State v. Cavell
| Decision Date | 23 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 15161,15161 |
| Citation | 235 Conn. 711,670 A.2d 261 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Scott CAVELL |
Richard Emanuel, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Harry Weller, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Attorney, Susan C. Marks, Supervisory Assistant State's Attorney, and John M. Massameno, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and KATZ, JJ.
The issues in this certified appeal are whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that: (1) the trial court acted improperly in excluding the testimony of a defense expert witness, due to a violation of a sequestration order, but its ruling was harmless; and (2) the trial court acted properly by permitting the state to present certain forensic evidence in rebuttal but refusing to allow the defendant to present surrebuttal evidence. 1 The defendant, Scott Cavell, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70. 2 Because we agree with the decision of the Appellate Court on both of these certified issues, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
Certain of the facts are undisputed. The victim lived in Cheshire with her husband and four children in a house owned by the victim's mother. On the evening of May 3, 1990, the victim, who had been drinking, and her mother had an argument. The victim then took her children and left the house, driving away in her car. Family members notified the police, who stopped the victim and arrested her for disorderly conduct and criminal mischief. The children were taken home and the victim, after being processed at the police station, was permitted to leave. Unable to contact her husband, the victim called a friend, who, shortly before midnight, dropped the victim off at a bar in Southington. Still unable to contact her husband, she ordered a drink at the bar, where she met the defendant and his girlfriend. The victim complained to the defendant about her arrest and explained that she was having difficulty finding a ride home. After the defendant had offered the victim a ride home, the victim, the defendant and his girlfriend left the bar together. Only then did the victim realize that the defendant and his girlfriend were driving separate cars. The defendant told his girlfriend that he would drive the victim home and then meet the girlfriend at their home in approximately ten minutes. The victim got into the defendant's car. They were stopped almost immediately by the Cheshire police because the defendant's car had a broken taillight. The police officer, who had known the victim for many years, observed her in the passenger seat and later testified that she appeared to be fine. The police officer gave the defendant a verbal warning and released the parties. Instead of taking the victim home, the defendant drove her to a secluded, wooded area.
With respect to subsequent events, the parties diverge in their versions of what occurred. The victim testified at trial that when they had arrived at the secluded area, the defendant had gone to the passenger side of the car and had asked her to get out. When the victim refused to leave the car, the defendant grabbed her and dragged her out by her hair. He then dragged her, on her back, across a gravel driveway to a leafy area, where he pinned her down, removed portions of her clothing, and attempted to force her to engage in fellatio. The victim testified further that she had been able to distract the defendant and run back to the car. The defendant caught up with the victim in the car and forced her to have vaginal intercourse on the front passenger seat, during which he ejaculated. The defendant then took the victim home, where she called the police and reported having been raped by the defendant.
The defendant testified that the victim had asked him to take her to a secluded area, where she had consented to sexual intercourse. He testified that the intercourse had taken place in a leafy and rocky area away from the car, and he denied having had intercourse inside the car. He stated that on the ride back to the victim's house, she had pulled leaves and debris from her hair. State v. Cavell, 34 Conn.App. 276, 280, 641 A.2d 426 (1994).
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment. Id., at 276, 641 A.2d 426. We granted the defendant's petition for certification, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our decision in State v. Robinson, 230 Conn. 591, 646 A.2d 118 (1994) (). State v. Cavell, 231 Conn. 902, 645 A.2d 1021 (1994). Upon reconsideration, the Appellate Court affirmed its previous judgment. State v. Cavell, 36 Conn.App. 912, 649 A.2d 262 (1994). This second certified appeal followed.
We first address the defendant's claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court's exclusion of the testimony of one of the defendant's medical expert witnesses, due to the violation of a sequestration order, 3 was harmless error. The defendant argues that the trial court's improper exclusion of his expert witness' testimony violated his constitutional right to present a defense and, even if the impropriety was not of constitutional magnitude, the Appellate Court used an inappropriate standard in applying the harmless error doctrine. We disagree.
The trial began on April 23, 1991. Prior to the taking of any evidence, the court asked both parties whether either of them intended to request a sequestration order. Both the state and the defendant represented that a sequestration order was not necessary.
The victim testified on the first day of the trial, stating that after the defendant had dragged her across the gravel driveway to the leafy area and had attempted to force her to engage in fellatio, she had escaped and had run back to the car. She further testified that the defendant then had forced her to have intercourse on the front passenger seat of the car, during which, she believed, he had ejaculated.
