State v. Chacon

Citation484 P.3d 208,168 Idaho 524
Decision Date18 March 2021
Docket NumberDocket No. 47009
Parties STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rocco Joseph CHACON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Idaho

168 Idaho 524
484 P.3d 208

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Rocco Joseph CHACON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 47009

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: March 18, 2021


Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LORELLO, Judge

Rocco Joseph Chacon, Jr. appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding a police officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After receiving a tip regarding Chacon's whereabouts, officers sought to arrest Chacon on outstanding warrants. Plain-clothes officers in unmarked police vehicles converged upon and partially surrounded the vehicle Chacon was driving as he approached an intersection. The officers exited their vehicles and, with weapons drawn, commanded Chacon to show his hands and exit his vehicle. Chacon responded by fleeing in his vehicle through an opening in the police blockade, hitting an officer who was approaching on foot. As Chacon sped away, an officer fired on Chacon's vehicle and wounded his passenger. The ensuing high-speed pursuit ended after Chacon's vehicle lost one of its rear tires. After a short foot chase, officers apprehended Chacon. Searches of Chacon's person and vehicle yielded marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a stolen handgun, and a black case containing methamphetamine.

The State charged Chacon with eluding a police officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, battery with intent to commit a serious

484 P.3d 212

felony on certain personnel, and grand theft by possession of stolen property (the firearm). After Chacon unsuccessfully moved to sever some of the charges, the State moved to consolidate this case with another in which Chacon was charged with possession of a controlled substance for the methamphetamine in the black case found on his person. The district court granted the motion over Chacon's objection. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Chacon guilty of eluding a police officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance, but acquitted him of battery with intent commit a serious felony on certain personnel and grand theft. Chacon appeals, arguing that the district court erred by trying all three charges for which he was convicted in a single proceeding and by improperly admitting prejudicial evidence of his prior acts.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether joinder is proper under I.C.R. 8 is reviewed de novo. State v. Nava , 166 Idaho 884, 889, 465 P.3d 1123, 1128 (2020). Whether joinder is proper under I.C.R. 13 is also reviewed de novo. State v. Gamble , 146 Idaho 331, 336, 193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 2008). However, whether joinder is prejudicial under I.C.R. 14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Nava , 166 Idaho at 900, 465 P.3d at 1129. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera , 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

III.

ANALYSIS

Chacon argues that the district court erred by granting the State's motion to consolidate, denying his motion to sever, and admitting prior-acts evidence--specifically, evidence of his heroin use and possession of drug paraphernalia on the day of his arrest. The State responds that all the charges against Chacon were properly litigated in a single trial and that Chacon did not preserve his appellate claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever. The State further contends that the district court properly admitted evidence of Chacon's prior acts and, alternatively, that any error in admitting that evidence was harmless. We hold that Chacon has failed to establish any reversible error.

A. Joinder of Methamphetamine Charge

Chacon first challenges the district court's decision to grant the State's motion to join the allegation (originally pled in a separate charging document) that he possessed methamphetamine with its original allegations that Chacon eluded law enforcement, unlawfully possessed a firearm, battered an officer with the intent to commit a serious felony, and committed grand theft by unlawfully possessing a stolen firearm. The State argued that joinder was proper because the possession of methamphetamine charge arose from the same "facts and circumstances" as the four other offenses the State alleged Chacon committed. In its supporting memorandum, the State asserted that "all of these acts occurred essentially within a very short period of time from the beginning of the traffic stop until the end of the traffic stop. Possession was occurring at the same time the eluding and the battery on an officer occurred." Therefore, proving each charge would entail the presentation of similar witnesses and exhibits. At the hearing on the State's motion, Chacon objected to joining the possession of methamphetamine charge, arguing "very minimal facts" connected the possession offense with the other offenses and that he was prejudiced by "having both the gun charge and now drug charges tacked on," which would allow the jury to consider evidence that would not otherwise be admissible. Chacon further argued that joinder under the circumstances only served to "paint him out to be a bad guy and draw attention away from what actually happened at the intersection on the battery with intent." The district court concluded that, under

484 P.3d 213

I.C.R. 13, joinder was appropriate. Regarding prejudice, the district court stated: "I don't know that the jury--that [Chacon] would be prejudiced because there were multiple charges against him. I think that the jury can sort through each and every charge and has the ability to do so."

On appeal, Chacon faults the district court for conducting an incomplete analysis of the potential prejudice that would result from joining the methamphetamine offense with the other offenses. Idaho law provides two independent grounds for challenging joinder. First, a defendant can challenge joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) by arguing that the requirements of the rule have not been met. Nava , 166 Idaho at 888, 465 P.3d at 1127. Second, a defendant can argue that, even if joinder is proper under I.C.R. 8, the charges should be severed under I.C.R. 14 because joinder is prejudicial. Id. For purposes of I.C.R. 14, Idaho appellate courts have recognized three potential sources of prejudice: (1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (3) the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find the defendant guilty of the other crimes because of his or her criminal disposition. See State v. Williams , 163 Idaho 285, 293, 411 P.3d 1186, 1194 (Ct. App. 2018).

Although the transcript of the hearing on the State's motion for joinder suggests that Chacon disputed the propriety of joinder under I.C.R. 8(a) by arguing that "very minimal facts" connected the methamphetamine offense to the other offenses, he does not pursue this claim on appeal. Instead, Chacon's appellate arguments are limited to the prejudice he argued relative to joinder. Because Chacon presented his arguments within the context of joinder in the first instance, he did not file a separate I.C.R. 14 motion to sever, nor do we believe he was required to under the circumstances, particularly since the district court addressed Chacon's prejudice arguments. Thus, we reject the State's argument that Chacon was required to file a separate motion in order to preserve this argument for appeal.

Turning to the merits of Chacon's prejudice claim, he asserts that his "argument with regard to not joining the methamphetamine charge to the eluding or firearm charges was focused" on the prejudice arising from "improper propensity evidence," which would "infect" the jury's "analysis on each charge." Chacon contends the district did not address this potential source of prejudice but instead only addressed the "first type of prejudice," i.e., the possibility that the jury would confuse or cumulate the evidence. We disagree.

As Chacon notes, he argued that joinder prejudiced him because it risked the jury convicting him on the basis that he was a "bad guy," which is a propensity argument. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that the existence of multiple charges was insufficient to show prejudice and the jury...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT