State v. Chamblis
| Decision Date | 12 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012AP2782–CR.,2012AP2782–CR. |
| Citation | 864 N.W.2d 806,362 Wis.2d 370 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross–Respondent, v. Andre M. CHAMBLIS, Defendant–Respondent–Cross–Appellant–Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by Steven W. Zaleski and Zaleski Law Firm, Madison, and oral argument by Steven W. Zaleski.
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent, the cause was argued by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.
¶ 1 Andre Chamblis (Chamblis) pleaded guilty to operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) as a sixth offense in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) (2011–12).1 Prior to accepting the plea, the circuit court2 informed Chamblis that the offense constituted a Class H felony which carried a minimum penalty of 6 months imprisonment and a $600 fine and a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment (three years confinement and three years extended supervision) and a $10,000 fine. Wis. Stat. §§ 346.65(2)(am)5., 939.50(3)(h)., 973.01(2)(b)8. The circuit court ultimately sentenced Chamblis to four years imprisonment comprised of two years confinement and two years extended supervision.
¶ 2 The State appealed the judgment of conviction. It argued that the circuit court erred by excluding additional evidence the State sought to submit to prove that Chamblis possessed a sixth prior drunk-driving related conviction. Had the circuit court admitted the evidence and found it sufficient to establish the alleged prior conviction, Chamblis would have faced the decision to plead guilty to the charge of operating with a PAC as a seventh offense. That offense constituted a Class G felony and would have subjected Chamblis to an increased range of punishment. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)6. Specifically, the minimum penalty for a seventh offense was a term of imprisonment that included three years confinement and a period of extended supervision. Id. The maximum penalty was 10 years imprisonment (five years confinement and five years extended supervision) and a $25,000 fine. Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(2)(b)7., 939.50(3)g.
¶ 3 The court of appeals agreed that the circuit court erred in excluding the additional evidence. It further determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove the alleged prior conviction. As a result, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence for a seventh offense.3
¶ 4 This case presents two issues for our review. The first is whether the circuit court erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment on the basis that the State offered the evidence “too late.” The second is whether the court of appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's right to due process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary.
¶ 5 We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court erred in excluding the additional evidence the State sought to submit to enhance Chamblis's punishment.
¶ 6 Although we assume error, we hold that the court of appeals' decision remanding the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence for a seventh offense violates Chamblis's right to due process. Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense. Because a seventh offense carries a greater range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of appeals' remedy renders Chamblis's plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. We further conclude that a remedy which requires Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process under the facts of this case.
¶ 7 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and uphold Chamblis's conviction.
¶ 8 On November 22, 2011, Chamblis was arrested on suspicion of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) in La Crosse. The criminal complaint, dated November 30, 2011, charged Chamblis with the following: (1) OWI as a fifth or sixth offense and as a repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) ; (2) operating with a PAC as a fifth or sixth offense and as a repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) ; and (3) obstructing an officer as a repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).4 The criminal complaint alleged that Chamblis possessed five prior drunk-driving related convictions from Minnesota for the purpose of penalty enhancement under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am).5
¶ 9 In January 2012, the circuit court granted the State's motion to amend the information6 to charge Chamblis with OWI as a seventh, eighth, or ninth offense and as a repeater, and operating with a PAC as a seventh, eighth, or ninth offense and as a repeater. The State claimed that Chamblis had two prior drunk-driving related convictions from Illinois in addition to the five from Minnesota and submitted documentation to that effect.
¶ 10 On August 6, 2012, Chamblis filed a motion challenging the purported Illinois convictions on two grounds that are relevant here. First, he argued that the two alleged convictions should be counted as one conviction because they stemmed from the same incident. Second, he contended that the State had offered insufficient documentation to prove the purported convictions.
¶ 11 The circuit court held a hearing on Chamblis's motion on September 12, 2012. The circuit court agreed that the two alleged Illinois convictions should be treated as one conviction. However, it determined that the State's proffered evidence of the purported conviction—an Illinois driver's abstract—was insufficient to establish that Chamblis had been convicted of a drunk-driving related offense in Illinois. In rendering its decision, the circuit court recognized that “we are not at sentencing” and “there could be further proof that comes up.” It informed the prosecutor that if “more evidence is supplied ... we will review it at that point in time....”
¶ 12 At the final pretrial hearing on September 14, 2012, the parties informed the circuit court that Chamblis wished to enter a guilty plea. Neither the parties nor the circuit court raised the issue of the disputed Illinois conviction. Because the State intended to request a presentence investigation report, the circuit court did not schedule a sentencing hearing to go along with the plea date.
¶ 13 Chamblis's plea hearing took place on September 19, 2012. The parties advised the circuit court that Chamblis planned to enter a guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a fourth offense “or greater” without a repeater.7 Chamblis was willing to admit to the five prior convictions from Minnesota but continued to dispute the alleged conviction from Illinois.
Accordingly, a question remained whether Chamblis would face the penalty range for operating with a PAC as a sixth offense or as a seventh offense upon conviction.
¶ 14 Recognizing the uncertainty regarding Chamblis's potential punishment, defense counsel stated on the record the minimum and maximum penalties for both offenses. Defense counsel then expressed his confusion with handling the plea in such a manner. This prompted the circuit court to inquire into the status of the alleged Illinois conviction. The prosecutor explained that he had obtained additional information from Illinois and that he planned to submit an offer of proof prior to sentencing. Defense counsel objected to the State offering the new evidence at that point in the proceedings.
¶ 15 The circuit court determined that the State was attempting to offer the additional evidence “too late.” It reasoned that Chamblis could not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea without understanding the precise minimum and maximum penalties associated with the plea. Determining that it was unfair to put off the plea date, the circuit court declared that discovery was “done.” It noted that the case had “been set for trial a long time”; that the issue concerning proof of the purported Illinois conviction “was flagged a long time ago”8 ; and that the issue prevented the parties from resolving the case “in a way that would have made more sense months ago....” As a result of its decision, the circuit court indicated that it would accept a plea only to the lower charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense.
¶ 16 The State chose to go through with the plea agreement anyway. The circuit court then personally addressed Chamblis to ensure that he understood the nature of the charge and the implications of the plea. It began by asking whether Chamblis understood the plea agreement “at this point in time,” to which Chamblis responded “I do now, sir.” The circuit court proceeded to explain the minimum and maximum penalties commensurate with a conviction for operating with a PAC as a sixth offense. Upon accepting the plea, the circuit court sentenced Chamblis to four years imprisonment comprised of two years confinement and two years extended supervision.
¶ 17 The State appealed the judgment of conviction. The court of appeals determined that the circuit court erred in excluding the State's additional evidence for two reasons. First, this court's decisions in State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 539, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982), and State v. Wideman, 206 Wis.2d 91, 104–05, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996), provide a general rule that prior drunk-driving related convictions must be proved before sentencing. Second, the circuit court “explicitly invited” the State to bring forth additional evidence of the alleged Illinois conviction prior to sentencing....
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