State v. Ceppi
| Citation | 91 A.3d 320 |
| Decision Date | 28 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2011–190–C.A.,2011–190–C.A. |
| Parties | STATE v. Mark CEPPI. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for State.
Robert B. Mann, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
The defendant, Mark Ceppi, appeals from a judgment of conviction on one count of domestic felony assault, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 11–5–2 and G.L.1956 § 12–29–5, and one count of domestic simple assault, pursuant to § 11–5–3 and § 12–29–5, which judgment was entered on August 5, 2010, following a jury-waived trial in the Newport County Superior Court. The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to dismiss a criminal information, which motion invoked Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and G.L.1956 § 12–12–1.7. The criminal information at issue contained two counts, on both of which the defendant was eventually convicted; he posits that the criminal information package was not sufficient to establish probable cause for either of the two counts. He further contends that the trial justice committed a number of evidentiary errors during the course of the trial. Those errors, according to the defendant, were as follows: (1) finding that certain portions of the testimony of Newport Detective Christopher Hayes were not hearsay and allowing improper bolstering of the testimony of Heather King (the complaining witness) by the testimony of Det. Hayes; (2) improperly allowing questioning of the defendant with respect to an alleged past incident of violence involving his former wife; (3) impermissibly restricting the defendant's testimony with respect to Ms. King's alleged intoxication; and (4) wrongly allowing Stephanie Bacon, the complaining witness's twin sister, to testify with respect to the complaining witness's injuries.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Superior Court's judgment of conviction.
On October 6, 2009, defendant was charged by criminal information with domestic felony assault, pursuant to § 11–5–2 and § 12–29–5 (Count One), and domestic simple assault, pursuant to § 11–5–3 and § 12–29–5 (Count Two). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal information pursuant to Rule 9.1 and § 12–12–1.7, alleging that the criminal information package “failed to establish probable cause.” On May 19, 2010, a hearing was held in Superior Court, at the close of which the trial justice denied defendant's motion to dismiss.1 In due course, a jury-waived trial was held over six days in July and August of 2010. We summarize below the salient aspects of what transpired at trial.
Heather King, the complaining witness, testified first at the trial. Ms. King testified that she had dated defendant from “either the end of July, 2007 or very early August, 2007” until May 3, 2009. She further testified that she began living with defendant in January or February of 2009. According to Ms. King's testimony, “a couple of days before” March 17, 2009, she and defendant had an argument; she did not recall what that particular argument was about, but she acknowledged that her arguments with defendant were “usually over jealousy or controlling issues.” It was her testimony that, during the course of the March 2009 argument, defendant “punched [her] twice in [her] rib cage.” 2 She stated that she heard a “crack” when she was punched in the ribs, and she added that it was confirmed that she had fractured a rib when she eventually had x-rays taken in “early May” of 2009. The March 2009 incident formed the basis of Count Two.
Ms. King next testified that, on May 2, 2009, she and defendant attended a charity event in Boston. It was her testimony that, during the drive home to their residence in Newport, they “pulled over” at a location “close to [Boston],” at which time they were arguing; she added that defendant “hit [her] in the head” in the course of their argument. Ms. King stated that the next morning (May 3, 2009), before defendant woke up, she deleted from his phone the name and phone number of a woman with whom defendant had been talking at the charity event which they had attended the night before. It was her testimony that later that morning defendant asked if she had deleted “numbers from [his] phone” and that she replied in the affirmative. She further testified that, later that same day, after taking one of defendant's sons out for breakfast, she and defendant had a “conversation” about her deletion of the phone number. She stated that “at one point, [she] got upset, [and] walked away and into the bathroom” but that defendant “followed [her] into the bathroom,” “locked” the door, and “cornered” her. It was her testimony that defendant “looked at [her] with these crazy eyes” and proceeded to “hit” her “in the stomach, the arm, the leg, and then * * * [the] head;” she added that she was hit “five to seven” times and that afterwards she felt as though her head was “going to explode.” It was this second incident which formed the basis of Count One.
