State v. Chance

• Decision Date: 13 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 14871,14871
• Citation: 236 Conn. 31,671 A.2d 323
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Stanley D. CHANCE

Page 323

671 A.2d 323

236 Conn. 31

STATE of Connecticut v. Stanley D. CHANCE

No. 14871.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 22, 1995.

Decided Feb. 13, 1996.

Temmy Ann Pieszak, Assistant Public Defender, with whom was Mary Miller Haselkamp, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and James Dinnan, Assistant State's Attorney, for the appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Stanley D. Chance, appeals ¹ from judgments of conviction rendered by the trial court after a jury found him guilty of both arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 ² and assault of a correctional officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c. ³ The defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) denied his request for a severance; (2) refused to instruct the jury on a lesser offense than arson in the first degree; (3) permitted a defense witness to be impeached with the fact that he had filed several lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of his treatment by prison authorities; (4) allowed the state to question him about three prior acts of alleged misconduct; (5) denied his request for a psychiatric examination in accordance with General Statutes § 17a-566; and (6) instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. The defendant also contends that certain comments made by the prosecutor during his closing argument to the jury deprived him of a fair trial. We reject all of the defendant's claims and affirm both judgments of conviction. ⁴

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At all times relevant to this appeal, the defendant was an inmate incarcerated at the New Haven correctional center. On February 2, 1993, he was transferred from a dormitory unit in that facility to a cell in the protective custody unit. At dinner hour that same day, correctional officer Tanya Mercoucheff, who was on duty in the defendant's cellblock, opened the doors of the cells in that block so that the inmates who wished to eat could proceed to the day room, where dinner was being served. The defendant, however, remained in his cell during the dinner period and, therefore, did not eat.

After the other inmates in his block had returned to their cells from dinner, the defendant set fire to a piece of paper in his cell. Several correctional officers responded and extinguished the fire. Mercoucheff then went to the defendant's cell to determine why he had set the fire. The defendant told Mercoucheff that he had done so to draw attention to the fact that the door to his cell had not been opened at the dinner hour and that, consequently, he had been unable to leave his cell to eat. Mercoucheff informed the defendant that she had, in fact, opened his cell and that it was too late for him to eat dinner that evening.

Shortly after his conversation with Mercoucheff, the defendant asked another inmate to tell Mercoucheff that if he was not promptly served dinner, he would "light the [expletive] on fire." ⁵ A few minutes later, the defendant, having received no response to his demand, set his mattress on fire. This fire, which also was extinguished by prison personnel, necessitated the evacuation of the other inmates on the cellblock and caused smoke damage to the wall of the defendant's cell.

That evening, the defendant was removed from his cell in the protective custody unit and placed in the institution's segregation unit. Later that night, the defendant gave a signed statement regarding the fire ⁶ to state police troopers Philip Pilletere and Warren Hyatt, both of whom had been assigned to investigate the incident. In his statement, the defendant admitted to having set his mattress on fire in protest over the fact that he had not been served dinner. The defendant subsequently was charged with arson in the first degree.

Several days later, on the afternoon of February 7, 1993, Mercoucheff, who was on duty in the segregation unit, conducted a head count in the defendant's cellblock. This task required her to inspect each cell visually to confirm that each inmate was present. As Mercoucheff looked through the screened window in the door of the defendant's cell to confirm that the defendant was present, she was struck in the mouth, eyes, hair and chest with urine thrown from the defendant's cell. Later that day, the defendant admitted to Lieutenant Melvin Wells, the supervisory correctional official on duty, that he had thrown the urine. The defendant claimed, however, that he had intended to strike an inmate across the hall rather than Mercoucheff. The defendant further explained that the urine had accidentally struck Mercoucheff when, coincidentally, she had appeared in front of his cell at the precise moment that he had thrown it. ⁷ As a result of this incident, the state charged the defendant with assault of a correctional officer under § 53a-167c.

The trial court, over the defendant's objection, granted the state's motion to consolidate the arson and assault counts for trial. At the request of the defendant, however, the court also ordered a bifurcation of the evidentiary portion of the trial, requiring the state and the defendant first to present all of their evidence on the arson charge, to be followed by the evidence on the assault charge.

Thereafter, trial commenced. After the state had rested its case on the arson count, the defendant testified in his own defense with respect to that count. During his testimony, the defendant stated that he previously had been convicted of eleven felonies, four of which involved larcenies, "basically" for "stealing cars." ⁸ The state then proceeded with its evidence on the assault count, at the conclusion of which the defendant informed the court that he elected not to testify with respect to that charge.

After all of the evidence had been presented in both cases, the defendant renewed his objection to the consolidation of the two charges for trial, claiming that the jury reasonably could not be expected to disregard his eleven prior felony convictions, which were admissible only in regard to the arson charge, in its consideration of the assault charge. The trial court again denied the defendant's severance request and proceeded to charge the jury, which found the defendant guilty of both charges. Additional facts and procedural background will be provided as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly consolidated the arson and assault charges for trial. Specifically, he argues that he is entitled to a new trial: (1) on the arson charge, because the state's evidence on the assault charge, which was unrelated to and inadmissible in regard to the arson charge, severely prejudiced him in his defense of the arson charge; and (2) on the assault charge, because the evidence of his eleven prior felony convictions, which was admissible only for impeachment as to the arson charge, severely prejudiced him in his defense of the assault charge. We are not persuaded.

Our review of a criminal defendant's claim of error concerning the consolidation of charges for trial involves the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conclude that the defendant would suffer "substantial injustice" if the two charges were adjudicated in a single trial. State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 721, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987). We have consistently recognized a "clear ... presumption ... in favor of joinder and against severance. State v. Boscarino, [supra, at 7211, 529 A.2d 1260]." State v. Jones, 234 Conn. 324, 344, 662 A.2d 1199 (1995). "The grant or denial of a motion for severance rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Jonas, [169 Conn. 566, 570, 363 A.2d 1378 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 1132, 47 L.Ed.2d 331 (1976) ]; State v. Silver, [139 Conn. 234, 240, 93 A.2d 154 (1952) ]; State v. Klein, [97 Conn. 321, 324, 116 A. 596 (1922) ]. Consistent with this discretion, which is broad, an accused bears a heavy burden to show that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice because of a manifest abuse of discretion in denying severance. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 134 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied sub nom. Martin v. United States, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977); State v. Jonas, supra, at 570, 363 A.2d 1378; State v. Oliver, [161 Conn. 348, 361, 288 A.2d 81 (1971) ]; Commonwealth v. Gallison, [383 Mass. 659, 671, 421 N.E.2d 757 (1981) ]." State v. King, 187 Conn. 292, 302, 445 A.2d 901 (1982). The burden includes a showing that any prejudice from joinder "was beyond the curative power of the court's instructions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boscarino, supra, at 721, 529 A.2d 1260. We conclude that the defendant has not met his heavy burden on either of his two claims relating to alleged impropriety in the consolidation of the two charges against him.

The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary to our resolution of the issues presented by the defendant's claim. Before trial, the state moved for joinder of the arson and assault charges. The defendant objected to consolidation of the charges for trial, claiming, inter alia, that the conduct underlying the assault charge was so shocking that the state's evidence of that charge would unduly prejudice him as to the arson charge, and that joinder would unfairly interfere with his right both to testify as to the arson charge and not to testify in regard to the assault charge. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection to the state's consolidation motion.

Several days after the trial court's ruling on the state's motion for consolidation, the state disclosed to the defendant inculpatory evidence pertaining to the assault...