State v. Caulder

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Citation339 S.E.2d 876,287 S.C. 507
Decision Date21 October 1985
Docket NumberNo. 0603,0603
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Danny CAULDER, Appellant. . Heard

David I. Bruck, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Staff Atty. Norman Mark Rapoport, Columbia, and Sol. Donald V. Myers, Lexington, for respondent.

CURETON, Judge:

Appellant Danny Caulder was convicted of murder and criminal sexual conduct in connection with the death of Jean Iriel. Caulder appeals from a life sentence imposed on the murder charge and a thirty-year sentence on the criminal sexual conduct charge. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

On appeal Caulder raises issues regarding (1) denial of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (2) denial of his right to call a witness; (3) failure to charge the jury on certain propositions of law; and (4) denial of his right to counsel. The evidence upon which Caulder's conviction rests is mostly circumstantial. A summary of the evidence follows.

The State's evidence showed that Jean Iriel was reported missing when she did not return home on the night of September 10, 1983. Her automobile was found by the Lexington County Sheriff's Department at the intersection of Hook and Morningside Streets near West Columbia in Lexington County about a mile from her home at approximately 5:00 P.M. on September 11, 1983. After the police pryed open the trunk of the automobile, her partially naked body was found inside.

An autopsy revealed that Ms. Iriel died of asphyxiation most likely caused by manual strangulation. The time of her death was estimated to be between 2:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. on September 11. Analysis of her vaginal swabs revealed the presence of semen but no sperm.

The deceased was last seen alive at the Landing Strip, a private nightclub where both she and Caulder were members. During the early morning hours of September 11, a witness claimed to have seen Caulder and the deceased leave the club together around 2:00 A.M.

The deceased's automobile came to rest at the intersection of Hook and Morningside Streets between 5:45 and 7:30 A.M. on September 11. A tenant of the trailer park where the crimes allegedly took place testified he saw Caulder walking down the street at a point between the car's location and Caulder's residence at 7:45 A.M. that day.

On September 13, a prospective tenant of a trailer owned by Caulder's stepfather called the police after he discovered suspicious items in the trailer. Police found ladies slippers and eyeglasses in the living room of the trailer. Blood found in the bedroom was consistent with that of the deceased. Also found in the bedroom were a piece of flesh, buttons, a bottle of cleaner, and some blue materials. Fingerprints found in the trailer did not match Caulder's. Personal items belonging to the deceased were found outside the trailer. The State also presented the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed Caulder confided in him that he thought he had gotten "away with killing this woman."

Caulder testified in his defense that he had been at the Landing Strip on September 10; that he left alone around 2:00 A.M. on September 11 and then spent several hours walking around brooding over his marital problems. He denied both that he had made the alleged statement to the jailhouse informant and that he had access to the house trailer which was the alleged scene of the crimes. He also presented evidence that the deceased had been seen with another man on the night of September 10. An analysis of Caulder's body fluid was inconclusive and demonstrated that he was a member of a class of potential depositors of the semen comprising sixty-four percent of the male population.

I.

Several days prior to trial, Caulder's attorney moved pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) to produce the results of the blood test of David McElveen. 1 The State refused to disclose the results at that time claiming that its prosecutorial strategy would be compromised.

Thereafter the trial judge and the solicitor had an ex parte conference after which the judge ruled that the State did not have to disclose the test results. Just before trial, however, the State voluntarily provided the test results to Caulder. Our Supreme Court has held that ex parte communications between the court and the solicitor are impermissible. Locklear v. Harvey, 273 S.C. 58, 254 S.E.2d 293 (1979); State v. McGuinn, 268 S.C. 112, 232 S.E.2d 229 (1977). Nevertheless, we perceive no prejudice from the actions of the court since the test results were furnished Caulder prior to trial. State v. McCoy, 285 S.C. 115, 328 S.E.2d 620, 621 (1985).

II.

Caulder next assigns error to the failure of the trial judge to permit him to cross-examine the State's forensic serologist on whether David McElveen was a potential depositor of semen in the deceased. We find no merit to this argument. On cross-examination the serologist testified without objection that Caulder was within a blood group of possible depositors of semen that encompassed sixty-four percent of the male population. Caulder sought to elicit from the serologist that McElveen also fell within that same category. The State objected to the testimony and the trial judge sustained the objection based on relevancy.

