State v. Cavers, 17649

Decision Date03 May 1960
Docket NumberNo. 17649,17649
Citation236 S.C. 305,114 S.E.2d 401
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE, Respondent, v. Walter M. CAVERS, Appellant.

C. T. Graydon, A. T. Graydon, Harold Boulware, Columbia, for appellant.

George F. Coleman, Sol., Winnsboro, John Spratt, York, for respondent.

STUKES, Chief Justice.

As the result of a fatal traffic accident the appellant was indicted upon two counts, (1) murder, and (2) reckless homicide, the latter being statutory, Section 46-341, Code of 1952. State v. McCracken, 211 S.C. 52, 43 S.E.2d 607; State v. Rachels, 218 S.C. 1, 61 S.E.2d 249; State v. Phillips, 226 S.C. 297, 84 S.E.2d 855. Upon trial involuntary manslaughter was submitted to the jury under the first count, as was reckless homicide under the second. The jury returned verdict of guilty of reckless homicide and appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years. He appeals and submits questions which will be considered seriatim after brief statement of the facts.

Appellant was driving a new Lincoln automobile from Charlotte and collision occurred with decedent's automobile within the corporate limits of the town of York, at the intersection of North Congress and Kings Mountain Streets, which caused the immediate death of decedent. Appellant was driving south on North Congress and decedent, who had been driving north, was turning from that street, to the left, into Kings Mountain Street. The collision occurred on appellant's right side of the street, and decedent's left. The accident happened about 5:40 P.M. on March 18, 1958, at or near twilight and after it had been raining earlier so that the pavement was partially wet. Appellant's car left skid marks, showing application of the brakes, for a distance of 91 feet to the point of impact. By the force of it decedent's car was pushed sideways for a distance of 51 feet; appellant's car came to rest 38 feet forward from the point of collision. The street was straight and from appellant's approach the intersection was visible for a distance of 314 feet. Both cars were badly crushed and damaged, indicating the effect of at least considerable force.

The excessive speed of appellant's car was the gist of the State's case. Several State's witnesses testified as to it. Some of them met appellant as he approached the intersection and complaint is made, by appellant's first question, that their points of observation were too distant to be admissible. It was about one and one-half miles from the intersection that the most distant witness met appellant and was so frightened by the latter's speed that he drove off the highway to avoid the possibility of collision. Another witness nearer the intersection did the same. One of them estimated appellant's speed at 90 miles per hour. They were terrorized at his approach. Other witnesses testified as to speed closer to the point of collision so that all of the evidence was connected and tended to show continuity of excessive speed. However, we need not consider whether the evidence which was objected to should have been excluded because in each instance appellant's counsel cross-examined the witness concerning his testimony on direct examination without reservation of the objection. It was thereby lost and, if error it was cured. 18 S.C. Dig., Trial, k412, p. 236. Of interest is an annotation in 46 A.L.R.2d 9 entitled, 'Admissibility, in action involving motor vehicle accident, of evidence as to manner in which participant was driving before reaching scene of accident.'

Appellant points out that these witnesses did not positively identify him or his car. But they testified that it was a two-toned Lincoln which they saw speeding on the highway toward the point of collision, driven by a colored man, and at a time immediately before the accident. We think that these circumstances made the testimony competent and the weight of it was for the jury. They were fully instructed by the court with respect to circumstantial evidence. Appellant, who is a Negro, admitted that he and his two-toned Lincoln car were involved in the fatal collision. Annotation, 46 A.L.R.2d 29.

Further complaint is made of the admission in evidence of the testimony of a State's witness who was in his yard about 300 feet from the collision and testified that, quoting, 'I heard a car come by at a high rate of speed, and in my opinion in just almost a split second I heard this very loud brakes being applied, and the impact and I went out to the street and saw that there was a wreck, and I went down to see what I could do about it.' Whether a witness may testify to his conclusion of high speed from the sound of the vehicle is an interesting question. Annotation, 156 A.L.R. 387, c. Here there was more than the sound of the vehicle--the noise caused by application of the brakes and by the virtually instantaneous collision. However, we need not consider it because, again, the witness was cross-examined at length by defendant's counsel and substantially the same evidence elicited, without reservation of his former objection.

Appellant's second question asserts that the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that decedent's negligence and recklessness was the proximate cause of the collision; we take the contention to be that it was the sole proximate cause. We do not think so, in view of the evidence of high and unlawful speed of appellant. About two-tenths of a mile from the intersection there is a traffic circle where there is a posted speed limit of twenty miles per hour although a State's witness testified that he had once negotiated it out of necessity with a truck at fifty miles per hour. The speed limit at the scene of the collision, which was a residential section, was 35 miles per hour and a 35 mile per hour sign was posted at the city limits. Inferably, appellant reduced his speed temporarily to pass through the traffic circle and resumed it immediately. It is within common knowledge that powerful automobiles accelerate rapidly. The Lincoln here was of 375 horsepower. Contributory negligence is not a...

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10 cases
  • Simmons v. State
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1975
    ...607 (1947); State v. Rachels, 218 S.C. 1, 61 S.E.2d 249 (1950); State v. Clary, 222 S.C. 549, 73 S.E.2d 681 (1952); State v. Cavers, 236 S.C. 305, 114 S.E.2d 401 (1960); State v. Jenkins, 249 S.C. 570, 155 S.E.2d 624 (1967); State v. Addis, 257 S.C. 482, 186 S.E.2d 415 (1972), all of which ......
  • State v. Greene
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 23, 2018
    ...inherent in double jeopardy and due process preclude multiple punishments for the same offense.6 See, e.g. , State v. Cavers , 236 S.C. 305, 311–12, 114 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1960) ("It was within the province of the jury to find whether appellant's conduct was negligent or reckless, or neither;......
  • State v. Bass
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 1, 1963
    ...cross-examined the State's witnesses thereabout without reservation, thereby waiving any objection he had thereto. State v. Cavers, 236 S.C. 305, 114 S.E.2d 401; State v. Puckett, 237 S.C. 369, 117 S.E.2d Appellant's third exception relates to the five 5 gallon cans of paint found behind th......
  • State v. Young
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 4, 1963
    ...was thereby lost and if any error had been committed in the admission of the testimony of these witnesses it was cured. State v. Cavers, 236 S.C. 305, 114 S.E.2d 401; State v. Puckett, 237 S.C. 369, 117 S.E.2d 369, and State v. Bass, 242 S.C. 193, 130 S.E.2d 481. This exception is The appel......
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