State v. Castner
| Decision Date | 24 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 910275-CA,910275-CA |
| Citation | 825 P.2d 699 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. William Eluie CASTNER, II and Bonnie Lee Castner, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for defendants and appellants.
R. Paul Van Dam and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.
Defendants Bonnie Lee Castner and William Eluie Castner, II, appeal from several drug related convictions. Defendants argue that the trial court erred in not granting their motion to suppress certain evidence found as a result of a search of their vehicle and personal belongings. We affirm.
The following factual statements are taken from undisputed testimony at the suppression hearing. The Castners elected not to testify at that hearing; therefore only the State presented evidence. Since the Castners stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript could be utilized at the suppression hearing, the State's evidence is not controverted.
On August 1, 1990, Officer Merv Gustin was proceeding east on U.S. 40 outside of Duchesne, Utah. Using radar, Officer Gustin clocked the vehicle defendant William Castner was driving, and determined Castner was speeding. Officer Gustin pursued the vehicle and eventually Castner pulled off the road and stopped his vehicle. Officer Gustin testified that before the vehicle pulled off the road, he observed a passenger in the back seat making several erratic movements and moving items from the front seat to the back seat area.
When Officer Gustin approached the vehicle, he spoke with Castner through the passenger window. Seated in the front passenger seat was Castner's twelve year-old son. Defendant Bonnie Castner was in the back seat. Officer Gustin asked Castner for identification and the vehicle registration, whereupon Castner exited the vehicle, produced a valid driver's license and directed his son to get the registration from under the driver's seat. When his son could not locate the registration, Castner, who was out of the car at this time, opened the passenger door and began reaching under the front seats. Officer Gustin became concerned that Castner was reaching for a weapon, and asked Castner if he had any weapons in the vehicle. Castner said no. Officer Gustin then examined the vehicle registration and compared the vehicle registration number (VIN) on the registration with the one on the dashboard. There was no discrepancy. Officer Gustin asked if he could check the VIN on the inside doorpost of the vehicle. Officer Gustin testified that Castner consented and Officer Gustin opened the car door.
Officer Gustin further testified that he observed a green leafy substance on the floor in the front of the vehicle. Believing it to be marijuana, Officer Gustin picked it up, went to his vehicle and radioed for another officer. He then issued Castner a speeding ticket. Castner asked Officer Gustin a few questions about where he could go to pay the ticket and then asked why Officer Gustin had inquired about weapons. Officer Gustin replied that he had seen Bonnie Castner making erratic movements before the vehicle stopped. Officer Gustin then asked Castner if he had any drugs in the vehicle. When Castner replied in the negative, Officer Gustin asked if he could look. According to Officer Gustin, Castner said he could look, and stated "we don't have anything here." Castner reached into the back seat of the vehicle and pulled two jackets up to the front seat. Officer Gustin asked Castner to unlock the back door, which Castner did. Officer Gustin located a zipped pouch at Bonnie Castner's feet and asked what was in it. Bonnie Castner stated it contained Castner's belongings as Officer Gustin began to unzip the bag. Bonnie Castner attempted to pull the bag from Officer Gustin's hands but not before Officer Gustin found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the pouch.
At that time, a second officer arrived and he assisted Officer Gustin in the search of the vehicle. Bonnie Castner got out of the vehicle, holding her purse. Officer Gustin asked if she had any drugs in her purse and Bonnie Castner said no. Officer Gustin then removed one of several zipped pouches from the top of the purse and looked inside. He found two more baggies of marijuana. Officer Gustin then removed a second pouch from the purse and found that it contained a white powdery substance. At some point during the search, Castner stated that the bags belonged to him. Officer Gustin then asked Castner to open the trunk, where Officer Gustin found a gym bag and a suitcase. In the gym bag he found a set of scales and in the suitcase he found a cardboard box containing more marijuana. Officer Gustin arrested Castner. Bonnie Castner was arrested later at the Duchesne County Jail.
Based on the evidence found in the vehicle and in the purse, both Castners were charged with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990); possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990); possession of marijuana without a tax stamp affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (Supp.1991) ; and possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990). In addition, Castner was charged with speeding, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1988).
The Castners filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search. The parties stipulated the trial court could decide the motion with reference only to the preliminary hearing transcript. At that hearing, Officer Gustin testified on behalf of the State; the Castners presented no evidence. The trial court found that the initial stop of the vehicle was justified, and that the Castners consented to the examination of the VIN, and the search of the interior of the vehicle and the trunk. The Castners then entered pleas of no contest and reserved the right to appeal the denial of their motion, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.1988). This appeal followed.
On appeal, the Castners raise four issues: (1) was the stop of the vehicle legal; (2) did the request to see the VIN on the doorpost exceed the scope of the traffic stop, and if so, did this taint the product of the second search; (3) were the Castners illegally detained after the citation was issued; (4) did the search of the vehicle and its contents exceed the scope of the Castners' consent?
We review a trial court's factual findings underlying the decision to suppress evidence under the "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, (Utah App.1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah App.1991); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah App.1991). We defer to the trial court's fact-finding role and reverse those factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991).
In arguing that there was no probable cause to justify the search of their vehicle, the Castners argue the State erroneously relied on furtive movement as probable cause for the stop and subsequent search of the vehicle. While Officer Gustin testified he observed Bonnie Castner making erratic movements, "like she was really grabbing stuff from the front and putting them down at her feet," the stop of the vehicle was not based on these observations. Rather, Castner was stopped because he was speeding, a fact which he does not dispute on appeal. Therefore, the Castners' assertion that the stop was effectuated by Officer Gustin for reasons other than ticketing Castner for speeding, is without merit.
The Castners next argue the stop of their vehicle and their subsequent detention constituted unreasonable delay because the request to see the doorpost VIN exceeded the scope of the traffic stop, and that therefore the results of the alleged consent search are inadmissible.
After Castner had given Officer Gustin his valid driver's license and vehicle registration, Officer Gustin asked to compare the VIN which was visible on the dashboard of the vehicle with the VIN on the inside of the doorpost. When he opened the vehicle door to examine the VIN, Officer Gustin also looked on the floor of the vehicle and discovered burnt marijuana. 1
In determining the limits of police conduct during a traffic stop, we employ a two-prong analysis: "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Having determined that the stop was justified at its inception, we must now address whether the officer's request to search the interior of the vehicle for the second VIN was "reasonably related" to the issuance of a speeding ticket. We hold that it was not.
"[W]hen an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and the driver's license." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). See also State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.1990). "[O]nce the driver has produced a valid license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.' " Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988)). Any further questioning or detention on the...
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Case Summaries
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