State v. Chapland
| Decision Date | 13 July 2006 |
| Citation | 901 A.2d 351,187 N.J. 275 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne E. CHAPLAND, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
James L. McConnell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Wayne J. Forrest, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney).
Seon Jeong Lee, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).
Mary E. McAnally, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney).
A jury convicted defendant Wayne Chapland of first-degree robbery for a purse-snatching incident in which he simulated possession of a deadly weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction because it found that the jury instruction on simulated possession of a weapon failed to convey that the jury was required to acquit defendant if it accepted his version of what took place. Defendant conceded that he snatched the purse but claimed that he neither had a weapon nor threatened the victim with anything that simulated a weapon.
According to the panel, in a simulated-possession case the threat to the victim must be linked to some "object" that the defendant either displays or uses in a way that suggests a deadly weapon to the victim. The court held that because defendant contended that his threatening words were accompanied only by his moving his hand behind his back as if to reach for an undisclosed object, the link to a deadly weapon was not made. No object simulating or suggesting a weapon was displayed to the victim and, thus, the jury should have been told that it must acquit defendant if it believed him.
We disagree and reverse. The jury charge adequately conveyed to the jury that it could have acquitted defendant. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt. In a simulated-possession case, the jury may consider the combined effect of a defendant's words and conduct or gestures when determining whether the combination would suffice to induce a victim's reasonable belief that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon when perpetrating a robbery. It is not necessary that the victim actually see some tangible item that is supposed to be the simulated weapon. In this case, there was a sufficient record to support a first-degree robbery conviction based on the simulated possession of a weapon.
On February 11, 2003, at approximately two o'clock in the morning, Chenalle Lee was walking home to her mother's house from a local pub. When she was about a block and a half from her destination, defendant "ran up behind [her] and started pulling on [her] pocketbook." As the two struggled over the purse, defendant demanded that Lee "[g]ive [him] her purse." As a result of that struggle, the shoulder strap on the purse broke and Lee fell to the sidewalk. Nonetheless, as she fell she continued to hold on to her purse.
What occurred next is a matter of dispute. Lee testified that, when she fell, defendant "dr[ew] back a little bit and whipped out a knife, like a pocket knife, [and] said `Give me your purse, b*tch.'" Lee stated that defendant "wasn't up on [her] but he like pointed the knife out so [she] recognized he had a knife." Although she said that she could not see the handle of the knife, she heard the knife "click" open and saw its blade. Lee testified that she begged defendant, "can I get my license — just can I get my license out of my purse." He, however, replied "B*tch give me your purse before I cut you." Accordingly, she "tossed the purse to him," and he ran away.
Defendant was apprehended several weeks later, after Lee identified him from a photo array. In a voluntary recorded statement defendant admitted to taking Lee's purse, but he denied having a weapon. Rather, as he described the incident,
I just reached behind me . . . and I said give me the pocketbook and she threw it at me and said is that what you want and . . . when she threw it at me I grabbed you know and caught it and took off running.
The State charged defendant with first-degree armed robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a. At trial, the following colloquy took place between Officer Hebbon, who interrogated defendant and recorded his voluntary statement, and the prosecutor:
Officer Hebbon added that no knife was recovered from defendant.
Defendant testified that Lee's account of the robbery was essentially correct "[e]xcept for [his] having a weapon." During defendant's cross-examination, he testified as follows:
....
....
On re-direct examination, defendant added that while putting his hand behind his back, he "simultaneous[ly]" stated "Give me your pocketbook, bitch."
After hearing from both parties in respect of the jury instruction on armed robbery, the court gave the following charge, which is set forth in full.
A section of our statute provides that robbery is a crime of the second degree except that it is a crime of the first degree if the robber is armed with or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.
In this case it is alleged that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon while in the course of committing a robbery.1
In order for you to determine the answer to this question, you must understand the meaning of the term deadly weapon. A deadly weapon is any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance whether animate or inanimate which in the manner it is used is intended — excuse me, is intended to be used or is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim to reasonably believe it is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
In this case the State alleges that the defendant was armed with a knife. You must determine if this object qualifies as a deadly weapon, and if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used it in the course of committing this robbery.
In the alternative the State alleges that if you find that the defendant did not actually possess a deadly weapon, but instead threatened the use of the — excuse me, threatened the immediate use of such a weapon, and engaged in conduct or gestures which simulated possession of a deadly weapon, and which would lead a reasonable person to believe defendant possessed such a weapon beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, I must explain to you what a deadly weapon is. Again, I pointed out a deadly weapon is any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim to reasonably ... believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
"To simulate" means to assume the outward qualities or appearance of often with the intent to deceive. It is a feigned, pretended act, usually to mislead or to deceive.
The State does not have to prove that the defendant actually possessed a real deadly weapon, rather the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant led Chenalle Lee to reasonably believe by words and conduct or gestures that the defendant possessed such a weapon.
It is not sufficient that the defendant only made a threat or reference to a weapon alone, in other words the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only [1] threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon but [2] it must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in conduct or gestures which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant possessed some tangible object that a reasonable person would believe to be a dedly [sic] — a deadly weapon.
In this case the State alleges in the alternative that the defendant had a tangible object, that the victim believed to be a...
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