State v. Castrejon
| Decision Date | 22 July 1992 |
| Citation | 834 P.2d 528,114 Or.App. 297 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Leonard D. CASTREJON, Appellant. 9004-32451; CA A66770. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Charles S. Crookham, Atty. Gen., Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., and Robert B. Rocklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, for petition.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and ROSSMAN and DE MUNIZ, JJ.
The state has petitioned for review of our opinion, 111 Or.App. 299, 826 P.2d 68 (1992), which we treat as a petition for reconsideration. ORAP 9.15. We withdraw our opinion and affirm the conviction.
In our original opinion, we reversed because the trial court had failed to define "reasonable doubt"; instead, it gave this instruction:
On appeal, defendant assigned error to the court's failure to give his requested jury instruction, UCJI No. 1006, contending that that instruction is required by statute and that the court's failure to give it constituted reversible error. Although we stated correctly that the statute, ORS 10.095(6), does not require that a particular definition of reasonable doubt be provided to the jury, we held that the trial court erred in not defining reasonable doubt.
After our opinion issued, the Supreme Court decided State v. Williams, 313 Or. 19, 828 P.2d 1006 (1992), in which the defendant assigned as error the giving of a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt. The court discussed at great length the meaning of reasonable doubt and the advisability of attempting to define the phrase. It quoted this language from State v. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 256, 35 P. 655 (1894):
" '[I]nnumerable efforts have been made by the courts to define the expression "reasonable doubt," as used in the criminal law, but so far none of them have [sic ] met with universal approval, or been remarkable for accuracy of expression or clearness of thought, and in many jurisdictions the courts have declined to enter into any explanation of what the term means, because it is believed the term itself is as well calculated to convey to the mind of the juror its own meaning as any definition which can be given, and that to try to give a specific meaning to the word reasonable is * * * "trying to count what is not number, and to measure what is not space."
" " 313 Or. at 36, 828 P.2d 1006.
The court then noted that that description of the state of the law is an apt description of its current confused state. It then pointed out:
Here, the trial court did not attempt to define reasonable doubt, and it was not required to. As in Williams, the instruction given did not mislead the jury to believe that it could convict on a lesser degree of proof than that required; therefore, it was not error.
On reconsideration, we conclude that the instruction given by the trial court was not reversible error.
Petition for reconsideration allowed; opinion withdrawn; affirmed.
The majority holds that a jury need not be told the meaning of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." In so doing, it commits a mistake which, for some future defendant in a capital case, could be fatal. Because its holding contravenes a fundamental precept of our system of jurisprudence and because it is based on a misreading of State v. Williams, 313 Or. 19, 828 P.2d 1006 (1992), I must dissent.
Reasonable doubt is the underpinning of a criminal case. Even the sacrosanct presumption of innocence, see ORS 136.415, is "nothing more than another way of emphasizing the state's burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kessler, 254 Or. 124, 128-29, 458 P.2d 432 (1969); ORS 10.095(6). To instruct a jury that "reasonable doubt means just that," as the trial court did in this case, is to treat cavalierly one of the most significant rights of any criminal defendant.
During my years as a trial judge, it became abundantly clear to me that juries needed and wanted help in understanding the concept of "reasonable doubt." The great majority of this state's trial judges have carefully developed well-reasoned and easily understood jury charges. Generally, those instructions start with the basic premise that the accused--sitting before the jury--is presumed innocent. Just because the grand jury, law enforcement or a private citizen says that the defendant is guilty of a crime does not make it so. The presumption of innocence stays with the defendant from the moment the accusation is made and throughout the trial until the state is able to overcome it by proving defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" as to each and every element of the charge. At the conclusion of the trial, the traditional instructions zero in on the meaning of "reasonable doubt." Most often, the jury is told that reasonable doubt means an honest uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant; it does not mean every possible doubt that may arise in one's mind. "Reasonable doubt" is not a matter of mathematical or absolute certainty. Neither is it a trivial or unimportant doubt. It is doubt that may be entertained by a reasonable person after a careful consideration and comparison of all the evidence; a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to pause or hesitate in matters of vital concern. If the jury has such a doubt, it must give the defendant the benefit of it. Those are but a few of the common admonitions that give "reasonable doubt" the definition that it requires and the attention that it deserves.
I believe that good trial practice necessitates that kind of definitional assistance. See United States v. Wosepka, 757 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.), mod. 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.1985) (). Case law and jury studies support the conclusion that the concept of reasonable doubt is not commonly understood by jurors. Failure to define it results in hung juries and improper convictions on the basis of evidence that is equally balanced between guilt and innocence. Note, "Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define," 90 Colum.L.Rev.1716, 1722-23 (1990). That would be especially true when the same jury has earlier resolved a civil case in which it was instructed to simply weigh the evidence and pick the winner on the basis of the greater weight of the evidence.
The majority concludes that, under State v. Williams, supra, trial courts are not required to define reasonable doubt. Williams absolutely does not reach that result, and neither should we. First, in quoting State v. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 256-57, 35 P. 655 (1894), the Supreme Court did no more than sum up the historically "confused state" of the law regarding definitions of reasonable doubt. 313 Or. at 36, 828 P.2d 1006. The court made no attempt to clear up the confusion....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Castrejon
...given did not mislead the jury to believe that it could convict on a lesser degree of proof than that required." State v. Castrejon, 114 Or.App. 297, 300, 834 P.2d 528 (1992). This court allowed defendant's petition for Defendant makes the same arguments that he made in the Court of Appeals......
-
State v. Castrejon
...454 843 P.2d 454 314 Or. 727 State v. Castrejon (Leonardo D.) NOS. A66770, S39642 Supreme Court of Oregon Nov 24, 1992 114 Or.App. 297, 834 P.2d 528 ...