According to Ms. King's testimony, after the May 3 assault, she felt lethargic and was just “lying in bed” “all day long;” she added, however, that the May 3 incident prompted her to decide to leave defendant.3 With respect to her injuries, it was her testimony that the symptoms worsened and that, on May 9, 2009, she “woke up, and * * * couldn't lift [her] head up,” at which time she went to Newport Hospital. She stated that personnel at Newport Hospital indicated that she had a “brain bleed;” she further stated that she was also told by personnel at Newport Hospital that she was “lucky to be alive” since most people with “the size of [her] hematoma * * * die within twenty-four hours of that injury.” Ms. King added that she was told that she would be “rush[ed]” to Rhode Island Hospital. It was her testimony that, at Rhode Island Hospital, she was given the option of going home, which she did, leaving Rhode Island Hospital “late” on May 9, 2009—only to return at 6 a.m. the next morning because she “couldn't stop throwing up.” At trial, she remembered spending “more than one day” at Rhode Island Hospital before being released to stay with her sister, Stephanie Bacon, in Rutland, Massachusetts.
Ms. King testified that her symptoms continued to worsen 4 while she was staying with her sister; she stated that she ultimately called her “doctor [in] Rhode Island” and that he said: “ ‘Rush her to [the University of Massachusetts Medical Center] because it's the only level one trauma near you.’ ” It was her further testimony that, at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center (U.Mass.Medical) located in Worcester, she was diagnosed with a “[s]ubdural hematoma;” she added that she spent “more than a day” at U. Mass. Medical and thereafter returned to work about one month after she was discharged.5
We note that the prosecutor submitted into evidence Ms. King's medical records (including her records from Newport Hospital, Rhode Island Hospital, and U. Mass. Medical); and defense counsel, rather than simply acquiescing to their admission by remaining silent, specifically stated to the trial justice that he had no objection. We also note that, at trial, the parties stipulated that Ms. King's subdural hematoma constituted a “serious bodily injury” under § 11–5–2.
Stephanie Bacon, Ms. King's identical twin sister, testified at trial that she visited Ms. King in the hospital in Newport in May of 2009. In her testimony, Ms. Bacon confirmed that her sister's symptoms intensified while she was staying with her in Rutland. Specifically, Ms. Bacon testified that Ms. King was “vomiting uncontrollably” and that her head was filled with pressure “which now we know was the blood on the brain.” Her testimony went on to confirm Ms. King's testimony with respect to being admitted to U. Mass. Medical.
During the course of Ms. Bacon's testimony, the prosecutor asked her: “Did you come to find out what kind of injury [your sister] sustained that she needed treatment at the hospital?” Ms. Bacon responded: Defense counsel then said: “Objection to the relevance.” The trial justice stated: “It's all right.”
Detective Christopher Hayes of the Newport Police Department testified that on or about May 9, 2009, he learned of an alleged assault on Ms. King; he added that he thereafter drove to Worcester to speak with her while she was at U. Mass. Medical. It was his further testimony that during his visit to U. Mass. Medical he spoke with one of Ms. King's physicians, who told him that Ms. King had a subdural hematoma and that the possibility of performing surgery on her was being debated. During his testimony, Det. Hayes also indicated that Ms. King named defendant as her assailant.
After Det. Hayes had testified that one of Ms. King's physicians told him she had a subdural hematoma, the following exchange took place:
“[The State]: Did you, during your investigation, have a chance to inquire as to what injuries she, Ms. King, was diagnosed with when you went to see her?
“[Detective Hayes]: Yes.
“[The State]: What injuries?
“[The Court]: There is going to be medical evidence, so you may answer, Detective Hayes.”
Detective Hayes proceeded to indicate in his testimony that, in addition to the just-referenced statements made to him by Ms. King's physician with respect to her medical condition, Ms. King herself told him, when he took her statement at U. Mass. Medical, that, in addition to the subdural hematoma, she had “sustained some fractured ribs.” The direct examination then proceeded as follows:
“[The State]: Did she give you a time...
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