As additional evidence in its case-in-chief, the state called as a witness Sultan Quarishi, the emergency room physician who had examined the victim. Quarishi testified that the victim's injuries were consistent with her having been dragged across the ground, but conceded on cross-examination that it was impossible to determine definitively what had caused the injuries.
The state also called as a witness Marybeth Guman, a criminalist at the state police forensic laboratory. Guman testified that hair had been found in the defendant's car and on clothing belonging to both the victim and the defendant. She testified that the hair was consistent with that of the victim, that it was remarkable in amount, and that she had never encountered a crime scene with so much hair linked to one person.
When the defendant commenced the presentation of his case, he objected to the fact that one of the detectives who had testified on behalf of the state was seated at counsel table with the assistant state's attorney, assisting with the trial. The defendant, claiming that the detective's presence at counsel table was prejudicial, moved that the detective be required to leave. After the court denied the motion, the defendant moved, pursuant to Practice Book § 876; see footnote 3; that the detective be sequestered. Subsequently, the state moved for a mutual sequestration order, which the court issued. 4
The defendant called as a witness Michael Conroy, a surgeon, to testify about the cause of the victim's injuries, particularly scratches and abrasions on her back. After Conroy had given preliminary testimony about his background, the state requested an offer of proof regarding the evidence Conroy would be offering and his credentials to offer that evidence. During the offer of proof, Conroy revealed that he had been provided with, and had reviewed the preceding evening, a transcription of a portion of Quarishi's testimony. The trial court determined that the defendant had violated the sequestration order by providing Conroy with a copy of Quarishi's testimony. As a sanction for this violation, the court precluded Conroy from testifying further, and struck the testimony that he had already given. 5 The court allowed the defendant nine days to obtain the services of another witness to testify in lieu of Conroy. The defendant retained another surgeon, Jack Huse, who subsequently testified as an expert witness regarding the victim's injuries.
During the offer of proof regarding Conroy's proposed testimony, Conroy, a graduate of Yale College and Cornell Medical School, had acknowledged that there are forensic criminalists who are trained in the reconstruction of crimes, but that he had received no such training. He stated that his knowledge regarding the etiology of wounds had come "from experience" rather than from specific training. He also stated that the only time he had visited the secluded area where the assault had taken place, in order to observe the conditions there, was on the preceding day, more than one year after the assault. Conroy proposed to testify that the victim's injuries were consistent with her having engaged in active sex in the leafy area but were inconsistent with her having been dragged head first over the gravel driveway.
Huse, a vascular surgeon, was a graduate of Dennison University and Hahneman University Medical School. He, too, lacked training in crime reconstruction. He testified that he had never received any training in the area of forensic science, had never taken any courses in crime scene reconstruction, and had no qualifications or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. King
...proportions, the state bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 720, 670 A.2d 261 (1996). "When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the......
-
Kelo v. City of New London
...beyond a reasonable doubt rests with the state. E.g., State v. Francis, 267 Conn. 162, 188, 836 A.2d 1191 (2003); State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 720, 670 A.2d 261 (1996). Accordingly, the adoption of a burden shifting analysis in cases involving the taking of property for private economic ......
-
State v. Shabazz
...v. McIntyre, 242 Conn. 318, 329, 699 A.2d 911 (1997); State v. Wilkes, 236 Conn. 176, 188, 671 A.2d 1296 (1996); State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 721-22, 670 A.2d 261 (1996). Another line of cases states that the defendant must establish that the trial court error caused him "substantial pre......
-
State v. Holley, AC 37166
...(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cavell, 34 Conn. App. 276, 289 n.7, 641 A.2d 426 (1994), aff'd, 235 Conn. 711, 670 A.2d 261 (1996); see also State v. Rodriguez, 146 Conn. App. 99, 104-108, 110, 75 A.3d 798 (failure to make offer of proof results in inadequate......
-
Significant Developments in Criminal Law 1995-1996
...994, 107 S.CL 579, 93 LEd.2d 598 (1986). 88 State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588, 682 A.2d 972 (1996). 89 Id., at 610. 9O State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. 711, 670 A.2d 261 (1996). 91 State v. Cavell, 235 Conn. at 730-731. 92 236 Conn. 342, 673 A.2d 463 (1996). 93 State v.'Person, 236 Conn. 348, 677 A......