State v. Catanese
| Decision Date | 05 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 62184,62184 |
| Citation | 368 So.2d 975 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph A. CATANESE. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Richardson, Dist. Atty., Eugene Bryson, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-relator.
M. Daniel LaGrone, Jr., Smith & LaGrone, Shreveport, for defendant-respondent.
In this case we are called upon to reconsider this Court's rule excluding for any purpose evidence of a polygraph examination. Our review convinces us that, at present, such evidence should not be admitted in criminal trials. However, the reasons for the exclusion of polygraph evidence during trial do not militate against its introduction, within the trial judge's discretion, in a post-trial proceeding such as a hearing on a motion for a new trial.
Defendant, Joseph A. Catanese, is charged by bill of information with armed robbery. Catanese is prepared to admit that shortly after the crime he picked up and gave an automobile ride to the gunman who committed the robbery. However, the defendant seeks to show by his testimony and the results of a polygraph examination that he was unaware of the robbery and innocent of any involvement in the crime.
The state has consistently objected to the introduction of the polygraph evidence at trial, relying on previous decisions of this Court. After Catanese was denied a pre-trial hearing on his request to introduce evidence of a proposed polygraph examination during trial, he applied to this Court for relief, and we ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing. 350 So.2d 677 (La.1977). Following a contradictory hearing, the trial judge concluded that, if the polygraph examination were conducted under safeguards prescribed by the court, the testimony of the polygraph expert explaining the test results would be admissible at trial. 1 The State applied here for supervisory review and we brought the case up to consider whether the trial judge's ruling should be reversed or the previous decisions of this Court on the subject should be overruled.
Modern polygraph technique employs an apparatus consisting of scientific instruments which measure and record three or more involuntary physiological responses. 2 The typical polygraph instruments in use today record changes in blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, and "galvanic skin response" 3 which occur while the subject is being asked carefully prepared questions. 4 Before the test the examiner prepares the questions from information supplied to him by an interview with the subject and by other persons familiar with the subject or the particular case under investigation. The examiner also prepares the subject for the test by explaining to him the theory and measurements involved in the polygraph technique. After the examination the examiner interprets the subject's physiological responses recorded during the test in conjunction with all other information gathered by the examiner, including his careful observation of the subject before and during the examination. Based upon these interpretations and information, the examiner arrives at an opinion as to whether the subject responded truthfully to questions during the test. 5
The theory underlying polygraph technique is based on several propositions concerning human psychology and physiology: The autonomic nervous system normally responds involuntarily to stress. An individual who is deceptive when questioned about a meaningful subject will experience stress. The polygraph apparatus is capable of accurately detecting the involuntary responses of the autonomic nervous system which result from stress. If the subject attempts to control his autonomic nervous system, this conscious effort is evident to a competent examiner through observation or analysis. 6
The first appellate decision on the admissibility of polygraph evidence was Frye v. United States, 54 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923). In that case the defendant offered the testimony of an expert witness regarding the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test which had been performed on the defendant. The court of appeals upheld the exclusion of this testimony in the following language:
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
"We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." 54 U.S.App.D.C. at 47, 293 F.2d at 1014.
This "general acceptance" test has been rigorously applied by many federal and state courts to exclude evidence of polygraph tests. 7
In the relatively few cases in which this Court has considered the admissibility of polygraph evidence in criminal trials, the expert's testimony has been excluded by a rationale similar to the Frye "general acceptance" rule. In State v. Refuge, 270 So.2d 842, 844 (La.1974), for example, this Court noted:
See also, State v. Whitmore, 353 So.2d 1286 (La.1978); State v. Davis, 351 So.2d 771 (La.1977); State v. Schouest, 351 So.2d 462 (La.1977); State v. Weeks, 345 So.2d 26 (La.1977); State v. Governor, 331 So.2d 443 (La.1976); State v. Corbin, 285 So.2d 234 (La.1973).
The "general acceptance" standard has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism in recent years. 8 In particular, it has been suggested that the requirement of "general acceptance" is tantamount to a requirement that the validity of the test be susceptible of such demonstration as to enable the trial court to take judicial notice of the fact. Clearly, the criteria used for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence should not require the instant and unquestionable demonstration required for the judicial notice of scientific facts. 9 Other types of scientific evidence have been admitted into evidence under less stringent standards which merely require the evidence to be "an aid to the jury" or "reliable enough to be probative." 10
Professor McCormick and others have suggested that there should be no special rule for the admissibility of polygraphic evidence. C. McCormick, Evidence, § 203 (2d ed. 1972); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy A Conflict in Theory, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 385, 395 (1952). Instead, these scholars would submit the evidence in each case to a balancing process. Any relevant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness would be received unless there were other reasons weighing more heavily in favor of its exclusion. The probative value of the evidence in each case would be balanced against reasons for its exclusion, such as the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury and undue consumption of time, to determine the question of admissibility. 11
Recent jurisprudence has also made significant inroads into the "general acceptance" standard. Many jurisdictions now admit polygraph evidence upon prior stipulation of the parties, 12 and a number of recent cases have stated that polygraph test results would be admissible without stipulation and over objection of opposing counsel under a lesser standard than "general acceptance." 13
We agree that the "general acceptance" standard of Frye is an unjustifiable obstacle to the admission of polygraph test results. In the present case defendant's expert witnesses testified that the modern polygraph examination achieves a high degree of accuracy when conducted by well qualified examiners under proper test conditions. The trial court record supports much of the literature which we have examined that is critical of the restrictive "general acceptance" standard and urges a meaningful reexamination of the admissibility of polygraph evidence. 14 Since Frye was decided in 1923, law enforcement agencies and private industry have come to rely heavily on polygraph examinations for investigation of misconduct and for employment screening; 15 a national association of examiners, the American Polygraph Association, has been established for the purpose of formulating qualifications and ethical standards for polygraph examiners; 16 and many states have enacted statutes for regulating and licensing examiners. 17 Although the validity of the polygraph technique is not universally accepted within the scientific community, 18 it appears that polygraph evidence when obtained under proper safeguards is as reliable as other kinds of scientific evidence accepted routinely by courts.
Nevertheless, after considering the evidence in the instant case and studying the authorities and extensive literature in the field, we conclude that it shall be the judicial policy of Louisiana to exclude polygraph evidence in criminal trials at this time. In doing so, we do not rely upon the "general acceptance" standard which has barred admissibility in the past. Instead, we reach this conclusion after carefully considering the arguments for and against the introduction of polygraph evidence. We recognize the...
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...a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of lay[persons]." This view is shared by many other courts. See, State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La.1979); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.1975); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977). 31 A Committ......
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