State v. Chacon
| Decision Date | 27 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 95194-2,95194-2 |
| Citation | 431 P.3d 477 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John Anthony CHACON, Petitioner. |
Skylar Texas Brett, Law Office of Skylar Brett, PLLC, P.O. Box 18084, Seattle, WA 98118-0084, for Petitioner
Joseph James Anthony Jackson, Thurston County Prosecutor's Office, 2000 Lakeridge Drive SW, Building 2, Olympia, WA 98502-6045, for Respondent
¶ 1 John Chacon seeks reversal of an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion affirming his conviction for second degree assault and criminal trespass. At trial, the judge instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, using 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 4.01, at 93 (4th ed. 2016) (WPIC), but omitted the last sentence of that instruction, which states, "The defendant has no burden of proving that a reasonable doubt exists." See Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 30-31, 66.1 Chacon failed to object to the instruction but argues that the omission is a manifest constitutional error, which may be reviewed for the first time on appeal pursuant to RAP 2.5(a)(3). Further, relying on Sullivan v . Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), Chacon claims the error is not subject to a harmless error analysis.
¶ 2 We hold the instruction given here was not manifest constitutional error and affirm Chacon’s conviction.
¶ 3 Chacon was charged with second degree assault and first degree criminal trespass, following an altercation and subsequent arrest at the Olympia Senior Center. At trial, the State and defense both provided the court with proposed jury instructions, and the State specifically provided the court with WPIC 4.01, the burden of proof instruction. However, the instruction to the jury did not include the last sentence of the instruction, as mentioned above.
¶ 4 Chacon did not object to the court’s reasonable doubt instruction. Ordinarily, we do not consider unpreserved errors raised for the first time on review. State v . Scott , 110 Wash.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988). However, manifest errors affecting a constitutional right may be raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3) ; In re Dependency of MSR, 174 Wash.2d 1, 11, 271 P.3d 234 (2012). Chacon argues that he is entitled to review under RAP 2.5(a)(3) because the omission of language in the reasonable doubt instruction was manifest constitutional error.
¶ 5 To determine whether manifest constitutional error was committed there must be " ‘a plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.’ " State v . O'Hara, 167 Wash.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v . Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d 918, 935, 155 P.3d 125 (2007) ).
¶ 6 Some jury instruction errors have been held to constitute manifest constitutional error in this state such as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, State v. McCullum, 98 Wash.2d 484, 487-88, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983) (plurality opinion); omitting an element of the crime charged, State v . Johnson, 100 Wash.2d 607, 623, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v . Bergeron, 105 Wash.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985) ; and failing to define the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, State v . McHenry, 88 Wash.2d 211, 214, 558 P.2d 188 (1977), among others. See O'Hara, 167 Wash.2d at 100-01, 217 P.3d 756. In contrast, this court has held that failing to instruct on a lesser included offense, State v . Kwan Fai Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 745-49, 718 P.2d 407 (1986), and failing to define individual terms, Scott, 110 Wash.2d at 690-91, 757 P.2d 492, do not constitute manifest constitutional errors. This court has not yet considered whether failing to inform the jury that the defendant bears no burden to prove that a reasonable doubt exists constitutes manifest constitutional error.
¶ 7 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is well settled that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. Duncan v . Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). "The right includes, of course, as its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’ " Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (citing Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895) ). Id. at 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (citations omitted).
¶ 8 To satisfy due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of every crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ; Jackson v . Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). It is well settled that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is required for due process, but the constitution neither prohibits courts from defining reasonable doubt nor does it require them to do so. Victor v . Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994).
¶ 9 Similarly, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is " ‘axiomatic and elementary’ " and "is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v . Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (quoting Coffin v . United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895) ). However, in Kentucky v . Whorton, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not even absolutely require that an instruction on the presumption of innocence be given.2 441 U.S. 786, 789-90, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979). Instead, such failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances. Id. at 789, 99 S.Ct. 2088.
¶ 10 In Victor, the Supreme Court considered two separate jury instructions. The instructions for defendant Sandoval did not state that the defendant bore no burden to show a reasonable doubt existed. In defendant Victor’s instructions, there was a provision similar to WPIC 4.01, where the State’s burden of proof " ‘never shifts.’ " Victor, 511 U.S. at 7, 18, 114 S.Ct. 1239. In both cases, that court found the jury instructions were constitutional. What Victor makes clear is that due process is primarily concerned that the jury understands the State’s burden of proof—that the State must prove each element of each charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 11 The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments collectively require that a jury is instructed on the proper burden of proof and the defendant’s presumption of innocence, and that a jury verdict is the result of a complete understanding of those requirements. Thus, in order for Chacon to show manifest constitutional error, he must prove his complaint falls under one of these principles.
¶ 12 Here, Chacon complains that the jury instruction deviates from WPIC 4.01, which provides:
WPIC 4.01 at 93. The trial court omitted the last sentence: "The defendant has no burden of proving that a reasonable doubt exists." See CP at 30-31, 66. Relying on State v . Bennett , 161 Wash.2d 303, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007), Chacon urges that the failure to instruct the jury using WPIC 4.01, as directed by this court, is reversible constitutional error. We disagree.
¶ 13 In Bennett , the court was urged to invalidate a reasonable doubt instruction called a " Castle instruction," so named for the case that approved it, State v . Castle, 86 Wash. App. 48, 935 P.2d 656 (1997).3 Specifically, Bennett argued that the phrases "real possibility" and "every possible doubt" used in the Castle instruction are not inherently prejudicial but become so if the other words in the instruction fail to clarify their meaning. Bennett, 161 Wash.2d at 315, 165 P.3d 1241. Thus, in Bennett, the court was focused on the language "real possibility" and "every possible doubt" relating to the State’s burden of proof. We held that the language used there did not violate the Constitution but exercised our inherent supervisory powers in mandating the use of WPIC 4.01. Id. at 316-17, 165 P.3d 1241. Specifically, we stated:
We have approved WPIC 4.01 and conclude that sound judicial practice requires that this instruction be given until a better instruction is approved. Trial courts are instructed to use the WPIC 4.01 instruction to inform the jury of the government's burden to prove every element of the charged crime beyond a...
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State v. Bass
...¶ 45 Due process requires that the State prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chacon, 192 Wash.2d 545, 549, 431 P.3d 477 (2018). We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Rich, 184 Wash.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). Evidence is su......
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...the State bears the burden of proving every element of the charged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chacon , 192 Wash.2d 545, 549, 431 P.3d 477 (2018). In the deferred sentencing scheme under the misdemeanor dismissal statute, defendants are permitted to change their pro......
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State v. Bass
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...a conviction for the State without requiring it to meet its constitutional burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chacon, 192 Wn.2d at 549. this logic, defendants are essentially induced to plead guilty, relinquishing their presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial,......