State v. Celmer

• Decision Date: 21 June 1979
• Citation: 80 N.J. 405,404 A.2d 1
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, and Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist Church,Intervenor-Respondent, v. Louis J. CELMER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 405

80 N.J. 405

404 A.2d 1

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent and Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist Church,Intervenor-Respondent, v. Louis J. CELMER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 6, 1979.

Decided June 21, 1979.

William B. Gallagher, Jr., Asbury Park, for defendant-appellant (Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher, Asbury Park, attorneys).

Alfred C. Clapp, Newark, for respondent Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n (Henry H. Patterson, Asbury Park, attorney).

Donald W. Peppler, Jr., Asst. Monmouth County Prosecutor, for respondent State of New Jersey (Alexander D. Lehrer, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PASHMAN, J.

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 40:97-1 Et seq. a statutory scheme which grants various municipal powers to the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of The United Methodist Church. Specifically, defendant contends that by delegating to the Association the authority to make laws and the power to enforce those laws through the establishment of a municipal court, See N.J.S.A. 40:97-4 to 40:97-8, the Legislature has transcended the bounds of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 4 of our own State Constitution.

On March 24, 1976 defendant Louis Celmer, Jr. was arrested by officers of the Ocean Grove Police Department and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)); speeding (N.J.S.A. 39:4-98); and disregard of a traffic signal (N.J.S.A. 39:4-81). Following a trial in the Ocean Grove Municipal Court, defendant was found guilty of each of the three offenses.

Defendant appealed these convictions to the Monmouth County Court, See R. 3:23-1, -2. ¹ In addition to attacking the sufficiency of the proofs upon which the findings of guilt were based, defendant contended that the statutory scheme permitting the formation of a municipal court in Ocean Grove, See N.J.S.A. 40:97-4, was invalid under the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment, that the municipal court was therefore an improperly constituted tribunal, and that consequently his convictions must be reversed.

On June 11, 1976, following a trial De novo based upon the record below, See R. 3:23-8(a), the County Court concluded that defendant's guilt as to all three charges had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, it reversed the speeding and disregard of a traffic signal convictions on the ground that these offenses merged into the drunk driving violation. Decision as to the merits of defendant's First Amendment claim was reserved, in order that notice of the constitutional challenge be given to the Attorney General of New Jersey, the Ocean Grove Municipal Court, and the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist Church, See R. 4:28-4. None of the foregoing parties chose to intervene at that time.

The County Court's decision as to defendant's constitutional claim was rendered on July 12, 1976. State v. Celmer, 143 N.J.Super. 371, 362 A.2d 1330 (Cty.Ct.1976). It concluded that N.J.S.A. 40:97-1 Et seq. did indeed violate the dictates of the First Amendment, and that therefore the Ocean Grove municipal court was without jurisdiction to determine defendant's guilt or innocence of the charged offenses. 143 N.J.Super. at 377, 362 A.2d 1330. The drunk driving conviction there imposed was consequently reversed and a judgment of acquittal entered.

On July 26, 1976 the State filed a notice of appeal to the Appellate Division. The Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association requested and was granted permission to intervene. On March 10, 1978 the Appellate Division reversed the County Court's decision as to the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 40:97-1 Et seq. and reinstated the drunk driving conviction. State v. Celmer, 157 N.J.Super. 242, 384 A.2d 894 (App.Div.1978). We granted defendant's petition for certification. 79 N.J. 464, 401 A.2d 221 (1979). We now reverse.

I

Resolution of defendant's constitutional challenge must begin with an examination of both the internal workings of the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association (Association) and the powers granted that Association by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 40:97-1 Et seq. In 1869, a small band of Methodist clergy led by Rev. William B. Osborn established a camp meeting ground upon 260 acres of land which now form the nucleus of Ocean Grove. The site quickly attracted adherents, and within a short period of time the area was transformed from a sparsely settled expanse into a thriving community of fellow worshippers. See Gibbons, History of Ocean Grove, 9-11 (1939).

In 1870 the association which these people had established was incorporated by State charter under the name "The Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal Church" L. 1870, C. 157. That name has since been changed to "The Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of The United Methodist Church" L. 1968, C. 231. At present, the lands owned by the corporation form a part of Neptune Township.