In State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 16 S.E.2d 532 (1941), the Court sustained the exclusion of certain evidence because it did not sufficiently link a third person with commission of the crime involved and because the collateral matter tended to confuse the jury. The Court, citing 16 C.J. Criminal Law Section 1085 at 560 (1918) stated: "At any rate the evidence offered by the accused as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence; evidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible." 198 S.C. at 104, 16 S.E.2d at 534.

The Court's holding in Gregory is pertinent here. The potential class of semen donors that Caulder attempted to place McElveen into was too enormous to remotely show that McElveen committed the crimes. The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in excluding this testimony especially in light of the fact that the other evidence of McElveen's participation in the crimes was tenuous.

III.

Caulder sought to introduce the testimony of Minnie Lee Sutton, a neighbor of the deceased. The offer of proof showed that Ms. Sutton would have testified that on September 11, 1983, she received three telephone calls from an unidentified person relating to the location of the body of the deceased. The solicitor objected to the testimony on the basis that it was inadmissible hearsay. The trial judge sustained the objection. "The conduct of the trial and the admission or exclusion of evidence is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge. In order to justify relief ... it must be demonstrated not only that the trial judge committed error, but also that the error was prejudicial and denied to an accused person his right to a fair trial." State v. Greene, 255 S.C. 548, 180 S.E.2d 179, 186 (1971). See State v. Hale, 284 S.C. 348, 326 S.E.2d 418, 421 (Ct.App.1985). Despite the stated intention of Caulder's counsel to introduce the telephone conversations for purposes other than for the truth of the statements, there could have been no other purpose for their introduction than to prove the truth of the conversations, to wit, that someone other than Caulder was involved in the crimes. See State v. Williams, 285 S.C. 489, 331 S.E.2d 354 (Ct.App.1985) (rule against hearsay discussed). We find no error in the exclusion of the statements.

IV.

Jim Ross, who had been incarcerated in the same jail with Caulder, testified that Caulder told him that "I think I got away with killing this woman." On cross-examination Ross admitted telling a police officer that he had heard someone else confess to commission of the crimes with which Caulder was charged. After Ross testified that this other person confessed after reading about the crimes in a newspaper, Caulder's counsel introduced a taped conversation in which Ross stated that the confession was made two days before the news was published. Over the objection of Caulder's counsel the trial judge instructed the jury that Ross's inconsistent statements could be used only for impeachment purposes and not as proof of what he previously stated.

A prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982). The State attempts to distinguish Copeland on the ground that Copeland involved inconsistent statements made by the witness himself, while here, the person who made the admission to Ross was not before the court nor subject to cross-examination. The distinction is not valid. The inconsistency here is not in the content of the admission, but rather in Ross's statements as to when he heard the confession. The trial judge's instruction was, therefore, in error because it deprived the jury of evidence that someone else confessed to the crimes before news of the crimes was published in the newspaper.

V.

Caulder next argues that his conviction should be reversed because the trial judge failed to charge (1) the state must prove his presence at the scene of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) a guilty verdict cannot be based upon suspicion. In reviewing a jury charge for error, we must consider the charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial. State v. Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1981...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • State v. Rice, 4300.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • October 5, 2007
    ...as substantive evidence when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination." State v. Caulder, 287 S.C. 507, 513, 339 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct.App.1986) (citing State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 However, in this case the admissibility of a prior incon......
  • State v. Crawford, 3933.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • January 31, 2005
    ...State v. Smith, 309 S.C. 442, 424 S.E.2d 496 (1992); State v. Ferguson, 300 S.C. 408, 388 S.E.2d 642 (1990); State v. Caulder, 287 S.C. 507, 339 S.E.2d 876 (Ct.App.1986). In this case, Jonathan gave a statement to police following his arrest asserting that Appellant participated in the gran......
  • State v. Williams, Appellate Case No. 2011–189886.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • September 19, 2013
    ...Evans, 354 S.C. at 583, 582 S.E.2d at 410. A person is “in custody” when a person's freedom has been restricted. State v. Caulder, 287 S.C. 507, 515, 339 S.E.2d 876, 881 (Ct.App.1986). To determine whether a suspect was in custody for the purposes of Miranda, the Supreme Court has asked whe......
  • State v. Cutro
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 15, 2005
    ...the evidence in light most favorable to the State); Issue 6: State v. Hyder, 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963); State v. Caulder, 287 S.C. 507, 339 S.E.2d 876 (Ct.App.1986) (no error to refuse a charge on mere suspicion where the charge adequately instructs the jury regarding reasonable do......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT