State v. Central Vermont Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 30 October 1908 |
| Parties | STATE v. CENTRAL VERMONT RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
January Term, 1908.
SPECIAL ASSUMPSIT for damage caused by the payment of freight charges exacted in violation of P. S. 4485. Heard on general demurrer to the declaration at the September Term, 1907 Washington County, Waterman, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled, and declaration adjudged sufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion recites the material allegations of the declaration. See next following case.
Judgment reversed, demurrer sustained, declaration adjudged insufficient, and cause remanded.
C W. Witters and H. H. Powers for the defendant.
Clarke C. Fitts, Attorney General, for the plaintiff.
Present: ROWELL, C. J., TYLER, MUNSON, and WATSON, JJ.
It is provided by V. S. 3901 that "a railroad corporation whose railroad is located in the State, shall not charge a larger sum for freight, merchandise, or passengers thereon for a less distance, to or from a way station on said road, than is charged for a greater distance;" and that "in case of a violation of the provision, the excess so charged may be recovered from said corporation, by the party aggrieved, in an action for money had and received, with costs."
The State, the plaintiff in the case, supplied its asylum in Waterbury with coal bought of the George Hall Coal Company and shipped by that company from Alburgh to Waterbury over the defendant's line. The defendant charged and collected from the George Hall Company a larger sum for freight on coal shipped from Alburgh to Waterbury than it charged for hauling coal from Alburgh through Waterbury to Montpelier. This excess of freight charge was added by the George Hall Company to the price of its coal, and was paid by the State to the George Hall Company as a part of the purchase price of the coal. The excess so charged, the State now seeks to recover as money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.
The question is whether the plaintiff is an aggrieved party. The statute is clearly remedial, and remedial statutes are to be construed liberally to effectuate their purpose. But all statutes capable of more than one construction are to be examined in the light of common law principles.
The expression "aggrieved party" is not a technical one, and the words are to be given their natural meaning. Robinson v. Currey, 7 Q. B. D. 465, 470. But when used with reference to legal remedies, they must be taken to mean one who is injured in a legal sense. Green v. Blackwell, 32 N.J.Eq. 768, 772.
The cases are generally those involving the right of appeal. It is said with reference to this right that a person aggrieved is one whose pecuniary interest is directly affected by the adjudication. Andress v. Andress, 46 N.J.Eq. 528. Wiggin v. Swett, 47 Mass. 194. It is said in this State, with reference to probate proceedings, that the persons entitled to appeal as aggrieved or interested persons are those who have some legal interest that may be enlarged or diminished by the decree. Hemmenway v. Corey, 16 Vt. 225; Woodward v. Spear, 10 Vt. 420.
There are a few cases where the term has been construed as used in statutes providing for the recovery of penalties or damages. See 1 Words and Phrases 273. Under statutes imposing a penalty for selling liquor to minors, it is held that the person aggrieved is the father or mother of the minor, or the person standing in loco parentis. Peavy v Goss, 90 Tex. 89; Qualls v. Sayles, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 400. Where a statute made the unlawful furnisher of intoxicating drinks liable for any injury to person or property resulting from a furnishing, in terms treated as sufficiently broad to cover losses from expenditures of money and time,--and provided for the recovery of damages by any one aggrieved; it was held that the father of an unmarried adult son, who had ceased to live with him and was not his servant, could not...
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