State v. Chapin
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38633 |
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES CHAPIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY Jarod K. Hofacket District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM John Kloss Assistant Attorney General: Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Thomas J. Lewis Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
{1} Defendant James Chapin entered a guilty plea for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23 (2011,: amended 2021), and reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress based on a violation of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. On appeal, Defendant contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence, claiming that (1) his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution was violated because the search of his home without a warrant did not fall under the emergency assistance doctrine, and (2) the discovery of a prior warrant did not purge the taint of the unconstitutional seizure. We reverse.
{¶2} We rely on the district court's factual findings in this memorandum opinion, which are not contested by the parties.
{¶3} Defendant challenges the district court's ruling that the officer's entry into Defendant's home was justified under the emergency assistance doctrine under both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. Because we determine the search violated the Fourth Amendment, we need not address the New Mexico Constitution. See State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957 ().
{¶4} When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we consider whether its findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171. We review the evidence in the light "most favorable to the prevailing party." State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We then consider the district court's legal conclusions de novo. See Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8.
{¶5} Warrantless searches and seizures "are presumptively unreasonable," subject to a few specific, narrowly defined exceptions. State v. Cordova, 2016-NMCA-019, ¶ 8, 366 P.3d 270 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The exception relevant to this appeal is the emergency assistance doctrine. See State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 24-25, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032. Under this exception, police, in their community caretaker role, may enter a home without a warrant or consent. See State v. Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 34-35, 142 N.M. 18, 162 P.3d 173. The doctrine justifies a warrantless entry when police have "a strong perception that action is required to protect against imminent danger to life or limb, an emergency that is sufficiently compelling to make a warrantless entry into the home objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 31.
{¶6} For the emergency assistance doctrine to apply, (1) "police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property," and (2) "there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched." State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008, ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 182 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).
{¶7} In this appeal, an officer entered Ms. Holland's home to perform a welfare check after dispatch received a call from Holland's sister that she had not heard from Holland in two weeks and "some people" were in the home with her and may be harming her. Under these circumstances, we assume that the officer's entrance into the home based on Holland's need for emergency aid was objectively reasonable, and we turn to the second factor of the doctrine-the scope of the search-to assess whether the officer "had some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched." Id. ¶ 38 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When police officers enter a home under the emergency assistance doctrine, they are not permitted to do more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance." Id.¶ 38 (). Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 38 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A search upon entry must be limited to the exigencies which justified its initiation." Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008, ¶ 38 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In sum, we must assess "whether the manner and scope of a search following an entry under the emergency assistance doctrine were reasonable." Id.
{¶8} In this case, after speaking with Holland, who denied anyone harming her, the officer asked the other two residents of the house, a woman and Defendant,[1] for identification and dates of birth. The officer ran the names through dispatch and discovered Defendant had an outstanding warrant. During a search incident to arrest, a baggie with what was later discovered to be methamphetamine was found. The district court concluded that the officer's inquiry into the identity of the residents of the home was limited in scope to the parts of the home that were associated with the emergency. The district court determined that because the initial concern was that the occupants of the home were harming Holland, identifying the occupants was therefore directly related to the emergency. We disagree.
{¶9} We conclude the evidence demonstrates that the officer's investigation into Defendant's name and date of birth went beyond to the exigencies that justified the initial entry. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 15. The officer was sent to the home based on concern that people in Holland's home may be harming her. The officer made contact with Holland inside the home, observed her, and spoke to her. Holland stated no one was hurting her, she explained she had medical conditions for which she was seeing doctors, and she explained she would call her sister who initiated the welfare check. Holland also told the officer to leave. To the extent the officer had concerns about a lock on the inside of Holland's bedroom door, he asked her about the lock, and Holland explained she did not lock the bedroom door. After this conversation, the emergency that justified warrantless entry into the home resolved. It was unnecessary and unreasonable for the officer to ascertain Defendant's name and birthdate and request that dispatch run a query after the officer questioned Holland, and resolved that she was alive, not injured, and able to communicate that she was safe. The officer's actions from that point forward were investigatory and therefore improper.
{¶10} The State relies on Schuster v. New Mexico Department of Taxation and Revenue, 2012-NMSC-025, 283 P.3d 288, and State v. Reynolds, 1995-NMSC-008, 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315, to argue that the scope of the search was reasonable under the emergency aid exception. We have reviewed both cases and neither support the argument that the scope of the search, once the emergency resolved, was reasonable. In Schuster, our Supreme Court determined that it was reasonable for an officer, who watched a driver of a motorcycle fall over on its side in a parking lot, to continue investigating an incident until the officer "was satisfied" that the driver did not need assistance. 2012-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 26-27. The officer was permitted to make contact with Defendant in his community caretaking role and expand his actions to investigating a DWI based on the welfare check. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. This does not conflict with our holding.
{¶11} In Schuster, speaking to the driver was directly related to providing assistance based on the motorcycle falling over. See id. ¶¶ 27-28. By contrast, in this case the officer spoke to Holland who said she was not being harmed and asked him to leave. At that point, his duty to provide emergency assistance was fulfilled. Questioning Defendant and seizing him in his home while the officer ran the warrant was outside of the scope necessary to address the emergency after Holland confirmed she was not being harmed.
{¶12} In Reynolds, our Supreme Court considered whether law enforcement is permitted to ask for a driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance when an officer stops an automobile for safety reasons under the New Mexico Constitution. 1995-NMSC-008, ¶ 1. The Court's analysis was based on the officer's statutory authority to request the documents in a traffic stop. Id. ¶¶...
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