State v. Chandler, Nos. 60594

Decision Date31 August 1993
Docket Number63036,Nos. 60594
Citation860 S.W.2d 823
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Eric CHANDLER, Appellant. Eric CHANDLER, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Henry Robertson, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David B. Cosgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

CRANDALL, Presiding Judge.

Defendant, Eric Chandler, appeals from judgments of conviction, after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the first degree, two counts of armed criminal action, and one count of tampering in the second degree. He was sentenced as a class X offender to imprisonment for a total of twenty-five years. He also appeals from the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion after an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgments of conviction; we dismiss defendant's appeal from the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, discloses that defendant and an unidentified accomplice attempted to steal an automobile. The owner's teen-aged children heard the car alarm and went outside to investigate. Defendant's accomplice was in the car and defendant was standing by the driver's window. When defendant spotted the two teenagers, he fired two shots in their direction.

The two would-be car thieves then fled in the car. Within moments, however, they crashed into another car in an adjacent parking lot. A foot chase ensued, involving the St. Louis Housing Authority security guards. During the course of this pursuit, defendant was shot in the left arm by one of the guards. Defendant's gun was recovered in a nearby trash can.

On appeal, defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his objection, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), to the state's use of six peremptory strikes to remove black venirepersons from the jury panel.

"Once a party has established a prima facie case under Batson, the other party must give race-neutral reasons for the challenged peremptory strikes ... To be sufficient the explanation need only be race-neutral, reasonably specific and clear, and related to the particular case to be tried." State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014, 113 S.Ct. 636, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). Once the state has offered sufficient race-neutral explanations for the strikes, the defendant must then show that the state's proffered reasons were merely pretextual and that the strikes were racially motivated. Id. at 939.

Trial judges are vested with considerable discretion in determining whether the defendant established purposeful discrimination. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 934. Much of their determination turns upon evaluation of intangibles such as credibility and demeanor. Id. The trial court's determination regarding purposeful discrimination is a finding of fact that will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 939, n. 7; State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 66 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988).

Here, defendant timely made his Batson challenge, and the trial court exacted explanations from the prosecutor for the challenged peremptory strikes. An experienced trial judge found the prosecutor's explanations to be valid and race-neutral. We defer to the trial court's assessment of the prosecutor's credibility and his explanations for striking the venirepersons. State v. Hudson, 822 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo.App.1991). Defendant's first point is denied.

Next, defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach one of its own witnesses with prior inconsistent statements.

During direct examination, the state's witness denied that he knew anything about the incident involving the defendant. He did not recall telling the police that he had been shot at during the incident. He denied identifying the person that had fired the shots.

To impeach this testimony, the state offered the testimony of the police officer who took the statement of the witness the morning of the incident. This testimony disclosed that the witness had voluntarily arrived at the site of defendant's capture and had informed the police officer that he had been shot at two times. This testimony also revealed that the witness had identified the defendant as his assailant.

The state offered the statement given to the police officer as substantive evidence pursuant to § 491.074, RSMo (1986), which provides:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, a prior inconsistent statement of any witness testifying in the trial of an offense under Chapter 565, 566, or 568, RSMo, shall be received as substantive evidence, and the party offering the prior inconsistent statement may argue the truth of such statement.

The only necessary foundation for the admission of the statement pursuant to this statute is the inquiry of whether the witness made the statement, and whether the statement is true. State v. Bowman, 741 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829, 109 S.Ct. 83, 102 L.Ed.2d 60 (1988).

Here, the necessary foundation was laid, and the statement was admissible pursuant to the statute because the assault charges were offenses under Chapter 565. Further, the admission of the statement was not prejudicial to the defendant, since the testimony related to the assault on the testifying witness, and the trial court entered judgments of acquittal on those counts. Defendant's second point is denied.

Finally, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to...

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4 cases
  • State v. Woodworth
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • February 25, 1997
    ...to Blankenship 's questioning of Oliver, in 1993 the Eastern District appears to have sub silencio overruled Oliver in State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). In Chandler defendant was convicted of assault and tampering in regard to the theft of a car. During direct examinatio......
  • State v. Grisby, 62074
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 14, 1993
    ...a prima facie case under Batson, the State must furnish race-neutral reasons for the challenged peremptory strikes. State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Mo.App.E.D.1993). To be sufficient, the State's explanations must be race-neutral, be reasonably specific and clear, and be related to ......
  • State v. Clay
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 2007
    ...it had fallen upon him. An expert's opinion must generally be based upon facts in evidence and not on assumptions. State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993). However, "`[a] general objection of lack of foundation does not call to the court's attention the aspect of the found......
  • State v. Garner
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 28, 1999
    ...because in so doing he met the foundation requirements for admission of such statements as set forth in State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). (3) The trial court did not err in letting the State produce evidence of prior uncharged crimes, in that they proved motive, a......
2 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 7 701 Opinion Testimony by Lay Witness
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Evidence Guide Deskbook
    • Invalid date
    ...an expert’s opinion must have substantial factual basis. Vitale v. Duerbeck, 92 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Mo. 1935); see also State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vittengl v. Fox, 967 S.W.2d 269, 278–82 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). An expert may reference publications that are not p......
  • Section 23.44 Generally
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Criminal Practice Deskbook Chapter 23 Evidence
    • Invalid date
    ...on facts within the expert’s knowledge or on hypothetical questions that include proven facts, not merely assumptions. State v. Chandler, 860 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). An expert can rely on hearsay evidence to support an opinion if the evidence is of the type reasonably relied o......

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