mont. 367, 374, 897 P.2d 1063, 1067. Here, the State raises the preliminary argument that Roger did not adequately preserve for appeal the issue of whether a proper foundation was laid for the admission of battered woman syndrome testimony. An objection must state the specific ground for objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the context. See Rule 103(a)(1), M.R.Evid.; State v. Greytak (1993), 262 Mont. 401, 404, 865 P.2d 1096, 1098. Failure to make a sufficiently specific objection constitutes a waiver of the right to claim error on appeal; the effect of waiver is that the evidence is...
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State v. Strizich
...262 Mont. at 404, 865 P.2d at 1098. In State v. Castle, the defendant again objected on grounds of speculation. 1999 MT 141, ¶ 13, 295 Mont. 1, 982 P.2d 1035. The court overruled the objection and referenced the witness's expert qualifications as laying sufficient foundation for their testi......
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State v. Snell
...of rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including oral testimony, is whether the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Castle, 1999 MT 141, ¶ 11, 295 Mont. 1, ¶ 11, 982 P.2d 1035, ¶ 11. The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left to the sound d......
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State v. Snell, 2004 MT 258 (MT 9/14/2004)
...of rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including oral testimony, is whether the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Castle, 1999 MT 141, ¶ 11, 295 Mont. 1, ¶ 11, 982 P.2d 1035, ¶ 11. The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left to the sound d......
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State v. Cesnik
...the district court abused its discretion." State v. Snell, 2004 MT 334, ¶ 17, 324 Mont. 173, ¶ 17, 103 P.3d 503, ¶ 17. See also State v. Castle, 1999 MT 141, ¶ 11, 295 Mont. 1, ¶ 11, 982 P.2d 1035, ¶ 11. "The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left to the sound ......