State v. Chamberlin, WD

• Decision Date: 22 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: State v. Chamberlin, 872 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. App. 1994)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Andrew Luke CHAMBERLIN, Appellant. 47705.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 615

872 S.W.2d 615

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Andrew Luke CHAMBERLIN, Appellant.

No. WD 47705.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

March 22, 1994.

Bruce B. Brown, Brown & Brown, Kearney, for appellant.

Randall D. Thompson, Pros. Atty., Harrison County, Bethany, for respondent.

Before SMART, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and FENNER, JJ.

SMART, Presiding Judge.

Andrew Luke Chamberlin appeals his misdemeanor convictions of: 1) minor in possession of intoxicating liquor, in violation of § 311.880; ¹ 2) resisting arrest, in violation of § 575.150; and 3) failing to drive on the right side of a highway which had been divided into two roadways, in violation of § 304.015.3. Defendant was assessed a fine of $150.00 for the possession conviction, a fine of $250.00 and thirty days punishment on the resisting arrest conviction, a fine of $350.00 for the failure to drive on the right side of divided road. He was also fined $250.00 for a speeding conviction in the same case.

Judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

On July 9, 1992, while standing outside in the parking lot of the fire department located in the City of Bethany, Trooper Kevin Fender heard a loud noise "like a vehicle accelerating and tires squealing" coming from the direction of the nearby highway. Trooper Fender drove his patrol car toward the area of the sound and observed two vehicles proceeding westerly on Highway 136. The front vehicle was straddling the center of the roadway with the left portion of the vehicle in the eastbound lane and the right portion of the vehicle in the westbound lane. It appeared as though the front vehicle was attempting to hinder the other vehicle from passing. The second vehicle was following in the westbound lane. As Trooper Fender approached the vehicles, the front vehicle began to accelerate. Leaving the second vehicle behind, Fender began pursuing the first vehicle, reaching speeds of approximately 120 miles per hour during the pursuit. Trooper Fender testified that the vehicle he was pursuing reached speeds of at least 100 miles per hour. After pursuing the vehicle at high rates of speed for approximately five miles, the front vehicle began emitting smoke and slowing down. Finally, the vehicle pulled onto the shoulder of the highway and stopped. The driver's side wheels were slightly on the pavement in the westbound lane of the highway. Fender stopped his patrol car within a few feet of the errant vehicle.

As Trooper Fender was in the process of exiting his vehicle, the driver's door of the other vehicle opened, and defendant exited the vehicle looking back toward the trooper. All of the patrol car's lights were illuminated. Trooper Fender recognized the occupant as Luke Chamberlin. After exiting the vehicle, defendant began running. Fender yelled at defendant to stop several times but defendant failed to comply. The other occupant of the vehicle exited the car from the passenger side and also began running. After other officers arrived on the scene, the officers began pursuit on foot. The officers were unable to locate the suspects. Cans of beer were found in the vehicle.

Later the same evening, Trooper Fender located defendant at a nearby residence and arrested him. Trooper Fender noted a "slight smell of intoxicants" about Chamberlin. At Defendant Chamberlin's trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. On April 5, 1993, the trial court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment affirming the convictions. Defendant appeals from the trial court's judgment.

In the only brief filed in this appeal, defendant complains that the trial court erred as a matter of law and to the prejudice of defendant by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal as to the offenses of: 1) failure to drive on the right side of a divided road; 2) resisting arrest; and 3) minor in possession of intoxicating liquor. Defendant asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find each and every element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Failure to Drive on the Right Side of a Divided Roadway

First, defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction for the offense of failure to drive on the right side of a divided road. Specifically, defendant claims that the State failed to prove defendant operated his motor vehicle upon a highway which had been divided into two roadways. When determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's verdict, appellate courts view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding contrary evidence or inferences. State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1989). Appellate review is limited to a determination of whether sufficient evidence has been presented for a reasonable juror to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

In count III of the information, defendant was charged with "failing to drive on the right half of the road" in violation of § 304.015.3. This section provides that:

It is unlawful to drive any vehicle upon any highway or road which has been divided into two or more roadways by means of a physical barrier or by means of a dividing section or delineated by curbs, lines or other markings on the roadway, except to the right of such barrier or dividing section, or to make any left turn or semicircular or U-turn on any such divided highway, except in a crossover or intersection.

(Emphasis added). The jury instruction submitted to the jury the following:

First, that on or about July 9, 1992, in the County of Harrison, State of Missouri, the defendant operated his motor vehicle upon a highway which had been divided into two roadways, and

Second, that the defendant failed to drive on the right side of the road.

Defendant asserts that the State had the burden to prove that U.S. Highway 136 was divided into two roadways and that the State failed to do so. The State, defendant suggests, proved only that the highway was a two-lane undivided roadway.

Trooper Fender testified that the highway had one eastbound lane and one westbound lane. A center line divided the lanes. He stated that defendant was driving partially in each lane and that the middle of his vehicle was directly over the center line. This testimony was offered to show that defendant was straddling the center line on a highway which was "divided into two or more roadways by means of ... lines or other markings on the roadway" in accordance with § 304.015.3. Defendant is correct, however, that the word "roadway" is not synonymous with the word "lane" in the statutory scheme. See, e.g., § 304.015.5 and § 304.016 (referring to the division of a roadway into lanes). Further, it appears that subdivision 2 of § 304.015 was really designed to apply to conduct such as defendant's in this case:

2. Upon all public roads or highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows:

(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement;

(2) When placing a vehicle in position for and when such vehicle is lawfully making a left turn in compliance with the provisions of § 304.014 to 304.026 or traffic regulations thereunder or of municipalities;

(3) When the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair;

(4) Upon a roadway designated by local ordinance as a one-way street and marked or signed for one-way traffic.

(Emphasis added). Subdivision 3, on the other hand (the subsection which defendant was charged with violating) was apparently drafted with the end of making it unlawful to cross a median. There is no exemption in subdivision 3 for overtaking and passing a vehicle. Consequently, if subdivision 3 were violated by defendant's conduct, then any motorist passing another vehicle on a two lane roadway would be guilty of violating the statute. The ultimate guide in statutory construction is the intent of the legislature. Edwards v. St. Louis County, 429 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Mo. banc 1968). The court should not construe a statute in such a way as to work an unreasonable, oppressive, or absurd result. Tribune Publ. Co. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 661 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Mo.App.1983). The only common sense understanding of the statute, in view of the entire statutory scheme, is that defendant should have been charged with violating subdivision 2 rather than subdivision 3. We hold subdivision 3 does not apply to his conduct in this case. We find merit in defendant's contention that he was not shown to be guilty of the offense with which he was charged, and which was submitted to the jury.

An argument could be made that the failure to charge defendant under the proper subsection is harmless due to the fact that defendant and everyone else knew his conduct was unlawful, the testimony as to his conduct was undisputed, and he would have been convicted anyway since the essence of the offense under either subsection was driving his vehicle toward the left side of the road. However, no such argument has been made, and we are reluctant to deal with any such issue without benefit of briefing. Consequently, we do not reach that issue. Based upon the facts and argument before us, defendant's conviction for violating § 304.015.3 must be reversed. Point I is granted.

Resisting Arrest

Next, defendant asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction for resisting arrest. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to prove by substantial evidence that defendant knew that a law enforcement officer was arresting him for failure to drive on the right half of the road and exceeding the 55 mile per hour speed limit.

In count II defendant was charged with resisting arrest in violation of § 575.150 when defendant "knowing that an officer was making...