State v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 19 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 930026,930026
• Citation: 921 P.2d 446
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Quetzalcohual CHAPMAN, Defendant and Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 446

921 P.2d 446

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Quetzalcohual CHAPMAN, Defendant and Petitioner.

No. 930026.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 19, 1996.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., J. Kevin Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Brook C. Wells, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DURHAM, Justice:

This case is before the court on a petition for a writ of certiorari. Defendant Quetzalcohual Chapman was arrested after violating a Salt Lake County loitering ordinance. He was subsequently charged with one count of burglary and two counts of theft, all second degree felonies. The Third District Court denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence gathered at the time of his arrest. He filed an interlocutory appeal, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 729 (Utah Ct.App.1992). We granted Chapman's petition for certiorari. State v. Chapman, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). We affirm in part and reverse in part, holding that the officers properly detained Chapman but improperly exceeded the scope of their initial detention of him when they ran a stolen weapons check on the gun in his possession.

FACTS

Around 10:00 p.m. on January 25, 1991, Officer Todd Rasmussen, a police officer employed by the Granite School District, noticed a Jeep Wagoneer with two individuals in the back seat parked in Central High School's parking lot. Rasmussen pulled behind the car and turned on his warning lights. After identifying himself, Rasmussen approached the car. He asked its occupants, Chapman and a young woman, what they were doing, to which they responded "just talking and stuff." He then requested identification from each of them. The woman, who owned the car, produced a driver's license and a vehicle registration. Chapman did not have any identification but spelled out his name for Rasmussen. Rasmussen asked Chapman and his companion to remain in the car. He returned to his patrol car and ran driver's license and warrants checks on Chapman. A second officer, Craig Ellertson, heard Chapman's name over his radio and promptly contacted Rasmussen. Ellertson warned Rasmussen to be careful because Chapman was an alleged gang member and was known to carry a gun. Ellertson had received this second-hand information roughly three weeks earlier. Ellertson then drove to the high school to join Rasmussen. Upon his arrival, both officers approached the car, asked Chapman to step out, and told him to place his hands on his head and lean forward against the car. They told Chapman about the information concerning his alleged gang membership and likely gun possession. They then conducted a pat-down search and found no weapon. When asked if he was armed, Chapman replied that he was not carrying a gun, but at some point he conceded that he did have a gun in a small pack under the front seat of the car. The warrants check ultimately came back negative. ¹

The officers requested permission from Chapman's companion to search her vehicle. They obtained consent and searched the car. While doing so, they found a small "fanny-pack" under the front seat and, upon looking inside, discovered a nine-millimeter pistol. The gun's clip contained bullets, but no bullet was in the firing chamber and its presence in the vehicle in that condition was lawful. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-502, -504. At Officer Rasmussen's initial decision to approach the car was based on his belief that its occupants, Chapman and his companion, were on school property "without lawful business," in violation of the following ordinance:

                some point shortly after discovering the gun, the officers ran an NCIC stolen weapons check against the gun.  Also at or about this time, Rasmussen handcuffed Chapman and gave him a Miranda warning. 2  Chapman agreed to talk to Rasmussen.  Rasmussen questioned him about the gun.  The computer check revealed that it had been stolen in a residential burglary.  During this questioning, Chapman confessed to the burglary.  The officers went to Chapman's apartment, searched it, and found nothing.  They then went to the Granite School District police office and continued to question him.  The officers eventually took Chapman to the police station, where he was booked into jail
                

It is unlawful for any person to loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play in, about, or on any school, college or university grounds, or building, either on foot or in or on any vehicle, without having some lawful business therein or thereabout, or in connection with such school, college or university, or the employees thereof.

Salt Lake County Ordinance ch. 10.32.010(C). Rasmussen testified that when he encounters people on school grounds without lawful business, he generally asks them for identification, checks for outstanding warrants and, if there are no warrants, asks them to leave. ³ He occasionally issues citations for violating the ordinance. Rasmussen testified that he is not sure why he arrested Chapman but to the best of his recollection believes that it was because Chapman had violated the ordinance. Chapman's companion was neither arrested nor issued a citation.

Chapman was charged with one count of burglary and two counts of theft, all second degree felonies. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence gathered after his initial detention. The trial court denied the motion following an evidentiary hearing. Chapman filed an interlocutory appeal, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 728 (Utah Ct.App.1992). A majority of the panel held that the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 727-28. It also found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Chapman, given his presence on school property "without having some lawful business." Id. at 728. Because the court felt Rasmussen had probable cause to arrest Chapman the moment Rasmussen saw him, it found that Rasmussen could search Chapman incident to that arrest, even though the search occurred prior to the arrest. Id. at 728 n. 4. ⁴ Judge Orme dissented. He argued that the search and related interrogation exceeded the scope of appropriate detention, given the reason for the initial stop. Id. at 729 (Orme, J., dissenting). We granted Chapman's petition for certiorari. State v. Chapman, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).

Chapman raises the following issues on certiorari: (i) whether the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify his detention; (ii) if the officers did have reasonable suspicion, whether they exceeded the permissible scope of detention given the reason for the initial stop; and (iii) whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him. The State maintains that the officers had reasonable

suspicion to detain Chapman, that they did not exceed the permissible scope of that detention, and that they had probable cause to arrest. The State also argues that even if the officers' conduct was improper, that conduct was sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of the inculpatory evidence to render the evidence admissible. ⁵

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before addressing the merits of Chapman's arguments, we must resolve a preliminary question concerning the appropriate standard of review for reasonable suspicion determinations. The court of appeals characterized the reasonable suspicion determination as a question of fact and therefore applied the clearly erroneous standard of review. Chapman, 841 P.2d at 727. As our decision in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), makes clear, that standard is incorrect. According to Pena, whether a particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Id. at 939. The legal standard for reasonable suspicion, however, "is highly fact dependent and the fact patterns are quite variable." Id. at 940. The legal standard therefore conveys a measure of discretion to the trial court in our application of the correctness standard to a given set of facts. Id. at 939. ⁶

II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

We begin by analyzing whether the officers violated Chapman's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by initially detaining him for search and interrogation. ⁷ The State concedes that Chapman was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Rasmussen pulled behind the parked vehicle and activated his warning lights. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). "However, 'what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.' " Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). To determine whether a search or a seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we must first determine whether the officer's action was " 'justified at its inception.' " Id. at 1132 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878 -79). If so, we then consider whether the resulting detention was " 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.' " Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878-79); see also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 785 (Utah 1991).

With respect to the first facet of this analysis, it is settled that a police officer may detain and question an individual " 'when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.' " Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641-42, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)); accord United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581 As indicated above, reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is engaged or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. ...