At the time it obtained its corporate charter, the Association adopted a set of by-laws to regulate the internal affairs of the organization. These by-laws make clear that the main purpose underlying the formation of the Association was, and remains today, that of

provid(ing) and maintain(ing) for the members and friends of The United Methodist Church a proper, convenient and desirable permanent camp meeting ground and Christian seaside resort * * *. (Association By-Laws, Art. II)

See L. 1870, C. 157, § 1.

In order that this goal be achieved, the Association retained title to all lands, streets, walks, parks, and other public places situated within the camp grounds. The property was, however, subdivided and individual lots leased for 99 years, renewable in perpetuity, to persons "who may be vouched for as of good moral character and in sympathy with the objects of (the) Association." Association By-Laws, Art. XI, § 1. Moreover, all transfers of lots were, and remain, subject to the approval of the Association's president or designated representative. Id.

The by-laws also established a governmental apparatus in order to manage the internal affairs of the community. As presently constituted, legislative and executive powers within the Association are reposed in a 26 member Board of Trustees. At least ten of these trustees must be ministers and ten, laymen. All, however, are required to "be and remain members of The United Methodist Church in good and regular standing." Association By-Laws, Art. III, § 1. This Board is self-perpetuating in that the trustees themselves select their replacements and successors. Id. Moreover, only the trustees can revise or amend the by-laws, and hence only they can alter the manner in which the present government is structured. Id.

The by-laws also provide for the election of "associate" trustees persons who "have the privilege of attending (board) meetings" but who cannot vote upon matters therein considered. Id., Art. III, § 5. Associate trustees need not be adherents of the Methodist faith; they must, however, "be member(s) of a Christian Church in good and regular standing." Id.

Responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the community has been delegated by the by-laws to those trustees who serve on the Board's executive, program and development committees. Id., Art. V, § 2. The executive committee serves as the administrative arm of the Board, and represents the Board in all official matters. Id., Art. VII. The program committee's main responsibility is that of organizing religious services and meetings for Ocean Grove's inhabitants. Id., Art. VIII. The development committee is charged with the duty of initiating and implementing financial programs "necessary to provide and maintain (Ocean Grove as) * * * a proper, convenient and desirable permanent Camp Meeting Ground and Christian Seaside Resort." Id., Art. IX, § 2.

Beginning with the Association's incorporation in 1870 and continuing to the present day, the Legislature has granted Ocean Grove's Board of Trustees various police powers ordinarily exercisable only by municipalities. See L. 1870, C. 157; L. 1878, C. 40; L. 1878, C. 76; L. 1881, C. 211; L. 1894, C. 90 as amended L. 1953, C. 37, § 274 (now codified at N.J.S.A. 40:97-1 Et seq.). As now in effect, these statutes delegate to the Board responsibility for the construction and maintenance of public highways, streets, walks, parks, and sewers located within the boundaries of the camp grounds. N.J.S.A. 40:97-1, -2. The trustees also possess veto power over the construction of any public highway in Ocean Grove, or the implementation of public forms of transportation. N.J.S.A. 40:97-3. Finally, the trustees are given "exclusive jurisdiction" to "maintain and preserve order" within Ocean Grove and, in order to facilitate the achievement of that end, have been accorded the power to "make and enforce rules and regulations to promote and protect the public health," N.J.S.A. 40:97-4, and to "prescribe penalties for (their) violation," N.J.S.A. 40:97-7. These rules, whether passed in the form of ordinances, by-laws or resolutions, may be enforced by a municipal court established by the trustees, N.J.S.A. 40:97-4, -5, -6, and are accorded by statute the same force and effect as municipal ordinances, N.J.S.A. 40:97-8.

The municipal court of Ocean Grove, as presently constituted, was established through an ordinance adopted by the Association's trustees on April 17, 1964. A court with similar powers has existed within the community since 1876. See L. 1876, C. 149, § 2. The magistrate of the court is appointed by the Board for a term of three years and until such time as a successor is appointed and qualified. It was this court that initially found defendant guilty of the charges which form the basis of the present suit....