State v. Chapman
| Citation | 944 N.W.2d 864 |
| Decision Date | 19 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-1504,18-1504 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Chad Richard CHAPMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender (until withdrawal), and Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
In this appeal, we must determine whether the minutes of testimony for a charge to which the defendant makes an Alford plea can be used to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's underlying conduct was "sexually motivated" for purposes of requiring him to register as a sex offender under Iowa Code section 692A.126 (2017). If not, we must also determine whether the State's failure to introduce sufficient additional evidence at sentencing to meet the statutory reasonable doubt standard requires dismissal of the order requiring sex offender registration or whether the State should get a chance to introduce additional evidence on remand.
The defendant entered an Alford plea to child endangerment, a crime that, on its face, does not involve sexual conduct. The district court relied only on the Alford plea and a victim impact statement from the child's mother to find the defendant's criminal conduct was sexually motivated and ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender. The court of appeals determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by section 692A.126(1)(v ), and remanded to give the State a chance to prove sexual motivation. We granted the defendant's application for further review. On our review, we agree with the court of appeals that the evidence was insufficient to prove sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt. We also agree that the proper remedy is to remand and give the State an opportunity to prove sexual motivation. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
Chad Richard Chapman was charged with two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3, a class "B" felony. Chapman agreed to plead guilty to child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a ), an aggravated misdemeanor, in exchange for dismissal of the sex abuse charges. Child endangerment under section 726.6(1)(a ) does not include sexual conduct as an element of the offense.
According to the minutes of testimony, the charges originated after the six-year-old victim, C.B., reported to her mother, K.Z., that Chapman engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with her. Chapman babysat C.B. and her eight-year-old brother at his home on Saturdays while their mother was at work. C.B. told K.Z. that Chapman "did S-E-X" to her, including putting his "wiener" on her and licking her "pee-pee." She explained that the conduct occurred at Chapman's home on three occasions, twice recently and once when she was five. She later described the same incidents to investigators.
To establish the factual basis for his plea at the plea hearing, Chapman testified to facts different from those contained in the minutes of testimony. Chapman testified he created a substantial risk to C.B. by allowing her to be unsupervised with her brother after having previously found them "acting out sexually on each other" in his home. The prosecutor asked for a recess following this colloquy, after which Chapman's attorney asked "to withdraw the guilty plea and statement made in support of the factual basis and proceed with" an Alford plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Chapman ultimately retracted his factual statement, and the court accepted his Alford plea. Chapman did not admit guilt but admitted the evidence identified in the minutes of testimony would support the child endangerment charges against him.
At sentencing, only K.Z. provided a victim impact statement. The state did not have C.B. testify. When the state asked K.Z. what C.B. told her about Chapman's actions, the court sustained a hearsay objection. K.Z. then testified that C.B. had changed significantly as a result of Chapman's actions, including a general avoidance of men, night terrors, falling behind in school, increased protectiveness of her younger sisters, and that she now needs therapy. K.Z. additionally testified:
The court sentenced Chapman to a two-year suspended sentence and placed him on probation. The State asked the court to find that Chapman's conduct was sexually motivated and order him to be placed on the sex offender registry. Noting that "this was an Alford plea, so the court had to go through the minutes of testimony and any other matters that were put in the Court's hands on the date of the plea," the court found sexual motivation was established and placed the defendant on the sex offender registry. The court asked whether a special 10-year sentence placing him in the custody of the department of corrections pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.2 would apply, and the State answered in the affirmative, so the court added the special sentence.
At that point, Chapman's counsel and the court had the following exchange:
Finally, the court determined Chapman did not have the reasonable ability to pay his court-appointed attorney fees.
Chapman appealed, alleging the following grounds of error: (1) the court erred in finding that Chapman committed a sexually motivated offense, (2) the special sentence was not authorized by law, and (3) the court erred by failing to determine Chapman's reasonable ability to pay before it ordered him to pay costs.1
On appeal, the State conceded the special sentence was not authorized under Iowa Code section 903B.2, and the court of appeals vacated that part of Chapman's sentence. The court of appeals also remanded for a determination of Chapman's reasonable ability to pay as a prerequisite to ordering him to pay costs, as required by State v. Albright , 925 N.W.2d 144, 160–62 (Iowa 2019).
On Chapman's first issue, the court of appeals identified the question presented as whether substantial evidence existed to prove the offense of conviction was sexually motivated beyond a reasonable doubt. It found the victim statements by K.Z. did not provide sufficient evidence. However, because the minutes of testimony identified evidence to establish the offense could have been sexually motivated, it remanded to give the State another chance to prove sexual motivation.
Chapman applied for further review to challenge the remedy, and we granted his application to resolve that issue.
Chapman agrees his appeal involves a challenge to that part of his sentence requiring him to register as a sex offender. Ordinarily, "[r]eview of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors at law." State v. Letscher , 888 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 2016). "We will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure." Id. (quoting State v. Formaro , 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) ).
However, as the court of appeals noted, Chapman is really raising a sufficiency claim—whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the district court's determination the offense was sexually motivated. To that extent, our review is for substantial evidence. "In evaluating sufficiency-of-evidence claims, we will uphold a verdict if substantial evidence supports it." State v. Trane , 934 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Iowa 2019).
To the extent resolution of this case turns on constitutional principles, our review is de novo. In re T.H. , 913 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Iowa 2018).
Chapman pleaded to violating subsection (1)(a ) of Iowa Code section 726.6, which defines "child endangerment" as:
Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(a ). Violation of subsection (1)(a ) is an aggravated misdemeanor, i.e., an indictable offense. Id. § 726.6(7).
Iowa Code section 692A.126 in turn provides:
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